A Brief Sketch of the Possibility of a Hegelian cosmopolitanism

Abstract
The following essay is an attempt to investigate the possibility of a different account of cosmopolitan thought inspired by Hegelian considerations of Kant’s ethical theory. I contend that cosmopolitanism requires the objective freedom of a common shared humanity grounded in rational self-determination and that Hegel’s outline of the state in the Philosophy of Right can be extrapolated (contrary to Hegel’s own intuitions) to describe such a global community.

Keywords
Cosmopolitanism, Hegel, recognition, Sittlichkeit, social ethics.

Introductory comments
In this paper, I want to investigate the possibility of a different account of cosmopolitan thought inspired by Hegelian considerations of Kant’s ethical theory. Of course, there is the initial and obvious sticking point to consider as, I believe, the immediate reaction to such an assertion would rightly be one of, at best, befuddlement and, at worst, scepticism and so the majority of this paper will address both why I am interested in elaborating such an account of cosmopolitanism and also why I believe there is scope to call such an approach ‘Hegelian’ in order to show that Hegelian cosmopolitanism is possible and
desirable. Unfortunately, for these reasons, the detail and structure of it will be inadequately elaborated.

Let us begin with a brief outline of what I mean by cosmopolitanism with reference to different levels of conflict:

1. an argument between a brother and sister over which channel to watch on the television (he wants to watch *Bob the Builder* and she wants to watch *In the Night Garden*, but there is only one television);

2. an argument over the pruning of a neighbour's hedge that overhangs my garden (I want to cut it, but he wants to leave it be);

3. the content of educational curricula (a specific group of individuals want creationism to be taught, another representative group thinks it is superstition and myth and teaching it would be no better than replacing chemistry with alchemy);

4. the level of tax to be imposed on an import from a specific country (the UK thinks 20% is fair on US steel, the US disagrees);

Each of these conflicts has its appropriate 'court of appeal': an argument between siblings should be resolved within the family, an argument about the use of land within the local community, educational policy at the national level and trade restrictions in bilateral state-to-state talks. Each level also has its appropriate concepts, hierarchy of values and modes of reasoning such that participants agree upon what constitutes rational discourse and what determines an acceptable solution. (So, various legitimate assertions will include: 'Ask your father to decide.'; 'My territory is decided legally by the fence...' and so
(number 4) are still well-suited to a contractual model of international relations since there exists a recognisably national will which a sovereign government can represent (all citizens would desire economic stability and growth, all things being equal, if they reasoned impartially).

However, properly cosmopolitan issues differ:

5. the use of fossil fuels in the manufacturing industry (for the industrialist it is the most efficient method and maximizes profits, for the environmentalist its negative externalities are too damaging).

What distinguishes cosmopolitan issues are their subsidiarity or the level at which a conflict must be resolved (the problem is a global one concerning issues that are not necessarily contained within the boundaries of a sovereign state) and the nature of the agents involved (at least one 'person' is to be identified as supra-national, that is a representing interests which, although shared by a community, are not identical with the government who rules that community and such a community may well cross national boundaries). Problems such as poverty, environment and the rights of minority cultures, for example, are inadequately dealt with by nation state politics because, firstly, the consequences of action are not bound by the interests of one specific state (the burning of fossil fuels in the USA and China may have damaging consequences for India and the sub-continent; the selling of arms by the UK rarely results in deaths to UK citizens); and, secondly, certain issues transcend a strict state to state multi-lateralism and necessitate a transnational, hyper-communal standpoint that will often divide the citizens of nations into different interest groups incapable of representation in the unified person of the state. Within a state, there may exist no homogeneous opinion about the environment
or arms since these are not subjects which are divided by national identity; what is good for one citizen may not be good for another (the industrialist sees environmentally inspired sanctions as punitive, the resident on the coast of East Anglia sees them as necessary).

So, cosmopolitan problems seemingly concern issues which are not reflected in any person of the nation, where no institutional authority is easily recognizable, where there is an absence of a shared agreement on how to reason and what is of import and what is not in the debate. In order to offer a viable alternative to international state-to-state politics, cosmopolitics divides itself into two main strategies: the universalist and the particularist. (Renegger, 2003) The first seeks universal consensus in desires or values that all human beings share, whereas the second, particularist strategy identifies particular communities with their own specific shared values to substitute the person of the state as a participant in rational dialogue. The former identifies the reason of Everyman, the latter identifies the reason of those affected by a specific policy or action. Neither, I shall argue more deeply below, is adequate to the task and it is for this reason that Hegel’s thought on recognition may offer a plausible and convincing third way.

However, before looking at the two standard models of cosmopolitanism and their deficiencies, it is necessary to describe when an agreement or resolution to a conflict can be said to be legitimate. In the case of conflict, resolution is reached when the participants recognize the legitimacy of the policy either due to the authority of the legislating body (the father, the court system) or due to the rationality of the dictate itself (the participant either admits an error (I didn’t realize the tree’s roots were attacking the foundations of your house) or the participant re-evaluates the content of his or her
subjective set of motivations (I see the rightness of the law which says I can cut your branches off, but I simultaneously am aware of the good of peaceful neighbourhood relations and so put aside the rightness for the sake of the good). In all of these cases, the wills of all participants have to be respected, otherwise the policy will be a form of coercion or violence. Cosmopolitan dialogue must aspire to this level of respect between participants to avoid the use of violence and might is right. So, at the heart of both models of cosmopolitanism is, oddly, the Kantian demand for publicity: 'All actions affecting the rights of other human beings are wrong if their maxim is not compatible with their being made public.' (Kant, 1991: 126)

The universalist model of cosmopolitanism is overtly Kantian (even if it more often than not rejects the strict reason-desire dichotomy) and is implicitly committed to the claim that any law or dictate that regulates the behaviour of individual agents must be based in a principle of action that is a possible maxim for those agents. Otherwise, it is coercion. So, in the realm of international relations only those principles of action capable of being universalized can be possible laws because they do not appeal to me as a particular individual, as a class, as a social role or unit or as a citizen of a specific nation. Similarly, the particularist, who disagrees that there is actually anything such as efficacious universal reason, identifies embedded 'persons' in terms of communities (industrialists, environmentalists, Catholics) and represents such interests and values in dialogues. Only those policies that respect these interests are legitimate. Behind both claims of legitimacy is the shared acceptance of the necessity (but not sufficiency) of the Kantian principle of publicity grounded in the free autonomy of the agent (even if the agent is differently conceived).
Of course, the commitment to the equal footing of all agents on the international stage undeniable jars with certain remarks of Hegel. (PR §§347, 351 for example) However, let us first return to the inadequacies of the two forms of standard cosmopolitan thinking. The first is, after all, Kantian and if Kantianism does not work it is generally due to Hegelian criticisms and, hence, Hegel is a standard alternative (much as utilitarianism is in other quarters). Similarly, the failure of the particularist approach is due to its inherent communitarian features of which Hegel is one of the ancestors. So, if it achieves nothing else, this paper may at least explain the reason why there is no Hegelian cosmopolitanism out there when it is as obvious as it is incongruous to invoke his thought.

The inadequacies of the standard models 1: The universalist

The universalist seeks universal consensus in either desires or values that all human beings share. The advantages of such an approach are that it is inclusive as well as being non-perspectival. The disadvantages are, of course, the non-existence or formalism of universal values or desires and the denial of difference to the point of exclusion. The communitarian critiques of liberalism repeatedly assert that formal right is empty and unable to supply positive obligations unless accompanied by a substantive, social account of the good, or at least a guide to how to interpret the universal rights of liberty, equality, respect and dignity. (Sandel, 1998) And these critiques are, of course, part of a Hegelian tradition in moral philosophy aimed not just at Kant but at 'subjective moralities' in general. Applied directly to cosmopolitan conflicts, we can see that these are sufficient to raise serious doubts about any universalist agenda.

First, the many kinds of duties (filial duties, local community duties, national duties, duty
as moral being, as economic unit) are not related in any universal hierarchy and the subjective will alone is unable to overcome these conflicts. (EPM §508) Nor does it seem to pay proper regard to my particular well-being as a factor in dialogue. (EPM §509) If my 'rational' duty contradicts happiness, wellbeing or elements of my substantial identity, can I truly be said to be acting from my own will if it is true that I still want what I did not do? A Kantian cosmopolitan will say that the rational self is the true self, but Hegel cannot accept that since the human is a sensuous creature, so he assumes that happiness and inclination should not be excluded by reason. And such a conflict between welfare and right will be repeated with the conflict between tradition and right: can I truly be said to be acting from my own will if it is true that I still want what I did not do? It is schizophrenic to divide a 'me' as Muslim from a 'me' as participant at the debating table and the division perfectly reflects the communitarian claim that liberalism distorts our moral experience and privileges a particular way of life. Of course, the universalist agenda, in its Kantian form, will assume that there are special kinds of duties (properly moral ones) which are not suspect to contingent features, but that claim falls to points two and three below.

Second, due to the abstract nature of the Universal Good, the conscience can endorse any content subjectively and content itself that the substantial motivation is in accordance with the formal nature of the Good. Rightness consists in 'felt' subjective conviction of the agent. (EPM §§510, 511; PR §140) Pathological examples of this phenomenon include asceticism, the Terror of revolutions and the stance of irony: '... it is no longer someone else’s authority or assertion that counts, but the subject itself, i.e. its own conviction, which can alone make something good.' (PR §140R) The drive to universalism actually resolves itself into its opposite: a subjectivism of values where the 'rightness' consists in
the assertion of the individual as individual. As such, it make will rational agreement impossible and resolution will be nothing but the comparison of intensities of preferences.

Third, the belief that the rationality of the subjective will can supply determinations for the will from pure reason is simply misguided because it is too abstract. (EPM §§506,508, PR §135) The subject is unable to generate determinations of the will out of his reflective understanding, its abstractness needs to be overcome by objective determinations; that is, the individual can only be free in an objective, moral order which expresses his intelligibility and informs his intentions as to the way in which their external nature will be comprehended by others; that is, in a moral fabric which makes the satisfaction of his rational desires and aspirations possible. Universal values such as respect, sympathy, goodness are available for the subject but how one is able to express them is relative to the substantial moral fabric which one inhabits. For example, all agents may agree the world over that respecting one’s dead is a social practice which ought to be tolerated and maintained, yet the obligations that such a practice involves may well be abhorrent to a specific culture: who is to say whether respect should be demonstrated through burying one's dead or eating them? (Herodotus, 1936: III, 160-1) At the national level where a shared tradition exists or a dominant one defines the moral fabric which is to serve as a standard and a hierarchy of conceptions of the good, but at the global level there is no single, homogeneous or historically dominant conception of the good which determines values, positive obligations and substantive norms. Hegel’s point is simply that the nature of universal moral imperatives which are derived from reason is not that they are wrong, but simply that they need to be substantial and substance comes from social practices. (PR §261A) They are reduced to the prescriptions 'act rightly' and 'do good'.
And, at the global level, there exists no immanent ordering of reasons and values by a social substance. Reasons for all, according to Hegel, can be formal values or substantial desires, but only when these are ordered within a social and moral fabric which the participants share and it is from this shared substance that they take their universality.\footnote{This may make Hegel sound like a relativist. He is not. He has a story about why certain ways of life are 'better' or 'more advanced' than others, but it does not interest us here.}

**The inadequacies of the standard models 2: The particularist**

In contrast to the universalist model of cosmopolitan reason, the particularist model echoes certain communitarian criticisms of liberal politics. The supposed person of universal reason is metaphysically puzzling, practically inefficacious and also inadequately represents non-liberal ways of life in the dialogical practice. There is a very real need to appeal to actual communities with actual interests, not abstract political entities with supposedly unified interests, in order to generate true agreement. Instead of reducing everyone to the same universal reasoner, the particularist attempts to celebrate difference and give the merited respect to all ways of life. So, in order to fully comprehend what a reason might be for a participant in a dialogue, one needs to comprehend his or her tradition, history and situation. Instead of using universal structures of reason, one uses the faculty of imagination to make a creative 'leap' into an alien form of life.

As a viable alternative to the dominant Kantianism in the discussion of cosmopolitan issues, there is perhaps more to be said about the role of imagination in deliberation. (Rose, 2007) A commitment to universal reason cannot be the whole story since it distorts...
ways of life such that the debating table is always going to weighted in favour of participants from secular and liberal ways of life. One way values can rebalance this distortion is by respecting the difference between traditions and communities, but the problem with it is somewhat obvious: normativity. The values which decide a conflict between groups cannot be purely local or intelligible only to the specific few because reason cannot be a free and arbitrary play of concepts otherwise the publicity requirement for the resolution is not met. One’s values and political judgements must be structured in such a way that they can be possible motivations for other participants in the dialogue.

The hermeneutical use of the imagination faces the problem of normativity (one cannot say 'you ought to imagine thus and so' in the same way that one can say 'you ought to reason thus and so') and the faculty of imagination can offer only conditional prescriptions of the form: 'If I were a member of your way of life, I would be required to do X', but there is no necessity for me to be a member of your way of life and, in fact, in conflict I will not be. That is to say, those values and statements which are to play the role of legitimation must not just be intelligible to all, but must be possible motivations for all. The celebration of difference and openness to other ways of life is bought at the cost of comprehension and agreement. Rational values dissolve into particular relative expressions of interests and worldviews seemingly incapable of convergence. For example: I understand that a sharp knife is a good for a serial killer because I can imagine the expectations, aims and values of a serial killer. However, I do not feel compelled to let Jack have a sharp knife just because he belongs to the community of serial killers.

**What a cosmopolitanism should be**
On the one hand, rationalist approaches overburden reason resulting in either vacuous agreement or simple non-agreement. On the other hand, if difference is respected in dialogue, legitimate agreement seems to be impossible. Resolution, therefore and in both cases, comes at the cost of violating the condition of publicity so central to the notion of a legitimate law. For a cosmopolitics to be adequate to its task, it must be articulated in terms of values which are intelligible and recognized by each community involved in the dialogue. In other words, these values must be universal without being empty, substantive without being local.

Yet, Hegel often intimates that one nation has the 'right' to decide and he does have very strong ideas on bounded traditions. So, in the absence of a shared global tradition, is a Hegelian cosmopolitanism dead in the water? One worthwhile 'Hegelian' route resides in the positive reason why Hegel offers an immanent doctrine of duties. Negatively, transcendental moralities fail and hence ought to be rejected, but that would not be in itself a sufficient reason to adopt an immanent theory of ethics. Positively, an immanent doctrine of duty is required for free human action.

The publicity constraint and recognition

Both standard cosmopolitan strategies agree that a publicity requirement ought to be met, yet believed it was to be met in different ways: the universalist in an appeal to principles that apply to all human beings (formal principles relating to universal values or desires); the particularist in an appeal to the principles which properly respect the identity of participants in the dialogue (substantial values relating to the agents' identity). Hegel's theory of moral action implicitly embodies the publicity requirement in
what he calls 'homeliness'. (EPM §503) An agent, for him, must feel 'at home', that is these values must make an appeal to the identity of the agent for him to freely endorse and act according to them. In other words, dictates of citizenship, the moral conscience and the personal will must be a felt 'good' for the agent, otherwise he or she acts against his or her own will.

For Hegelian cosmopolitanism to be adequate to its task, it ought to keep the advantages of cosmopolitan (as opposed to multi-lateralist state) reason:

i. the separation of the individual's voice from the national voice;

ii. the undermining of non-democratic governments where there is not even the weakest link between individuals and their representative on the international stage; and

iii. the representation of voices from smaller countries or minorities that are usually drowned out in international dialogues where, all too often, might is right seems to be the order of the day.

(i) and (ii) are covered by the reworking of the publicity requirement into 'homeliness' since resolutions must embody reasons that appeal to particular, subjective agents and not their representation whether this be in a rational device or the 'person' of the state. (PR §120) Reasons for the justification of a policy or agreement must be for me and not for a formalized, abstract 'me' understood in terms of supposed desires or values that can be represented either by a substantial institution (the nation state) or a rational device (the categorical imperative, the original position). (iii) is of significance because it reveals the requirement of equality between participants understood as substantial communities such that agreement will arise from reciprocal recognition. The contemporary power play
of state-to-state relations makes this impossible. But, equally, the universalist cosmopolitan agenda grants recognition only between 'unencumbered' selves or abstract rational entities. (Sandel, 1998: ch. 1) Moreover, the particularist agenda fails since recognition is obstructed by the prescription to respect difference (any attempt to say we 'share' is seen as an attempt to offer universal reasons and these distort moral understanding) and so descends into relativism. Publicity demands that a resolution must be articulated in terms of values, needs, desires, or motivations which are intelligible and recognized by each community (and hence, each personal identity) in the dialogue. Both the universalist and particularist fail because of their misunderstanding of recognition: these values cannot be purely formal or wholly relative.

At the national level, Sittlichkeit supplies the possible determinations of the individual's will from a world constructed by social reasons for actions and perhaps this will serve as a model. There exist shared motivations and obligations for the agent in virtue of his membership and his role in this institutional order and these expectations make mutual recognition possible. Hegel's novelty, beyond his critique of modern moral thought, in the discourse of normative ethics consists mostly in his concept of an immanent doctrine of duty (Sittlichkeit) which constitutes a moral and social fabric. What is relevant to discussions of cosmopolitanism is that this substratum of meanings, norms, expectations and duties that guide and regulate behaviour of individuals also acts as a requirement of recognition between subjects. Having only just met you, your clothes, roles, relationships and vocation will supply a host of information about how I expect you to behave, the transgressions which are permissible (idiosyncrasy) and the transgressions which are forbidden (wrongness). I recognize you as an agent (and not an object, an animal or child) because I perceive from your actions that you are able to act rationally over and above the natural drives and desires of your being: as a father you sacrifice your own ends for those
of your family; as a worker you prioritize your long term welfare and that of all over short term benefits; and so on. Sharing a social web of meanings and norms allows us to make this reciprocal judgement of each other.

However, such a form of recognition is problematic for cosmopolitanism since it relies on a substantial social fabric with its embedded roles, values and meanings and no such international social fabric exists. Hegel's theory of immanent ethics is based on a theory of reciprocal recognition between free beings and for equality to be granted to all participants it would require a higher, global level of moral and social fabric in order to reach rational agreement. Otherwise the participants are different in kind. Such a higher level is not extant and, more puzzlingly, Hegel's view of history seems to undermine it. Hegel's position seems to push us into relativism and difference with no possibility of cosmopolitan agreement. So, again, is the theory of Hegelian cosmopolitanism dead in the water?

The possibility of global recognition

Some sketchy comments on cosmopolitanism by Rorty demonstrate where Hegel's theory of recognition may come into play. Rorty assumes that obligations to others must be grounded in some sense of identification or a 'one-of-us-ness'. Put another way, it is the requirement of recognition granted through Sittlichkeit. On the national level, the state uses nationalism to foster such a sentiment. Hegel has quite a bit to say about patriotism and the use of war to firm up social bonds. (PR §§268, 324) So far, so familiar. Rorty, however, appeals to the imagination to broaden the horizons of identity on the basis of what we have in common:

In this account of rationality, being rational and acquiring a larger
loyalty are two descriptions of the same activity. This is because any unforced agreement between individuals and groups about what to do creates a form of community, and will, with luck, be the initial stage in expanding the circles of those whom each party to the agreement had previously taken to be 'people like ourselves'. The opposition between rational argument and fellow feeling thus begins to dissolve, for fellow feeling may, and often does, arise from the realization that the people whom one thought might have to go to war with, use force on, are, in Rawls's sense 'reasonable.' They are, it turns out, enough like us to see the point of compromising differences in order to live in peace, and of abiding by the agreement that has been hammered out. They are, to some degree at least, trustworthy. (Rorty, 1988: 54-5)

The encounter between difference is the initial beginning of the broadening of our loyalty since in forestalling or engendering violence towards the Other we have already delineated them as different from objects, animals, slaves and children. Hegel actually describes conflicts and wars as 'struggles for recognition'. (PR §351R) The other is immediately an object receptive to reasons and that already means we share something. The common feature for Hegel is the capacity to self-determine oneself. So, by entering into dialogue we have already begun a dialectic that should result historically in recognition. And this is historical progress towards some global community whereby all participants come to share a common identity that will rationalize conflicts: '... world history is the necessary development, from the concept of the freedom of spirit alone, of the moments of reason and hence of spirit's self-consciousness and freedom. It is the exposition and the actualization of the universal spirit.' (PR §342)
Conflict brings two groups together that, for the sake of rational resolution must be committed to the identification of some commonality. Two intuitive possibilities immediately appear the most sensible: a universal naturalism or a Kantian rationalism. However, neither response is convincing because the former leads to the vacuity of basic needs and desires (self-preservation, group-preservation) which will not be substantial or relevant enough for most conflicts, and the latter can only agree on formal values and not their substantial manifestation.

Neither is adequate, but a commonality considering some basic Hegelian assumptions may well bear fruit: human beings are sensuous creatures and there is no necessary contradistinction between inclination and reason. Human beings want and all human beings want shelter, food, the basic needs of a commodious life. And all human beings aspire to be rational: certain desires will have value over and above the fact that the agent wants to satisfy them. The dialectic of recognition in The Phenomenology of Spirit is a cultural narrative, whereas in the Philosophy of Right it is a personal requirement for the agent’s freedom. And recognition is granted through fulfilling one’s roles in the formal institutions of Sittlichkeit: the family, civil society and the political state proper. A human being is a family member, a consumer/producer/exchanger and also a political and moral agent. The substantial determinations of these roles are to be found in a particular state, but it would formally be difficult to imagine a human being without family ties, a storehouse of desires and producing capacities, the social means for realizing these and a standing within his or her society. Hence, although the nuts and bolts will differ (monogamy versus polygamy; matriarchal versus patriarchal; free-market versus collectivist; and so on), the spheres of Sittlichkeit can be used as a formal structure of recognition.
However, that will not be enough and the formal structures need to be substantiated for an objectivity to be granted to assertions within inter-cultural conflict. The bringing together of difference is mediated by Sameness of human-ness. Here, in a sense, is the structure of recognition in the *Philosophy of Right*:

These are the spheres of freedom in the *Philosophy of Right* and they confer substantial identity on an agent who is then able to make objective, rational choices of the will. Note that the third column has corresponding objective institutions, in the sense of being historically solidified decisions and choices of one's peers, which structure the goods, values and concepts of one's practical reason, namely the family, civil society and the political state proper. When we evaluate the actions of others, we immediately recognize them as a self pursuing ends and goods (a person), but that these goods may well have value or not (the family or other non-egoistic commitments, such as a religious community or a social class) and yet we can trust, that they will obey the overriding norms and conventions of our shared social structures because they, like me, are citizens under
the laws of the state. Recognition, or Sameness, is made possible by these structures and determinations of the will which, historically, we can trust.

An encounter between states is usually conceived of as an encounter between persons in the state of nature. Hegel's dialectic of recognition can be read as an alternative to this original encounter. Violence is very often the expression of a desire to be recognized as an equal because only by putting myself at risk can I be sure that you will engage with me differently from objects, animals, children and slaves. There will come a time when violence will be replaced by mutual recognition because both participants require it. Hegel, all too briefly, refers the encounter between states back to his own dialectic of recognition: ‘In the state of war the independence of States is at stake. In one case the result may be the mutual recognition of free national individualities (§430)²: and by peace-conventions supposed to be for ever, both this general recognition, and the special claims of nations on one another, are settled and fixed.’ (EPM §547) Freedom is common humanity and it, for Hegel, entails rational self-determination. Rational self-determination requires the recognition of one's equals. Where participants in a discourse do not share a social fabric, the attempt to engage in dialogue is the beginning of a dialectic that should lead to recognition. Cosmopolitanism ought to be understood as a history and not as a rational moment.

The progress of history is a commitment to substantial equality between all rational agents, so it must be a commitment to a universal social fabric shared by all. This decides how to reason and what is of import. However, just as the national state requires

²§430 is the dialectic of recognition in EPM.
institutions so does the international community to be fully free. Subjective social freedom, the moral conscience of the citizen, is necessary for the subject to feel ‘at home’ within his or her state. (PR §132R) Yet, if such an agent is unable to generate the ‘good’ from his own reason, he must rely on the objective freedom of Sittlichkeit as those shared meanings and values operative in the practical reasoning of oneself and one’s peers coupled with those social practices and material arrangements which make self-determination possible. (Neuhouser, 2000)

Cosmopolitanism requires the objective freedom of a common shared humanity grounded in rational self-determination. Recognition can only be granted when we are certain of one another and share expectations, values and concepts which inform our shared rational discourse. Hegel’s picture in the Philosophy of Right needs to be supplemented with another level for a Hegelian cosmopolitanism to be convincing:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Global, moral citizen</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Particular individual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationality/communal identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atomistic self</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subject</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Will</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom (negation)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
And, similarly, such determinations of the will require objective institutions to structure the relationship between values, concepts and desires. Just as the family is my immediate identity and structures goods as apart from my particular goods, so my immediate obligations in inter-cultural conflict are to my culture, whether this be a nationality or a community (the Greens, Islam, Serbian Kosovans). But there must be a mode of reflection that distances me from the immediate claims of my culture otherwise dialogue with an other is impossible and I would not be able to question the dictates of my community rationally. (‘A free state and a slavish religion are incompatible.’ and ‘Philosophy awakes in the spirit of governments and nations the wisdom to discern what is essentially and actually right and reasonable in the real world.’ (EPM §552)) There are concrete wants and needs of ‘me’ as individual identity which are not reducible to ‘me’ as social identity. Finally, there must be a role for me as a political agent in global institutions and this must be a reciprocal relationship. On the one hand, I must participate in decision making either directly or via representation and, on the other hand, I must recognize the dictates of the global institutions as an expression of my ‘universal’ goods. Resolutions, dictates and determinations must be recognized as right and not just the expression of the mightier will. We must recognize universal obligations to all human beings transcending the boundaries of our cultural identities and that requires a substantial identity as a global citizen; that is, true cosmopolitanism. One can identify a formal level of community or shared fabric for all human beings (a humanism that does not distinguish between duty and desire, but holds human beings as sensuous creatures with substantial, alien commitments) and a structure of institutions that regulate communication between the ways of life in which the individual is represented and recognizes as legitimate. What these institutions are, though, requires a whole new
part to the *Philosophy of Right* and much more reflection.³

**Conclusion**

And suddenly I have begun to sound like a helplessly optimistic utopian. Am I truly claiming history is the coming-to-be of global liberal politics and that Hegelian theory is the way we can best understand this? In the pages of *Political Liberalism*, Rawls offers two justification of the values of liberalism: one, that they are political values derived from a public reason able to form a stable overlapping consensus; and two, that Catholics and Protestants, at a certain point became bored with killing each other, and hence became tolerant by default. The modus vivendi of the values liberty, equality, respect, tolerance *et al*, over a period of time demanded the allegiance of agents over and above the other metaphysical and religious commitments of these agents because they made possible a society all saw as good. For a member of a liberal society, political and comprehensive values coincide and not coincidentally. A shared social fabric is formed out of violence and conflict that replaces the old allegiances of agents. Hegelian cosmopolitanism is consistent with a bottom-up political liberalism which conforms to the historical process rather than the theoretical exercise of reflective equilibrium. However, it seems we must await history – as the 'court of judgement' – to see what shared form of social fabric and what institutions will arise. It is perhaps this inherent conservatism that is most problematic.

³ The section entitled 'International Law' (§§330-40) in PR is inconsistent. It denies the possibility of global citizenship (see especially §333R), it refers to contract as the basis between sovereign states which exist in the state of nature and definitely delineates states as distinct entities that just happen to coexist. Much of what Hegel wrote, however, is hastily put together and extremely brief. There is, for example, a lazy, if understandable, assumption that the units of international relations will necessarily be nation states. Yet, there are enough hints at the 'recognition' (see especially §331) of states and the aim of violence as recognition (§338) to allow the possibility of an alternative formulation (and, for a little evidence, see EPM §547).
Bibliography

Abbreviations to the works of Hegel cited in the article


Cited works


Kant, I., (1991), Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch, Political Writings, ed. H. S. Reis, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press


