The workshop is in two sections. Work in groups and post answers below — I shall go through them at the beginning of next week.<\/p>\n
<\/p>\n
Liberty, and Necessity are consistent, as in the water, that hath not only liberty, but a necessity of descending by the Channel; so likewise in the Actions which men voluntarily doe: which, because they proceed from their will, proceed from liberty; and yet, because every act of mans will, and every desire, and inclination proceedeth from some cause, and that from another cause, in a continuall chaine, (whose first link is in the hand of God the first of all causes,) they proceed from necessity. (Hobbes, ch 21, pp 146-7)<\/p>\n
<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\n
- Define the theories of determinism, libertarianism and compatibilism.<\/li>\n
- In what way can a river be described as free?<\/li>\n
- What theory does the above passage suggest Hobbes hold?<\/li>\n
- Is Hobbes guilty of a high redefinition of the term or is our everyday thinking guilty of a metaphysical error concerning the meaning of the word free?<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n
<\/p>\n
Section B| The Naturalistic fallacy<\/h2>\n
I cannot forbear adding to these reasonings an observation, which may, perhaps, be found of some importance. In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remarked, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surprized to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, it is necessary that it should be observed and explained; and at the same time that a reason should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it. But as authors do not commonly use this precaution, I shall presume to recommend it to the readers; and am persuaded, that this small attention would subvert all the vulgar systems of morality, and let us see, that the distinction of vice and virtue is not founded merely on the relations of objects, nor is perceived by reason.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
— David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature<\/em>, III, 1, i<\/p>\n
The above passage has often been read to advocate the claim that it is not logically possible to deduce from what merely is<\/em> the case to what should <\/em>be the case. (Commentators disagree about the interpretation, though.)\u00a0 In other words, there is a logical gap between two classes of judgements or propositions: statements of facts and statements of value.\u00a0 It is claim about the validity of arguments when one uses a fact about human nature or the universe in moral reasoning.<\/p>\n
<\/p>\n
Do the following arguments involve an invalid attempt to derive ought from is? \u00a0If the answer is yes, show where the reasoning goes awry.\u00a0 Note that this is not a question about the truth or falsehood of the premises of the arguments (\u201cAll dogs are blue.\u00a0 Pedro is a dog.\u00a0 Therefore, Pedro is blue.\u201d Is VALID but FALSE).<\/p>\n
<\/p>\n
\n
- A human being who does not get food will die. Therefore, we ought to feed the hungry.<\/li>\n
- A human being who does not get food will. We ought to do what promotes human well-being.\u00a0 Therefore, we ought to feed the hungry.<\/li>\n
- Hurting people\u2019s feelings is wrong so you ought not to do it.<\/li>\n
- Paul gets money out of people by deceiving them. Therefore, he is a crook.\u00a0 Therefore, he ought not to do it.<\/li>\n
- You distinctly said, \u2018You can borrow my lecture notes \u2013 I promise,\u2019 therefore you promised to lend me your notes, so you placed yourself under an obligation and obligations are things one ought to do. Therefore, you ought to lend them to me.<\/li>\n
- Bob wants to win the chess game. To win he needs to move the queen one space forward.\u00a0 Therefore, he ought to move his queen one space forward.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n
<\/p>\n
Final discussion points:<\/p>\n
(1) given the interpretation of Hume offered and the above arguments, can one say it is impossible to derive normative (ought) statements from descriptive (factual) ones?<\/p>\n
(2) How does this relate to Hobbes’s attempt to redefine moral terms and foundations? Is he guilty of the naturalistic fallacy?<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
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