Mindfulness has been described by Dr Jon Kabat-Zinn as a particular way of paying attention on purpose, in the present moment and non judgmentally.Three assumptions the theory of mindfulness makes, which I aim to philosophically investigate, are:
\n1)As humans we have access to a direct primary experience free from conceptual thought, which constitutes secondary experience.
\n2)As humans we have the capacity to be impartial to our thoughts and bodily experiences, observing them from a vantage point rather than \u2018becoming\u2019 them.
\n3)As humans, we have the capacity to hold plural aspects of our experience in our attention simultaneously. <\/p>\n
The Re\ufb02ection Thesis
\nIn this model, self-awareness is the consequence of a second-order consciousness taking a discrete, \ufb01rst-order conscious experience as its intentional object.<\/p>\n
The Re\ufb02exivity Thesis
\nIn The Re\ufb02exivity Thesis conscious states concurrently reveal both the object of consciousness, and the awareness of oneself as a subject in the conscious state itself. According to this model therefore, any occurrence of consciousness involves the sense of ownership over the state, that there is a phenomenality of what it is like for the subject to have that experience. <\/p>\n
Higher-order theories
\nHigher-order (HO) theories propose the notion of a \u201cconscious mental state in terms of meta-mental self-awareness.\u201d (Van Gulick.) For these theories what makes a mental state conscious is the fact that it is accompanied by a simultaneous and non-inferential higher-order state whose content is that one is now experiencing M.<\/p>\n
1) Higher order perception (HOP) Theory
\nInner sense theory
\nThe most popular version of higher-order perception theory- the inner sense theory- holds that humans have additional inner senses and sense organs, with the duty of scanning the outputs of the \ufb01rst-order senses to produce equally \ufb01ne-grained, but higher-order, representations. This model takes basic self-awareness to be a form of inner perception, which involves two separate acts of awareness; a \ufb01rst-order intentional mental state directed externally, and an inner-directed higher-order awareness targeted at this \ufb01rst-order mental state.<\/p>\n
2) Higher order thought (HOT) theory
\nI will now investigate the second type of Higher Order theory, which holds that our self awareness is in the form of a thought rather than a perception. <\/p>\n
Actualist:
\nActualist HOT theory concerns the nature of state-consciousness. Its main proponent has been David Rosenthal whose proposal is that a conscious mental state M, of mine, is a state that is actually causing an activated belief (generally a non-conscious one) that I have M. A phenomenally conscious mental state is a state with non-conceptual intentional content, which is the object of a higher-order thought.<\/p>\n
Dispositionalist
\nOn the Dispositionalist interpretation if a subject is aware of an object, then necessarily, it is possible that she is aware of being aware of that object. According to all forms of dispositionalist higher-order thought theory, the consciousness of a perceptual state consists in its availability to higher-order thought: a conscious mental event M, of mine, is one that is disposed to cause a belief (generally a non-conscious one) that I have M, and to cause it non-inferentially.<\/p>\n
Mindfulness has been described by Dr Jon Kabat-Zinn as a particular way of paying attention on purpose, in the present moment and non judgmentally.<\/p>\n
Three assumptions the theory of mindfulness makes, which I aim to philosophically investigate, are:
\n1)As humans we have access to a direct primary experience free from conceptual thought, which constitutes secondary experience.
\n2)As humans we have the capacity to be impartial to our thoughts and bodily experiences, observing them from a vantage point rather than \u2018becoming\u2019 them.
\n3)As humans, we have the capacity to hold plural aspects of our experience in our attention simultaneously. <\/p>\n
The Re\ufb02ection Thesis
\nIn this model, self-awareness is the consequence of a second-order consciousness taking a discrete, \ufb01rst-order conscious experience as its intentional object.<\/p>\n
The Re\ufb02exivity Thesis
\nIn The Re\ufb02exivity Thesis conscious states concurrently reveal both the object of consciousness, and the awareness of oneself as a subject in the conscious state itself. According to this model therefore, any occurrence of consciousness involves the sense of ownership over the state, that there is a phenomenality of what it is like for the subject to have that experience. <\/p>\n
Higher-order theories
\nHigher-order (HO) theories propose the notion of a \u201cconscious mental state in terms of meta-mental self-awareness.\u201d (Van Gulick.) For these theories what makes a mental state conscious is the fact that it is accompanied by a simultaneous and non-inferential higher-order state whose content is that one is now experiencing M.<\/p>\n
1) Higher order perception (HOP) Theory
\nInner sense theory
\nThe most popular version of higher-order perception theory- the inner sense theory- holds that humans have additional inner senses and sense organs, with the duty of scanning the outputs of the \ufb01rst-order senses to produce equally \ufb01ne-grained, but higher-order, representations. This model takes basic self-awareness to be a form of inner perception, which involves two separate acts of awareness; a \ufb01rst-order intentional mental state directed externally, and an inner-directed higher-order awareness targeted at this \ufb01rst-order mental state.<\/p>\n
2) Higher order thought (HOT) theory
\nI will now investigate the second type of Higher Order theory, which holds that our self awareness is in the form of a thought rather than a perception. <\/p>\n
Actualist:
\nActualist HOT theory concerns the nature of state-consciousness. Its main proponent has been David Rosenthal whose proposal is that a conscious mental state M, of mine, is a state that is actually causing an activated belief (generally a non-conscious one) that I have M. A phenomenally conscious mental state is a state with non-conceptual intentional content, which is the object of a higher-order thought.<\/p>\n
Dispositionalist
\nOn the Dispositionalist interpretation if a subject is aware of an object, then necessarily, it is possible that she is aware of being aware of that object. According to all forms of dispositionalist higher-order thought theory, the consciousness of a perceptual state consists in its availability to higher-order thought: a conscious mental event M, of mine, is one that is disposed to cause a belief (generally a non-conscious one) that I have M, and to cause it non-inferentially.<\/p>\n
Mindfulness has been described by Dr Jon Kabat-Zinn as a particular way of paying attention on purpose, in the present moment and non judgmentally.<\/p>\n
Three assumptions the theory of mindfulness makes, which I aim to philosophically investigate, are:
\n1)As humans we have access to a direct primary experience free from conceptual thought, which constitutes secondary experience.
\n2)As humans we have the capacity to be impartial to our thoughts and bodily experiences, observing them from a vantage point rather than \u2018becoming\u2019 them.
\n3)As humans, we have the capacity to hold plural aspects of our experience in our attention simultaneously. <\/p>\n
The Re\ufb02ection Thesis
\nIn this model, self-awareness is the consequence of a second-order consciousness taking a discrete, \ufb01rst-order conscious experience as its intentional object.<\/p>\n
The Re\ufb02exivity Thesis
\nIn The Re\ufb02exivity Thesis conscious states concurrently reveal both the object of consciousness, and the awareness of oneself as a subject in the conscious state itself. According to this model therefore, any occurrence of consciousness involves the sense of ownership over the state, that there is a phenomenality of what it is like for the subject to have that experience. <\/p>\n
Higher-order theories
\nHigher-order (HO) theories propose the notion of a \u201cconscious mental state in terms of meta-mental self-awareness.\u201d (Van Gulick.) For these theories what makes a mental state conscious is the fact that it is accompanied by a simultaneous and non-inferential higher-order state whose content is that one is now experiencing M.<\/p>\n
1) Higher order perception (HOP) Theory
\nInner sense theory
\nThe most popular version of higher-order perception theory- the inner sense theory- holds that humans have additional inner senses and sense organs, with the duty of scanning the outputs of the \ufb01rst-order senses to produce equally \ufb01ne-grained, but higher-order, representations. This model takes basic self-awareness to be a form of inner perception, which involves two separate acts of awareness; a \ufb01rst-order intentional mental state directed externally, and an inner-directed higher-order awareness targeted at this \ufb01rst-order mental state.<\/p>\n
2) Higher order thought (HOT) theory
\nI will now investigate the second type of Higher Order theory, which holds that our self awareness is in the form of a thought rather than a perception. <\/p>\n
Actualist:
\nActualist HOT theory concerns the nature of state-consciousness. Its main proponent has been David Rosenthal whose proposal is that a conscious mental state M, of mine, is a state that is actually causing an activated belief (generally a non-conscious one) that I have M. A phenomenally conscious mental state is a state with non-conceptual intentional content, which is the object of a higher-order thought.<\/p>\n
Dispositionalist
\nOn the Dispositionalist interpretation if a subject is aware of an object, then necessarily, it is possible that she is aware of being aware of that object. According to all forms of dispositionalist higher-order thought theory, the consciousness of a perceptual state consists in its availability to higher-order thought: a conscious mental event M, of mine, is one that is disposed to cause a belief (generally a non-conscious one) that I have M, and to cause it non-inferentially.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Abigail Wilson, 2014, Stage 3<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":8792,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[201,22,123],"tags":[232,126],"class_list":["post-2130","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-201","category-abstracts","category-stage-3-abstracts","tag-mindfulness","tag-self"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.ncl.ac.uk\/philosophy\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2130","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.ncl.ac.uk\/philosophy\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.ncl.ac.uk\/philosophy\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.ncl.ac.uk\/philosophy\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/8792"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.ncl.ac.uk\/philosophy\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=2130"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.ncl.ac.uk\/philosophy\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2130\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.ncl.ac.uk\/philosophy\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=2130"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.ncl.ac.uk\/philosophy\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=2130"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.ncl.ac.uk\/philosophy\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=2130"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}