{"id":2380,"date":"2022-01-12T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2022-01-12T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/localhost\/wptest\/2022\/01\/12\/should-humans-continue-to-procreate\/"},"modified":"2022-01-12T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2022-01-12T00:00:00","slug":"should-humans-continue-to-procreate-2","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/blogs.ncl.ac.uk\/philosophy\/2022\/01\/12\/should-humans-continue-to-procreate-2\/","title":{"rendered":"Should Humans Continue to Procreate?"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>Anti-natalism and value creation: should humans continue to procreate?<\/p>\n<p>It is not worth being brought into existence if one can potentially experience<br \/>\nany form of suffering. The philosopher David Benatar argues that whilst life can<br \/>\nconsist of pleasures it also always consists of some form of suffering (making<br \/>\nliving harmful for people and the world). \u201cwhile existence brings pains as well<br \/>\nas pleasures, non-existence is a lack of pains and pleasures. While pain is bad,<br \/>\nabsence of pain and pleasure is not bad, so it is always worse to be than not to<br \/>\nbe\u201d (Brake and Millum, 2021). It means that even if life consists of 99%<br \/>\npleasure and 1% suffering then it still would have been better to have never<br \/>\nbeen.<br \/>\nAs controversial and counterintuitive it may seem to desire to stop humanity<br \/>\nfrom bringing more people into the world, it also does not violate the moral<br \/>\nlaw to live. Kant conveys strong beliefs surrounding the idea of suicide but<br \/>\nnever conveys it in a way that would take future generations into<br \/>\nconsideration. Implying that as long as the individual had not yet come into<br \/>\nexistence then one does not go against basic moral rights. It is not our duty to<br \/>\nconsider the life of potential future generations, but it is our duty to live our<br \/>\nlives once we have been born (Philosophynow.org, 2019).<br \/>\nThe arguments put forward by anti-natalists challenges common beliefs in<br \/>\nrelation to procreation and examines the roots of where various normative<br \/>\nviews stem from and whether they are adequate justifications for procreation.<\/p>\n<p>Benatar, D. (2013). Better never to have been : the harm of coming into existence. Oxford, England:<br \/>\nClarendon Press<br \/>\nPhilosophynow.org. (2019). Philosophy Now. [online] Available at:<br \/>\nhttps:\/\/philosophynow.org\/issues\/61\/Kant_On_Suicide.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Katrin Mihalova, 2022, Stage 2<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":8792,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[23,22,128],"tags":[130,131,132],"class_list":["post-2380","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-23","category-abstracts","category-stage-2-abstracts","tag-benatar","tag-existence","tag-suffering"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.ncl.ac.uk\/philosophy\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2380","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.ncl.ac.uk\/philosophy\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.ncl.ac.uk\/philosophy\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.ncl.ac.uk\/philosophy\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/8792"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.ncl.ac.uk\/philosophy\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=2380"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.ncl.ac.uk\/philosophy\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2380\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.ncl.ac.uk\/philosophy\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=2380"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.ncl.ac.uk\/philosophy\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=2380"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.ncl.ac.uk\/philosophy\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=2380"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}