With the\nelection over and the United Kingdom\u2019s exit from the European Union on some\nterms or other now a certainty, it is useful to reflect on the trade\nnegotiations that will follow. I offer\nthese initial observations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
First, there has been much talk of the option of reverting to World Trade Organization (WTO) rules in trade relations if \u2018deals\u2019 to replace the agreements to which the UK was party by virtue of its EU membership cannot be negotiated by the end of 2020.\u00a0 However, thanks to the United States\u2019 refusal to agree to appointing new members of the WTO Appellate Body<\/a>, effectively there will be no WTO rules<\/em> going forward, until and unless a future US government changes this position in 2021 or thereafter.\u00a0 Once out of the EU, the UK is effectively unprotected in a trade policy jungle, not having been able to negotiate independently of the EU, so pressure quickly to negotiate new agreements will be intense.\u00a0 Domestic proponents of a deregulated, ultra-liberal future, including (for example) further privatisation in the NHS and opening the country\u2019s arms even wider to dodgy flight capital, will make use of this opportunity. The government’s announced intent to legislate an exit from the EU at the end of 2020<\/a>, whether or not an agreement has been reached, is a first step in this process. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Second, in\nthis process the UK will be at a substantial disadvantage as it negotiates with\nentities like the United States (an economy more than six times larger<\/a>, based on GDP at purchasing power\nparity) and the comparably large European Union<\/a>. \nIt will have to offer more, in terms of market access and other\nconsiderations, to get less. And when\nanyone in an official capacity says that a particular service or health\nprotection measure, such as the NHS or food safety standards, \u2018will not be on\nthe table\u2019, we have to ask what else will be on the table instead. That is the reality of asymmetrical trade\nnegotiations, as countries throughout the Global South have found out.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Third, the House of Commons will be largely irrelevant.\u00a0 A former Canadian cabinet minister pointed out decades ago that: \u2018Under our parliamentary system, a Prime Minister or a Premier with a majority has immense power \u2026. [In] 1688 we traded the divine right of kings for the divine right of a Premier or a Prime Minister with a majority at his or her back for a period of five years\u2019.\u00a0 The new Conservative government has a large enough majority that even with a unanimous opposition, close to 40 defections would be necessary in order to defeat whatever legislation the government proposed, and that is all but unthinkable.\u00a0 Advocates for health equity concerned with the implications of post-Brexit trade policy will have to look elsewhere for points of influence. \u00a0There may not be many.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Thus, fourth, a final irony. The campaign to leave the EU was waged using the mantra of taking back control. During the process of leaving and after its completion, influences and actors outside the UK’s border will probably be more<\/em> important in terms of shaping the direction of the economy, society and everyday life than they were during the country’s EU membership.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" With the election over and the United Kingdom\u2019s exit from the European Union on some terms or other now a certainty, it is useful to reflect on the trade negotiations that will follow. I offer these initial observations. First, there … Continue reading