Alistair Clark

The Electoral Commission have just published campaign spending returns for parties who spent over £250,000 in the Scottish and Welsh Parliament elections of 2021. These elections were conducted during the COVID-19 pandemic. UKRI-funded research by Toby James, Erik Asplund and colleagues at International IDEA and myself has shown that pandemic circumstances impacted the way in which parties have campaigned since February 2020.

Expectations of campaigns were driven by the need to maintain social distancing and the prospect of campaigning contributing to the spread of the virus being uppermost among concerns. One study of 18 of Donald Trump’s campaign rallies estimated that there had been an additional 250 COVID-19 cases per 100,000 residents of the locality where they were each held, which was extrapolated to more than 30,000 incremental confirmed cases, and more than 750 deaths, not necessarily among attendees.

The expectation in the various elections taking place in Britain in May 2021 – scheduled Scottish and Welsh elections and postponed English local government, PCC and mayoral elections – was that in-person events would be minimal, and that traditional door-knocking canvassing and GOTV activity would be heavily restricted by limitations on movement, association and visiting households. Instead, mailings, online campaigning and more media work by senior party leaders was likely to fill the gap. What effect this would have on turnout was unknown, although our research with IDEA had shown a general decline in turnouts in COVID-era elections, albeit not universally and with variations.

Patterns of Campaign Spending

In both Scotland and Wales, the total amount spent increased somewhat, within the bounds of the campaign spending limits set in electoral law for both institutions. In Scotland, spending increased by around £1.7m to just over £5m in total. In Wales, total campaign spending across all parties grew by around £550,000 to just over £1.8m. What is of interest here is not spend by parties, something to be examined in due course but which requires considerable work to analyse. Instead, what is of interest here is analysis by category of spending as regulated by and reported to the Electoral Commission, with a view to examining if any patterns can be detected which might have been related to the need to change campaign techniques due to COVID-19.

Figures 1 and 2 show patterns of spending in both the 2016 and 2021 Scottish parliament and NAW/Senedd elections. Data come from Electoral Commission spending returns, while the analysis is mine alone. In Scotland the amount spent on unsolicited mail to electors (e.g. direct mail) accounted for more than £1m of the overall increase in campaign spending. Media spending increased more than ten-fold from £7,559, to £95,864, while transport spending increased three-fold from around £48,000 in 2016 to £157,000 in 2021. Spending on rallies and events remained the same at around £70,000 while that on manifesto material almost halved to £36,256. In Wales, unsolicited material spending increased by around 60% to just under £1.1m, while spending on advertising tripled to £365,748. Spending on rallies and events by contrast fell to only £2,563 from around ten times that five years earlier.

Older Methods Prevailed Over Newer?

Causation is difficult to show, not least since in Scotland this election was highly motivated by the issue of Scottish independence, and the Unionist parties appear to have spent considerably more than in 2016. Nonetheless, these appear suggestive patterns in line with the more remote campaigning expected during COVID circumstances. More analysis is of course required. However, it is important to note that rather than the much hyped online and social media campaigns that might have been expected to take much of the strain during the pandemic, this seems to show that it is the older, tried, tested and reliable methods of direct and unsolicited mail and material that seem to have been increased under these challenging campaign conditions in Scotland and Wales in the most recent devolved elections.   

The current Elections Bill before parliament contains a range of measures which require careful consideration. Among the most concerning are steps which appear designed to limit the independence of the Electoral Commission. Among these are proposals to amend the role of the chief accountability mechanism for the Commission, the Speaker’s Committee on the Electoral Commission.

The Speaker’s Committee is a statutory body, established by PPERA (2000). It’s membership includes the Speaker of the House of Commons, the Chair of the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee (PACAC), a Cabinet Office Minister, and various opposition members. It currently comprises nine members. Five of these are currently Conservative, with two Labour and one SNP member plus the Speaker. This means that for the first time, the Committee has a single party majority on it. Three of those Conservative members – Karl McCartney, Luke Hall and Craig McKinley – were investigated, and either acquitted or cleared, for elections expenses infractions in the aftermath of the 2015 general election.

The Elections Bill proposes two main things with regard to the Speaker’s Committee. Firstly, the Bill seeks to set out what it calls a ‘Strategy and Policy Statement’ for the Electoral Commission. The Speaker’s Committee’s functions are to be amended to allow it to hold the Electoral Commission accountable for its performance against this ‘Strategy and Policy Statement’. Critics have seen this as an attempt to impinge upon the Commission’s independence, and the Commission itself put out a statement indicating that what was being proposed would ‘place a fetter on the Commission which would limit its activity’.

The second proposal is for the Minister for the Constitution to attend Speaker’s Committee meetings. This is presented in the Bill’s Explanatory Notes (paras 55 & 56) as necessary because the Minister for the Cabinet Office named in the legislation often cannot attend meetings. Therefore, the Minister who in practice acts in this area should be able to attend instead. It should be noted however that the Bill makes a virtue out of parliamentary accountability of the Electoral Commission. It is arguable that ministerial attendance at such an important regulatory committee should have no place in parliamentary accountability to begin with, not least since the independence of the electoral regulator is at stake.

I would like to make an alternative suggestion for reform of the Speaker’s Committee. I first made this suggestion in oral evidence to PACAC’s inquiry into the Electoral Commission on 9th March, and followed it up with supplementary written evidence. This can be found here. At that session, we discussed how opaque the Speaker’s Committee’s processes are, and concern over the Committee having a single party majority for the first time.

It is crucial to note that while political parties are well represented on the Speaker’s Committee, the voters’ voice is notably absent from much of the parliamentary accountability around the Electoral Commission. This is a major oversight. Voters are major stakeholders in the Commission’s work. To address this, my recommendation is that:

the Speaker’s Committee on the Electoral Commission is complemented by the addition of several Lay Members (3-5), with voting rights, to represent the views of voters in electoral processes and in oversight of the Electoral Commission.

Following good regulatory practice in other sectors, the inclusion of Lay Members has already become accepted standard practice in parliamentary oversight of bodies regulating political behaviour in the House of Commons. For example, the Speaker’s Committee for the Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority (SCIPSA), has three Lay Members, while the House of Commons Committee on Standards has five Lay Members. Lay Members on both committees now have full voting rights. Crucially, this has helped counter the suggestion that parliamentarians are ‘marking their own homework’ on these committees.

The inclusion of Lay Members on the Speaker’s Committee for the Electoral Commission would go some way to addressing similar concerns around the Electoral Commission, while also helpfully ensuring that voters’ voices can be clearly heard in the accountability process.

Dr Alistair Clark is Reader in Politics at Newcastle University. His research examines the regulation of politics and political behaviour, electoral integrity and political parties. He is the author of Political Parties in the UK (2e), and he tweets at @ClarkAlistairJ

Estimated reading time: 10 minutes

Voting is a basic democratic right. But while many countries have put special measures in place to enable people with COVID-19 and those self-isolating to vote, some have made it impossible for them to do so. Erik Asplund, Bor Stevense (International IDEA), Toby James (University of East Anglia) and Alistair Clark (Newcastle University) look at the different approaches taken by countries holding elections in 2020. Those with elections in 2021 need to act now.

Belize’s prime minister recently warned that people with COVID-19 or self-isolating would not be able to vote in the general election in November, as they had to stay at home. Yet the right to vote in an election is an essential part of the democratic process. International standards on elections (see pages 33-5) and democratic theorists attest that everyone should be equal before the ballot box. Democracy should be the greater leveller, irrespective of voters’ physical or mental health on polling day.

In practice, however, people often face inequalities in accessing elections, even in more normal circumstances. Citizens with disabilities might find barriers such as the absence of ramps at polling stations or being unable to travel on election day because of short- and long-term sickness. Measures to make elections more accessible for citizens with disabilities are therefore often prescribed in electoral law, such as remote voting, accessible polling stations, or the provision of braille ballot papers. Elections need inclusive voting practices in place to overcome these problems.

The COVID-19 pandemic has brought these questions sharply to the forefront and presented an unprecedented challenge in delivering accessibility at the ballot box. The virus has led to the severe illness of many people around the world on their election day, with 40 million confirmed cases worldwide, and numbers rising fast. Millions more have been caring for family or friends or have been quarantined within their households if they or a family member has been infected.

The propensity of the virus to fall unevenly on populations means that it can also fall unevenly on electoral participation. The virus does discriminate. It is thought to be more of a threat for citizens who have underlying health conditions, such as lung or heart disease, diabetes or conditions that affect their immune system – as well as those over 60. These citizens and their family members may therefore think more than twice about visiting a polling station in person. Elections involve the movement of millions of people on election day – elections staff, candidates and voters – and therefore are an opportunity for the disease to spread.

Inaccessible elections and disenfranchisement

There is a real risk quarantined (or other risk groups) will be disenfranchised. In some states, people diagnosed with COVID-19 are not allowed to vote due to restrictions on their freedom of movement as part of the government’s regulations and laws to reduce the spread of infection (see Table 1). Belize’s PM insisted that people with COVID-19 or in isolation would not be allowed to vote during the general election on 11 November as it was against the law, and that extending proxy voting for COVID-19 patients would not be possible. “If you are COVID positive,” he said, “you are supposed to be in quarantine either at a government facility or at your own home.”

Belize is not the only country where citizens could be disenfranchised. In Singapore, citizens under a quarantine order, stay-home notices, or diagnosed with acute respiratory infection were not allowed to vote. Had they left their home they would have been in breach of Singapore’s Infectious Diseases Act. Similarly, in Taiwan, people under isolation or quarantine at home were prohibited from going and casting their vote as this would go against the Taiwan Communicable Disease Control Act. Meanwhile, in Chile’s constitutional referendum on 25 October, people with COVID-19 will be sanctioned if they vote. Chile has reported 490,003 cases since March 2020. As of 7 October, 14,000 voters over the age of 18 will be disenfranchised, as no special voting arrangements exist in the country.

The lack of special voting arrangements proved not only a danger to democracy, but unconstitutional in Croatia. The electoral management body was initially not planning to allow infected people to vote, saying that “more lenient measures would put citizens’ health at risk”. However, this decision was ultimately overruled by the Croatian Constitutional Court, which allowed COVID-19 positive voters to vote by proxy.

Enabling people with COVID-19 to vote

The good news for democracy is that many of the 74 countries and territories that have held elections since late February 2020 have adopted new health and safety measures for voters and polling officials in collaboration with national health authorities. Ways of enabling people with COVID-19 or who are quarantined to vote cluster into five main clusters (see Table 1). These methods typically centre around postal voting, proxy voting, home and institution-based voting, or arrangements within the polling station, depending on what voting channels exist in the electoral law.

Table 1: Special voting arrangements used to facilitate voting for people with COVID-19 or under quarantine, by country

Note: Countries included more than once in the table offered more than one method. Countries that have a star * offered voting methods to people under quarantine only.
Source: Authors, constructed using International IDEA, media reports and EMB data

Postal voting is one obvious mechanism. This was made available for people diagnosed with COVID-19 during parliamentary elections in South Korea in April. Alternatively, in June, ahead of parliamentary elections in North Macedonia, people with COVID-19 or under quarantine could cast their votes from home via mobile voting teams accompanied by a doctor wearing personal protective equipment (PPE). In Spain, during the regional election in Galicia and Basque, voters with COVID-19 who were required to isolate could either postal vote or proxy vote, but were forbidden from voting in person. In New Zealand, voters in quarantine or isolation could vote by telephone ahead of the 18 October general elections.

Some countries adopted arrangements in polling stations to accommodate in-person voting for people with COVID-19 or under quarantine. Citizens with mild cases of COVID-19 in South Korea could cast their ballot at one of eight “special early voting polling stations” established at care centres for COVID-19 patients across the country. Meanwhile, in Jamaica, citizens with COVID-19 could vote during on election day between 4pm and 5pm at polling stations provided that they notified their health ministry and that they wore a mask, gloves, protective shield and gown. They also needed to be accompanied by a driver who was also required to wear PPE. Early in the pandemic, Israel established special medically-supported polling stations with full PPE and screens for quarantined voters.

In Sri Lanka, people in quarantine were only allowed to vote at designated polling booths between 4 and 5 pm if they had received permission from health authorities and completed the first 14 days of the quarantine. In the end, this disenfranchised about 500 people who had not met that requirement. This arrangement was implemented only after an unsuccessful attempt by the EMB to introduce advanced voting for people under quarantine as a new voting method. For the Senate election in the Czech Republic on 2-3 October 2020, voters with severe medical conditions and those ordered to quarantine or isolate had several voting channels, which included drive-in voting (essentially, voters would vote from their car at specific polling stations), in-person voting at a special polling station or to vote from home by requesting a mobile polling team.

The ‘new normal’

COVID-19 is not going away soon. During the last month, several European countries have experienced a resurgence as the number of confirmed cases globally increases at a rate of 230,000-400,000 cases per day in the past month. Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, the Head of the World Health Organisation, has said that he hopes that the pandemic will be over in under two years. A leading manufacturer of one of the COVID-19 vaccines in development has suggested that global inoculation will take until the end of 2024.

So electoral commissions and administrators should take a long-term view of the pandemic and how it may affect access to vulnerable groups and those with COVID-19 or under quarantine. New voting methods typically need to be agreed and legislated for between six months and one year before elections occur to uphold the principle of electoral law stability. Modifications to existing voting methods and arrangements in polling stations that facilitate access may be able to be done more quickly, provided that they are deemed fair, safe and secure by all stakeholders.

This means introducing measures to stop the wider spread of the disease, not just for those infected with COVID-19. They could include social distancing, access to hand sanitizers, disinfection of surfaces and voting materials, regular ventilation of facilities and access to PPE. New arrangements in polling stations that some countries have implemented include temperature checks, one-way systems for entry and exit, extended voting hours, providing individual pencils or allowing voters to use their own, and limits to the number of people allowed to be inside the polling station. Temporary polling booths for voters identified with respiratory symptoms have been introduced in Malaysia, South Korea and Russia.

Many countries have scaled up special voting arrangements (SVA) and encouraged citizens to vote early, remotely or through postal votes to reduce crowds on election day and lower infection risk. Some states have modified SVA to make it easier for citizens to vote. Notable examples include Russia, which extended advance voting and remote internet voting to around 1 million people during the constitutional referendum on 1 July 2020; Germany, which introduced 100% postal voting during a local election in Bavaria; and France, which simplified proxy voting ahead of local elections in June 2020.

Just as disabled citizens may need help to vote, the pandemic demands proactive steps to ensure accessibility and future-proof elections to make them accessible post-pandemic. EMBs should continue working closely with health authorities, and use this experience in order to encourage countries to make their elections more accessible under normal circumstances. For that to happen, political parties must play a part too.

Views expressed in this commentary are those of the authors, one of whom is a staff member of International IDEA, and not those of the COVID-19 blog, nor LSE. This commentary is independent of specific national or political interests. Views expressed do not necessarily represent the institutional position of International IDEA, its Board of Advisers or its Council of Member States.

About the author

Erik Asplund

Erik Asplund is a Programme Officer in the Electoral Processes Programme, International IDEA. He is currently managing the Global Overview of COVID-19: Impact on Elections project. Other focus areas include Electoral Risk Management, Financing of Elections and Training in Electoral Administration with an emphasis on BRIDGE and Electoral Training Facilities.

Bor Stevense

Bor Stevense is a second year Masters student at the University of Uppsala for the Peace and Conflict Studies programme, currently doing an internship at International IDEA.

Toby S James

Toby S. James is Professor of Politics and Public Policy in the School of Politics, Philosophy, Language and Communication Studies at the University of East Anglia. His most recent books are Comparative Electoral Management (Routledge, 2020) and Building Inclusive Elections (Routledge, 2020). He is co-convenor of the Electoral Management Network.

Alistair Clark

Alistair Clark is Reader in Politics at Newcastle University. He has written widely on electoral integrity and administration, electoral and party politics. He is author of Political Parties in the UK, 2e (Palgrave 2018). He tweets at @ClarkAlistairJ.

This Blog was first published on the LSE COVID-19 Blog on 23rd October 2020

This Blog was first published: 16 September 2020 by Centre on Constitutional Change

Tags: Oxford Handbook

Alistair Clark, Newcastle University, discusses small parties in Scotland since devolution for his chapter in the Oxford Handbook of Scottish Politics arguing that smaller parties will be a permanent presence in Scottish politics even if their fortunes vary. 

Scottish political history has seen a number of small organisations. Some of these are launched amid fanfare, such as the Highlands and Islands Alliance in 1999 or RISE in 2016, but fail to meet (normally unrealistic) expectations. Others such as the Scottish Greens prove more robust and long-lived, going on to have electoral, parliamentary and public policy impacts, and, in Robin Harper MSP, electing the first ever Green representative to any institution in the UK.

Small parties have had well-known figures as figureheads. Tommy Sheridan may have been eventually discredited for the Scottish Socialist Party (SSP), but he got considerable attention. But who remembers which footballing giant was associated with the Scottish Senior Citizens Unity Party (SSCUP)? None other than Caesar himself, Lisbon Lion Billy McNeill, Celtic great and, at one point during the 1980s, Aberdeen manager.

The chapter asks who these smaller parties are, what challenges they pose for party and electoral scholars, before considering their broader effects. The first part of the chapter begins with theoretical issues, asking how these parties can be classified and identified. It discusses different types of small parties, and asks if size is their defining characteristic, whether this means they are unlikely to have much influence.

The second part focuses on specific smaller parties that have had some success. These include the Greens, the SSP, SSCUP and, more recently, UKIP. This section also covers the Scottish Liberal Democrats. While the Liberal Democrats had considerable influence in the first two Scottish parliament terms, the party would nevertheless be classified as a small party by virtually all the measures used in comparative politics.

There is also brief discussion of the Scottish tradition of independent politics in local government, and the independents that have been elected to Holyrood – Dennis Canavan, Margo MacDonald, and Dr. Jean Turner.

The final part of the chapter discusses the place of smaller parties in the Scottish party system.

Explaining Success  

Why has Scotland been fertile ground since devolution for small parties? One answer is in the additional member electoral system (AMS) used for Scottish parliament elections. Small parties are unlikely to have constituency candidates elected. They primarily focus on the proportional regional lists and can be elected to represent that region with around 6-7% of the vote.

A further contributory factor is that traditional party loyalties have weakened considerably. This means that the two-tier AMS gives voters the opportunity to split their tickets – voting for one party in the constituency, another in the regional list. The 2011 Scottish election study estimated around 16.7% of respondents cast a vote for small parties, 7% explaining this as a tactical vote and 5% as being a second preference. The electoral system has changed the electoral opportunity structure and less loyal and ticket-splitting voters taking advantage of those opportunities are a key element in explaining small party success.

Small parties often push at the boundaries of political debate, bringing to the fore issues which are not represented by larger parties. Research suggests that parties drawing on a specific political tradition are more likely to have a lengthy lifespan than those which result from splits in other organisations or which do not draw on such embedded traditions. Thus, the Greens’ appeal based on the established environmental cleavage, coupled with left-wing social justice and pro-independence views has given them a degree of sustainability over the longer term. Similarly, and although much diminished since 2011, the Liberal Democrats continue to draw on the long tradition of Liberalism in parts of Scotland. By contrast, SSCUP had potential to appeal to an ageing electorate, but had an unclear profile that could not draw on such an historic political tradition, while the space for a party such as UKIP to develop in Scotland, where the political debate was very different to that of its heartlands in parts of England, was extremely limited.

Strategies and Prospects

In addition to raising new issues for debate and standing for election, there are three main strategies small parties can adopt to ensure some degree of influence if elected. They can form a coalition with a larger partner. They can offer support on an issue-by-issue basis, particularly on critical votes. Or they can seek to influence debate and legislation more generally. All of these have been evident in Scotland. The Liberal Democrats’ two coalitions with Labour between 1999-2007 saw the Liberal Democrats do well out of their participation in government, and, interestingly, provide contrary evidence to the idea that smaller coalition partners suffer politically and electorally from their coalition experience. The Greens have provided support for minority SNP administrations on numerous occasions, receiving concessions that have enabled budgets to be passed and voting for the investiture of Nicola Sturgeon as First Minister in 2016. They have also voted with the SNP on issues around independence and section 30 orders.

From the very earliest days of the parliament, Robin Harper was able to raise the profile for environmental issues for the Greens thereby forcing other parties to also consider them, and Tommy Sheridan’s 2001 private members bill on warrant sales was a piece of significant legislation on debt collection in Scotland.          

What are the prospects for small parties in 2021? The Liberal Democrats and Greens will continue to draw on their established political traditions, and with geographically-rooted support, will continue to win seats. Most expectations have been around the potential for a new pro-independence organisation to put pressure on the SNP and, supposedly, maximise the pro-independence vote. Such a party would also be competing against the Greens who are also pro-independence. Strategically, some may see opportunities in the electoral system. But even mainstream parties with more experience of targeting fail to maximise their vote where it matters. With limited organisation and targeting experience, such a new party would almost inevitably fail to do so. It would be unlikely to reach the 6-7% threshold in regional lists, and is more likely to take votes from the SNP and Greens, potentially limiting their prospects in places.     

Small parties are important actors in Scottish politics. They had maximum visibility in the ‘rainbow parliament’ between 2003-2007, with 6 SSP and 7 Green MSPs. However, Holyrood has had small party, and independent, representation throughout its history. Circumstances in each election will vary. Consequently, small parties are likely to have fluctuating fortunes but continue to be a permanent presence in Scottish politics even post-2021.           
 

Dr. Alistair Clark is Reader in Politics at Newcastle University. His research has focused on small parties, party systems and party organisation in Scotland and elsewhere. He has written widely about electoral reform in Scottish local government, and is currently researching aspects of electoral integrity and conduct. He tweets at @ClarkAlistairJ     

‘Smaller Parties’ Was published in The Oxford Handbook of Scottish Politics in August 2020 in the UK and Europe by the Oxford University Press.

Electoral officials need more money to run elections during Covid-19

Erik Asplund, Toby James and Alistair Clark audit the additional costs countries are facing to run safe and accessible elections during the Covid-19 pandemic. They argue it is vital that election management is sufficiently well funded during this crisis to maintain voter participation and trust in electoral outcomes.

Picture courtesy of the Republic of Korea National Election Commission

Money matters for elections. Those candidates and parties who have most in their election treasure chest are able to invest more on the campaign trail. But less well-known is that money also matters for the smooth running of elections.

Elections are not cheap. They involve employing thousands of temporary staff, hiring premises and producing huge volumes of election material. The difficulty for democracy is that, as recent comparative research on the funding of elections shows, electoral officials often face challenges receiving sufficient funds. Focus groups of electoral officials reveal that common problems include little awareness of the need for investment in election funding, so proactive lobbying by election administrators is often needed. Short-term responses to election funding make elections more expensive because it leaves contractors with a stronger bargaining position, leading to higher prices. Procurement and administrative processes do not fit with the political realities of snap elections. Meanwhile, unforeseen costs rack up because of unexpected events but rising expectations from citizens about quality of service.

The rising election costs because of Covid-19

Elections have often seen rising costs, but these financial challenges have increased in scope due to the Covid-19 pandemic. This is primarily because of costs related to risk mitigation measures, which include both health and safety and special voting arrangements. Countries that have held national or subnational elections during the pandemic, including Australia, the Dominican Republic, France, Mongolia, Poland, Russia, Singapore, South Korea and the USA, have purchased personal protective equipment (PPE) such as face shields, medical gloves and protective clothing for polling officials and sometimes masks and/or vinyl gloves for voters. These have often been acquired at very short notice in accordance with guidelines provided by health authorities. For polling stations or voter registration centres, electoral management bodies have also needed hand sanitisers, sanitising tissues, contactless thermometers, plexiglass screens and tape rolls. Some countries have also seen increased use of special voting arrangements which includes early voting (South Korea), postal voting (Styria/Austria, Bavaria/Germany, several states in the USA and Poland), mobile box voting (Singapore) and proxy voting (France) in order to reduce crowds on election day and so lower the risk of infection. These arrangements, including additional staff, facilities and materials, have undoubtedly increased the cost of elections in each country.

Costs are notoriously difficult to extract on the running of elections, leading to alternative measures being used. However, raw costs are still illustrative and important. Table 1 provides a summary of some of the publicly stated estimates of the additional costs for running elections, converted to US dollars. It shows a considerable hike in the investment needed – which varies according to the extent that additional measures are necessary (and purchasing parity).

Source: Authors, constructed using media reports and EMB data

Ahead of 3 November 2020, there has been considerable global interest in the US Presidential elections. Here, state election commissions are facing shortages of funds to recruit additional poll workers and purchase election materials. Meanwhile postal voting, which is an important safety measure to help reduce crowds on election day and thereby the risk of infection, can cost more. Recent primary elections in the US state of Kentucky were held both in person and through postal voting. State officials are estimating that the cost of running them may have been US $12 million instead of US $9 million, with the increased costs associated with extra staff needed to count votes as well as materials needed (postage and printing). Election boards in Georgia and Ohio – both of which reported increased election expenses during primary elections – are also seeking additional funds for forthcoming elections including the November Presidential election. The Federal coronavirus stimulus legislation (CARES Act) has earmarked some funds for US elections and the US Congress has set aside US $400 million for the election in a bill passed in March 2020. But the Brennan Center has since advocated for more funding (quoted in Table 1). Also the US $3.6 billion election package which is part of a larger economic bill has come to a standstill in the US Senate.

Beyond the USA, other election management bodies have also requested increased funding from central or local governments. For example, the Australian Capital Territory election commission has requested an extra AUD 2.3 million (US $1.6 million) to organise the 16 October 2020 ACT legislative assembly elections. Funds would pay to expand early voting arrangements from five early voting centres to 15 centres with extended staff hours for a period of 20 days as well as public information campaigns about the benefits of early voting. The Central Election Commission of Ukraine has requested from the government and parliament some UAH 1.252 billion (US $46,000,000) in additional funding to hold the October 2020 local elections. The National Election Commission of Sri Lanka believes that the July 2020 parliamentary election will cost between six and seven billion rupees (US $32–37 million) extra, in which 1 billion (US $5,332,530) will be spent on hand sanitisers and additional works. Rp 1.4 trillion (US $98.78 million) in extra funding has been requested for the the 2020 simultaneous regional elections in Indonesia. In Thailand, local elections scheduled for 2020 may suffer further delays as the funds earmarked to finance the election have been shifted to fight the pandemic.

South Korea provides an example that has already held elections during the pandemic from which we can draw considerable lessons. In April 2020, its National Election Commission (NEC) organised a parliamentary election that resulted in an historically high 66.2% voter turnout (with 29.12 million ballots cast). The NEC implemented a range of health and safety measures and expanded early voting arrangements in order to allow a larger number of people to vote before election day irrespective of their residence. Preliminary estimates suggest that the cost of the parliamentary national election was 226.7 billion Korean won (US $189 million), compared with the 203.4 billion Korean won (US $170 million) for the 2016 parliamentary election. The increased costs were attributed to 1) inflation; 2) an increase of eligible voters from 42,056,325 to 43,968,199; and 3) measures related to Covid-19, in particular personal protective equipment (PPE). Covid-19 measures alone came to 20 billion Korean won (US $16 million), which equates to approximately 9% of the total election cost.

Why investment matters

It is not just that costs are increasing, but that budgets are shrinking. The World Bank has issued ominous forecasts for economies around the world, suggesting that Covid-19 will spark one of the deepest recessions in years. In this context elections will be competing against many other services for funding. Elections are a necessary investment, rather than a cost, however.

Elections are essential for the democratic process. They are the opportunity for citizens to hold government to account and choose their own representatives. Many elections have understandably been postponed for public health reasons. There is a further risk, though, that elections will also be affected because of financial reasons. Bosnia-Herzegovina has already postponed local elections that were scheduled in October, owing to the failure of the government to pass the budget. Mongolian President Khaltmaa Battulga proposed to postpone the country’s parliamentary elections because he felt that ‘we are spending a lot of money on implementing the epidemic prevention measures.’

Even where elections are held, this might be under compromised conditions. Sufficient safety equipment might not be provided to guarantee the safety of election staff. Without sufficient interventions to reassure voters, turnout could be hit, especially amongst those with underlying health conditions. Evidence shows that there is a positive relationship between resourcing and election quality. Better-run elections are often those which are better resourced. Studies from the UK, USA and comparative research has established this link. When funding is cut, election quality is cut. Healthy and fair elections therefore require investment.

The costs of not investing in elections is therefore potentially much more substantial. When citizens feel that the electoral process has been unfair, their trust in government and states can be affected. This does not return easily. When political parties and supporters feel that the election has not been conducted properly, in more fragile situations, conflict and civil war can erupt.

It is therefore impossible to put a cost on democracy. Investment in elections is one area where budgets should not be slashed during or after the pandemic – and further funds will need to be invested following principles of sufficiency, transparency, sustainability, legitimacy and contingency to ensure voter and staff safety in a process conducted with integrity. The longer-term costs of not doing this will be much more considerable.

Disclaimer: Views expressed in this commentary are those of the authors, one of whom is a staff member of International IDEA. This commentary is independent of specific national or political interests. Views expressed do not necessarily represent the institutional position of International IDEA, its Board of Advisers or its Council of Member States.

This post gives the views of the authors, and not the position of Democratic Audit.     

About the authors 

Erik Asplund is a Programme Officer in the Electoral Processes Programme, International IDEA. He is currently managing the Global Overview of COVID-19: Impact on Elections project. Other focus areas include Electoral Risk Management, Financing of Elections and Training in Electoral Administration with an emphasis on BRIDGE and Electoral Training Facilities. 

Toby James is a Professor of Politics and Public Policy at the University of East Anglia, UK. His most recent books are Comparative Electoral Management (Routledge, 2020) and Building Inclusive Elections (Routledge, 2020). He is co-convenor of the Electoral Management Network.

Dr Alistair Clark is Reader in Politics at Newcastle University. He has written widely on electoral integrity and administration, electoral and party politics. He is author of Political Parties in the UK, 2e (Palgrave 2018). He tweets at @ClarkAlistairJ. 

This post was first published on the Democratic Audit Blog on 14th July 2020

Scottish parliament elections are currently scheduled for 6th May 2021. These elections will look and feel different under COVID-19 circumstances, with election administrators having to take various precautions in delivering the poll.

There has been variation in how countries have approached holding elections under COVID-19. International IDEA note that, as of the date of writing, around 67 countries have postponed elections. Others have held them, but with a variety of safeguards and provisions, up to and including special medically supported polling stations.

England chose to postpone the various local elections organised for May 2020. These will be held in a bumper round of sub-national elections also to be held on 6th May 2021. On the same day, Scottish and Welsh voters will go to the polls to elect the next Scottish parliament and Senedd Cymru.

What COVID-19 means for these elections is actively being discussed by policy-makers. As a contribution to this debate, I was invited to co-author a blog for the Scottish Parliament Information Centre (SPICe) with their senior constitution researcher Sarah Atherton. The blog looks at the legal route towards postponement were that deemed necessary. In my contribution, I expand upon what COVID-19 might mean for running those elections. Issues are identified which are of relevance beyond Scotland however, potentially to any country seeking to hold elections in the near future.

The blog for SPICe can be found here.

In March 2020, I was invited to give in person evidence to the Senedd Cymru committee on electoral reform during its fact-finding mission to Edinburgh. The Committee were particularly interested in the operation of the single transferable vote (STV) in Scottish local elections, something I have done a considerable amount of research on.

STV has become an important electoral system in the Welsh context. An expert committee recommended its use for Senedd elections as the institution sought to expand and reform. Local councils in Wales are also being given the opportunity to replace the first-past-the-post electoral system with STV in the Local Government and Elections (Wales) Bill 2019.

The COVID-19 pandemic meant that the in-person evidence session was unfortunately cancelled. However, I was invited to submit written evidence. This has just been published and can be found here. It summarises the research I have undertaken into STV in the 2007 and 2012 rounds of local elections, and extends that to the 2017 round. It examines some of the Scottish criticisms of STV, as well as providing evidence that Scottish voters have used their preferential STV ballot in a manner that might be expected from voters with a longer history of using the system.

Alistair Clark, 16th June 2020

In mid-2019, I acted as Advisor to the Scottish parliament’s Finance and Constitution Committee in its Stage 1 scrutiny of the Referendums (Scotland) Bill. The Bill proposed framework legislation for conducting referendums which were within the competence of the Scottish parliament.

The bill was widely interpreted, by the media and critics, as legislating for a second Scottish independence referendum. Indeed, First Minister Nicola Sturgeon had, prior to the bill’s introduction, set out an ambition of holding such a referendum by the end of 2020. However, the Scottish government argued that it provided a broad framework for referendums, and therefore had wider application than just a second independence referendum. It was a large and complex piece of legislation, covering calling a referendum, the electoral laws by which any referendum would be conducted, and regulation of campaign financing and conduct.

My new article, ‘More than IndyRef2? The Referendums (Scotland) Act 2020’, just published open access in Political Quarterly discusses this important piece of electoral legislation. It traces the evolution of the bill, through the various stages of scrutiny to being passed as the Scottish parliament’s final decision in 2019. It discusses its final provisions and argues that there are several innovations in the final Referendums (Scotland) Act 2020 worthy of broader note in electoral law more generally.

The article can be downloaded and read open access at this link: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/1467-923X.12861

Alistair Clark, 9th June 2020

The House of Lords has been undertaking a post-legislative scrutiny (PLS) inquiry in late 2019-early 2020 into the operation of the Electoral Registration and Administration Act 2013. Lords Committees for PLS are ad-hoc, set up for the purposes of the inquiry and then dissolved. They make recommendations that government must respond to.

The Committee has had two calls for evidence: one prior to the 2019 general election and one subsequent to the election in order to examine any lessons that might be learned from that experience. It has also held a number of oral evidence sessions, with practitioners, electoral administrators, political parties, and academics.

Based on my work on electoral integrity and administration in the UK, I have provided written evidence in both open calls from the Committee. I was also delighted to be invited to give oral evidence to the Committee, coincidentally on the day that the House of Commons was debating holding the December 2019 general election. My written submissions have been published by the Committee here. A transcript of my oral evidence on 29th October 2019 can be found on the Committee’s oral evidence pages here.

The Committee’s report will be published in the next few months.