Reimagining Borrower Protection in Bangladesh: Why UK’s FCA Consumer Duty Framework Should Guide Regulatory Reform of our Micro Credit Sector?

By Samiur Rahman

Once heralded as a beacon of poverty alleviation by targeting the achievement of Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 1, Bangladesh has made significant strides in the consumer lending sector since 1990 due to rapid growth in Micro Finance Institutions (MFIs), which are estimated more than 1,000 in numbers and among these 724 licensed MFIs are serving 32.18 million borrowers. An early 2005 empirical study on the consumer lending practices of mainstream MFIs, i.e., Grameen Bank, Brac, etc., indicates a reduction in subjective poverty through microcredit lending of 6.5% per programme a year. Likewise, a recent 2025 study revealed that the micro-credit sector has expanded dramatically showing that over the span of 5 years between 2018 and 2022 , Bangladesh obtained 29.74 million customers against 25.40 million during 2018 with an annual loan disbursement of BDT 1.9 trillion. 

These figures demonstrate the growing significance of micro-finance in our economy particularly in agriculture and rural economy. However, the overall regulatory landscape still reveals structural problems. For instance, the lack of effective regulation of interest rates, as most of the MFIs use a flat rate method typically between 10 to 30% , may conceal the true cost of credit and risk, inflating the interest rate for certain lending products, thereby harming the borrowers in the long run. Recently, a Supreme Court ruling also indicated this issue , questioning the exploitative interest rates of the micro credit services offered by Grameen Bank.

Furthermore, the rapid expansion of micro-credit institutions and recently introduced MFS (Mobile Financial Service) micro lending services may weaken the macro prudential regulatory oversight and create systemic risk within the consumer lending sector. However, the 2005 study also revealed that the top three NGOs in Bangladesh held 85% of total cumulative credit, leading to a high concentration of lending capital. The 2005 study revealed a strong picture of vulnerability for the new borrowers who are objectively poor, around 65.3%. Finally, drawing from these, there is an indication of  an anti-client-based lending regime which lacks transparency thereby raising a critical question, is the micro-credit regulation properly optimized to ensure fairness to our consumers? In this context, the regulatory framework of the micro-credit regulation in Bangladesh needs to be unpacked.

The regulatory framework for micro-credit regime in Bangladesh comprises of two organs. First, the Micro Credit Regulatory Authority (MRA) under the remit of the Micro Credit Regulatory Authority Act 2006, which is the primary legislation regulating entities like NGO and NBFIs (Non-Bank Financial Institutions) in Bangladesh. The act itself holds prudential regulation of the institution’s ability to lend rather than embracing any consumer duties and fairness obligations for the regulated entities working under its remit. Especially, section 9 of the act specifies supervisory duties of MRA to ensure proper regulation of the MFIs, but no consumer-friendly guidelines exist for ensuring fair treatment, fair value, transparency, and vulnerable borrower protection against unscrupulous lending practices of the MFIs. Moreover, other provisions of this legislation  focus on maintaining the prudential stability of the regulated institutions, with no provision  for borrower protection, which is alarming. The enforcement provisions of the Act similarly fall short, resembling sections 35 to 37 of Chapter 6 of the act. These only apply to licensing and certification-related issues not irresponsible lending or consumer protections. Therefore, the primary legislation governing the micro-credit sector only concerns about the governance of the MFIs (lenders) rather than promoting borrower protection.

 To remedy this, the MRA rules 2010 make matters to some extent favorable for the marginalized borrower. Circular 5 of the rules states interest rate caps of up-to 27%, which is still enormous for the most vulnerable borrowers. Additionally, it also ensures 15 days grace period before the first installment which is an attempt to ease the repayment-related burden of the borrowers. However, the compliance of such regulation is questionable because MRA lacks human resource capacity to supervise an enormous number of MFIs that exist in our country, thereby giving enough chance to the unscrupulous lenders to exploit the loopholes of the current regulatory regime and get away with unfair lending practices, as this regime fails to regulate borrowers’ understanding, affordability test, and MFIs attempt to justify the value of their debt financing. Finally, the rules of deposit mobilization enumerated in the MRA rules only justify liquidity, capital reserve, etc., which are prudential safeguards but overlook conduct regulation relating to responsible consumer lending. However, Bangladesh Bank (BB), also published some guidelines in the form of soft laws, which are non-binding instruments with zero accountability for non-compliance of the MFIs actively engaged in consumer lending. In this regard, Bangladesh Bank (BB) Guidelines for Customer Services and Complaint Management (2014), could be scrutinized as Bangladesh Bank is responsible  for macro prudential oversight of our financial sector.

The guideline as a soft law, lacks enforcement as it is a service and quality guideline rather than a conduct-of-business-centric rule book. Therefore, even if the MFIs breach this, there is no substantial disciplinary outcome as guidelines lack legislative enforcement power. Moreover, although the guidelines focus on administrative and operational resilience of the MFIs, it is does not cover borrower protection. The consumer protection regime of Bangladesh, i.e. the Consumer Rights Protection Act 2009, also paints a grim picture as the act itself regulates general consumer-related products rather than regulated lending activities like micro-credit services. Although the act recognizes financial services, the definition in sec.2(22) is too narrow to include regulated financial activities and does not contain any provisions concerning borrower protections. Therefore, drawing from the above concludes that the borrower protection regime is underdeveloped therefore facilitating a regime where the MFIs take advantage of uninformed borrowers .  Although the borrower can file a writ petition under Article 102 of our constitution as a judicial recourse for unfair lending practices, this pathway itself is unreliable because of cost, litigation backlog in the SC, and delay in the pronouncement of the judgments. Moreover, Artha Rin Adalat sec. 6(2)  (a special court in Bangladesh specializing in fast loan recovery from financial institutions pursuant to section 2),  also restricts individual access to financial redress as the forum only allows regulated corporations to file litigation. 

So, regulatory reform of the borrower protection regime is  inevitable in Bangladesh and should follow reform initiatives in light of the United Kingdom’s recent overhaul of the consumer lending framework. In the face of growing criticism of Pay-Day and Wonga lending scandal, which took the high cost short-term credit (micro-credit) interest rate to APR 4214% and 31.37% a month, led to the creation of FCA’s (Financial Conduct Authority consumer lending guideline  with stringent enforcement outcome,  safeguarding the sector-wide borrowers. Although the financial regulation in the UK is principle-based, the country has moved away from box-ticking and light-touch regulation to a more law- and society-based regulation . The new FCA consumer duty framework is revolutionary as it consists of three pillars. First ,  lending entities must follow strict retail and consumer-focused principles, i.e. the main agenda behind lending would be borrowers. Secondly, cross-cutting rules enabling the consumers to pursue their financial objectives, act in good faith, and avoid causing foreseeable harm to the retail customers. Finally, the financial services should promote four outcomes aligned with the previous objectives.

The four outcomes are: first, products and services that meet customers’ needs. Second, price and value that is fair for what customers get. Third, consumer understanding, meaning clear information that helps customers decide and fourth, consumer support when customers need assistance. Moreover, if the borrower is entering a regulated credit agreement, must coincide with the FCA Consumer Credit Sourcebook (CONC) 5A, with default charges not exceeding 15 pounds, an interest rate cap of 0.8% per day, and the borrower must never pay more in interest than the borrowed amount. Clifford Chance (2023) reported that this consumer duty regime in the UK is ensuring responsible lending and allowing board-level accountability. Moreover, in case of consumer complaints,  the legal aid through the Financial Ombudsman Service (FOS) allows the complainant quasi-judicial recourse to their grievances, provided FCA can also impose sanctions on non-compliant firms for breach of the consumer duty framework.  

So, why would Bangladesh care to model their borrower protection regime in light of FCA?  The straight answer is that enabling borrower protection would make corporate lending more accountable and would allow the vulnerable borrower, i.e. rural farmers, SME entrepreneurs make more informed choices and exert control over their lending or debt outcomes. To achieveborrower-level fairness, the MRA needs exclusive clauses of borrower protection and fairness outcomes of the MFIs as the MRA is responsible for the conduct and prudential regulation of the NGOs and MFIs. Later, Bangladesh Bank should enable strict consumer lending guidelines like the FCA and impose stricter sanctions for non-compliance. Most notably, the flat-rate interest should be abolished or should be made transparent by the Bangladesh Bank, allowing the impoverished borrowers a sigh of relief when borrowing money for their personal financial endeavors. 

Therefore, I suggest that the legal redress regime should mirror the UK and creation of a separate tribunal for financial consumer protection is inevitable or the government could empower the Ombudsman office quasi judicial power to tackle complaints relating to consumer lending products. Additionally, the legal aid must be made individually accessible to ensure access to legal justice which is a fundamental right of our citizens. In conclusion, the financial regulation of  Bangladesh is certainly rule-based regulation (RBR) and lacks conduct oversight where box-ticking is pretty much evident and a law and society-based approach focusing on consumer well-being seems like a misnomer. Therefore, a regulatory divergence in light of the twin-peak structure of the UK, separating conduct and prudential regulation, enabling outcome-based lending practices, would allow the micro-credit sector of BD to become more compliant, responsible and consumer-focused which will allow  borrowers to remain at the center of our financial regulation and allow them to pursue their financial objective as a result giving them a proper chance to alleviate from the vicious cycle of poverty.

Environmental Constitutionalism and EU AI Regulation (Part II) 

Nífémi Adéșínà – PhD Student (Digital Constitutionalism, Newcastle University) – o.adesina2@ncl.ac.uk

Introduction

Part I of this series explored what environmental constitutionalism is and the missed opportunity by the EU AI Act’s draftsmen to adequately enshrine environmental protections into its provisions. The final part of this series will seek a path forward through environmental constitutionalist principles and the forthcoming technical standards of the AI Act.

Technical Standards: A Path to Strengthen Environmental Constitutionalism? 

Article 2 of the Standardisation Regulation defines ‘standard’ as a technical specification, adopted by a recognised standardisation body, for repeated or continuous application, with which compliance is not compulsory. This includes ‘harmonised standards’ which are European standards adopted on the basis of a request made by the EU Commission for the application of Union harmonisation legislation.

The EU Commission has tasked two European Standardization Organizations (ESOs), i.e. European Committee for Standardization (CEN) and the European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization (CENELEC), forming the Joint Technical Committee (JTC21), to develop these standards. These standards will allow for the Act to simply specify that certain safety outcomes must be achieved by AI models or system providers; however, the Act itself does not go into technical detail about the methods of measuring compliance with these safety outcomes. This is where the technical experts come in. These experts are expected to fill in the blanks and update these methods of measurement to keep up with the evolving state of AI capabilities.

Although the standards being developed to support the EU AI Act are not legally binding in themselves, they provide a means to demonstrate compliance with the Act’s requirements, and adhering to them offers a presumption of conformity, as stated in Article 32 of the Act. This can be used as a tool of environmental constitutionalism by establishing a normative compliance mechanism which can shape the behaviour of corporations in a way that incentivises the incorporation of environmental considerations into technical practices. One of the primary ways these standards bolster environmental constitutionalism is by fostering regulatory cohesion, clarity and accountability. When harmonised standards set clear benchmarks for AI-related environmental impact assessments, risk mitigation measures, and sustainability criteria, they create predictable guidelines for developers and users of AI systems. This clarity enhances compliance and accountability, ensuring that AI operations are in line with existing constitutional environmental protections. Such standards essentially embed environmental considerations into the core of AI governance, making it easier to monitor and evaluate.

These standards can also serve as a pioneering means for cross-border cooperation beyond the EU. The “Brussels effect” has previously been demonstrated through EU constitutionalism and its related climate legislation and has been seen to incentivise governments and non-governmental organisations outside of the Union to increase their environmental protection standards. For example, the EU introduced the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), which was officially adopted in May 2023. Companies that imported products in sectors with high emissions were mandated to report the amount of carbon used in making those products and the carbon prices they’ve paid in their home countries. From 2027, these companies will need to buy certificates that cover the same amount of carbon emissions as the EU’s carbon prices, effectively putting a cost on imported carbon-intensive goods. Importers can get some relief by showing that they have paid higher carbon prices in their home countries, which can reduce the certificates they need to buy. This serves as an incentive for other countries to adopt greener policies and help companies reduce their emissions without the EU losing competitiveness. As foreign AI systems and products are launched in the EU, the standards can become invaluable in terms of the reduction of ambiguities, but also in maintaining consistent environmental safeguards and promoting consistency across jurisdictions. Although constitutionalism is often defined within a state model and therefore tied to a specific jurisdiction, environmental challenges transcend borders. Thus, for environmental constitutionalism to supersede mere legislative greening, it must be applied not only within defined national borders, but beyond.

Despite these promising prospects, there are a few challenges that influence the extent to which technical standards can be effectively employed to reinforce environmental constitutionalism. The voluntary nature of the standards may ostensibly be seen as a shortfall in the quest for environmental constitutionalism within AI regulation. Nonetheless, this is not necessarily the case because compliance with these standards holds an irrefutable incentive for AI companies that would be “impractical to ignore” in that a presumption of legal compliance is conferred along with voluntary compliance. 

Additionally, ensuring that standards are flexible enough to accommodate evolving AI technologies while robust enough to enforce environmental protections would constantly remain a balancing act for the standardisation committee(s). Lastly, the standard-setting process has been critiqued for lacking adequate scrutiny and accountability. The closed-off nature of the standard-setting process has been noted to potentially serve the commercial interests of industry players, therefore weakening the protection for affected stakeholders. There is, however, a means to overcome this obstacle in what has been termed “the twin-track approach”, which calls for the European Commission’s active participation and oversight in the process, therefore leading to socio-technical rather than just technical standards that address both the perspectives of AI experts and other stakeholders.

Substantive Elements of the Technical Standards

The task of defining technical standards for AI demands a critical approach to environmental considerations. This approach must transcend mere superficial greening and requires a deliberate shift towards the weaving of environmental protections into the very fabric of AI governance structures.

Firstly, JTC21 must embrace the precautionary principle in drafting these standards. Within the environmental constitutional discourse, the precautionary principle mandates that new technologies ought to be rejected until deemed safe; it is a presumption of avoidance when presented with uncertain risks. The precautionary principle, or the foresight principle, acts to prevent environmental harm even when all the scientific evidence is not yet fully established. Article 191of the Treaty on the Function of the EU also stipulates that the Union policy on the environment shall aim at a high level of protection taking into account the diversity of situations in the various regions of the Union. It shall be based on the precautionary principle and on the principles that preventive action should be taken, that environmental damage should as a priority be rectified at source and that the polluter should pay. 

JTC21 must look beyond the present impacts of AI and prioritise potential ecological harms. This would require developers and deployers to preemptively consider the full life cycle of AI systems, from the extraction of raw materials and manufacturing processes to their eventual use and disposal. The integration of circular economics will also be beneficial here, i.e. minimising waste and the carbon footprint of AI computing, maximising resource efficiency, and promoting intrinsic recyclability and reusability principles within the AI lifecycle.

These technical standards must also provide for environmental impact assessments of AI systems, incorporating comprehensive metrics that encompass energy consumption, carbon emissions, water usage, resource depletion, and electronic/electric waste. These assessments could ensure consistent evaluation across sectors and would provide a clear means to adequately scrutinise AI developers’ assessment results to promote accountability. 

The Future of Environmental Constitutionalism

As global discourse converges on establishing robust AI regulatory frameworks, the EU’s approach, exemplified by the AI Act and its supporting technical standards, offers a crucial opportunity to move beyond conventional technology governance. While the EU’s current framework reflects some environmental values within its constitutional tradition, there isn’t much evidence to suggest that the EU as a whole operates as an environmental constitutional model. However, the EU could serve as a compelling case for adopting such a paradigm, which would deepen the integration of ecological considerations into AI regulation.

It is important to note that the Act, although designed to facilitate compliance and accountability, does not embody a genuine commitment to ecological well-being, and it appears to have missed an important opportunity to embed environmental concerns at its core. For true environmental constitutionalism to be realised within EU AI regulation, there must be a normative shift that no longer places the environmental consequences of AI at the periphery but rightfully entrenches such considerations into the very foundations of the legislation. 

Environmental constitutionalism is arguably the most suitable framework for addressing the environmental risks and harms associated with AI development and deployment, particularly in the context of the EU, because it has the ability to build on and extend the existing discourse on transnational constitutionalism, and if adopted it could offer an adaptive and resilient pathway to guide AI regulation by way of the forthcoming technical standards.

It is too soon to say how the standards will fare, as JTC21 is currently in the process of drafting them and the AI Act itself is still navigating the turbulent waters of balancing innovation and regulation. But this opportunity should not be overlooked. The focus should be on navigating the ways in which these standards can strengthen environmental safeguards in AI development through the core tenets of environmental constitutionalism.

Environmental Constitutionalism and EU AI Regulation (Part I)

 

Nífémi Adéșínà – PhD Student (Digital Constitutionalism, Newcastle University) – o.adesina2@ncl.ac.uk

Introduction

There has been a wave of discourse over what a regulatory framework for Artificial Intelligence (AI) would look like across various jurisdictions around the globe. Stakeholders have continued to centre legislative AI debates on the balance of innovation with regulatory protection. Conversely, within the realm of constitutionalism, there has been momentum and a continuous push for the development of the environmental/climate component of the discourse. On the surface, these two domains may appear to be unrelated, the latter being grounded in ecological rights-based advocacy within constitutional law, and the former in technological governance and legislation. However, a space for potential overlap has emerged through the introduction of the European Union (EU) AI Act (‘the Act’) and the forthcoming technical standards. The EU’s regulatory framework on AI has the ability not only to serve as a frontier for similar governance structures but as a platform for advancing environmental constitutionalism. 

Environmental Constitutionalism

Environmental constitutionalism is a multi-perspective legal and philosophical movement aimed at integrating and embedding environmental protections within constitutional frameworks. It envisions environmental protection as both substantive and procedural, but its understanding is often wrongly limited to fundamental rights and judicial enforcement through the right to a healthy environment. Environmental constitutionalism, which ought to extend beyond mere codification and environmental rights adjudication, encompasses a broader commitment to ecological sustainability rooted within foundational legal and political structures and involves a shift in governance paradigms. It seeks to foster a societal ethos that prioritises ecological well-being, driving behavioural changes and collective action. Several countries have explicitly enshrined climate clauses into their constitutional texts. According to the United Nations (UN) Environment Programme, over 150 countries have incorporated environmental provisions within their constitutions, and the UN Human Rights Council has also recognised the ‘Right to a healthy environment’ in Resolution 48/13. But despite its transformative potential and emerging acknowledgement, environmental constitutionalism is sometimes viewed as symbolic or aspirational, and its strengths are often overshadowed by national or international political and economic interests, specifically the prioritisation of industries that guarantee shorter-term gains over environmental protections, such as the tech industry.

Furthermore, a restrictive evaluative position on the constitutionality of environmental preservation and justice to an enforcement/rights-based model, and an exclusively or primarily ‘rights and courts’-centric approach may “suffer from a legitimacy deficit” due to lacklustre enforceability mechanisms. Courts have been hesitant to engage for fear of justiciability and technical complexity, and this, in turn, limits the impact of environmental constitutionalism on an adjudicatory level. It is, however, important to note that this understanding is flawed and is ill-equipped to grasp the true significance and mechanisms of environmental constitutionalism. This narrow interpretation of what constitutionalism is, places a high degree of reliance on the judiciary while missing out on the potential impact of regulations and lawmaking on constitutional theory. Afterall, constitutions are not the only scenario in which environmental constitutionalism can thrive.

The Relevance of Non-constitutional Legislative Instruments 

Constitutionalism need not be confined to constitutional documents and can, in fact, encompass other instruments within the broader legal and political landscape. As much as environmental constitutionalism involves utilising the law to protect the environment by recognising environmental rights, duties, and principles, it also prioritises the influence of constitutionalist norms on the interpretation of other laws and policies. Instruments such as the Paris Agreements and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change are not constitutional in name, nor do they outrightly create constitutional provisions. They, however, epitomise environmental constitutional values that seek to foster a national or global culture of responsibility and instill a duty to protect and preserve the environment. 

In the age of technology, constitutionalism has become an integral means of safeguarding fundamental rights and limiting political and private powers in a rapidly evolving digital landscape. It has been applied to non-constitutional techno-centric regulations such as the General Data Protection Act (GDPR), Digital Services Act, the Digital Markets Act, and even the EU AI Act. However, this has centred on digital constitutionalism, and the environment has yet to make an appearance in the discourse.

AI Production, EU Constitutionalism and Environmentalism 

The production and deployment of AI tools and systems have a significant impact on the environment. From mining rare earth minerals used in manufacturing hardware to increased demands on energy consumption from the data centres that are used to train AI models, the environmental costs are quite steep. Thus, it would follow that such considerations ought to be reflected in AI regulation. The EU’s AI Act aims to ensure that AI systems are safe and ethical. With the objective of promoting transparency, accountability and human-oversight within AI innovation in Europe, the Act places great emphasis on the classification of systems in accordance with their risk thresholds, i.e. unacceptable, high, limited, minimal or no risk. However, the Act and its ancillary recitals make negligible efforts to adequately bolster its provisions with environmental risk obligations.

Within EU constitutionalism, legal principles and practices have been established to ensure that democratic values, governmental legitimacy, fundamental rights and the rule of law are preserved, through constitutional documents like the Treaty on European Union (TEU), Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. These treaties outline the EU’s core principles, institutional structure, and decision-making processes, similar to a national constitution, and codify fundamental rights and freedoms while reinforcing their constitutional status through enforceability. Amongst these core principles and fundamental rights is the protection of the environment and the promotion of sustainable practices. Within the EU, environmental considerations are not just a choice, but rather a legal, political and even moral obligation that holds up the EU’s constitutional framework and reflects a commitment to environmental sustainability.

Article 3(3) of the consolidated TEU states that the Union shall work for the sustainable development of Europe based on balanced economic growth…and a high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the environment. Article 11of the TFEU also states that Environmental protection requirements must be integrated into the definition and implementation of the Union’s policies and activities, in particular with a view to promoting sustainable development. Furthermore, Article 37 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights also requires this consideration to be integrated into EU policies in accordance with the principle of sustainable development. However, when it comes to ensuring environmental justice as a fundamental aspect of the AI Act, the provisions of the Act appear to be lacking.

Environmental Constitutionalism or Legislative Greening in the AI Act

Environmental protection/preservation is duly mentioned in Article 1(1) and Recitals 1,2,4,8,27,46,48,121,130,142,165, and 176. The Act also attempts to address environmental risks and opportunities through the use of tools like fundamental rights impact assessments (FRIA) and codes of conduct. These mechanisms, however, are less prominent aspects of the legislation and the nature of the codes of conduct and the potential for limited application of the FRIA due to scope constraints are clear shortcomings of their objectives.

The lack of sufficient environmental provisions in the final draft of the AI Act has been considered a missed opportunity. The EU Commission’s Paper on Artificial Intelligence, which predates the Act, lays emphasis on the importance of considering the environmental impact of AI systems throughout their life cycle, including resource usage for algorithmic training and data storage. However, these expectations have significantly been watered down, and much of the environmental considerations in the Act are through inference. 

In a bid to correct this, it is important to avoid taking the mere legislative greening approach that already exists within the Act. For legislation to possess the elements of environmental constitutionalism, it needs to be transformed through environmentally conscious norms; in this case, it would mandate a shift in the way AI regulation is interpreted and enforced. It is not just about environmental rights but as Louis Kotzé posits, provoking consciousness and responsibilityby defining and implementing duties for not just state actors but non-state actors, such as AI developers and deployers. 

The second and final part of this series will explore how the EU AI Act’s technical standards and environmental constitutionalist principles can mutually strengthen one another.

Going Global Podcast – Episode 3 ‘Mining in Africa: traceability and global companies’

By Beatriz Adas; Eleanor Mensah; Leo Johnson

Going Global: A Legal Podcast for Today’s Global Challenges is a collaborative Podcast series between Newcastle Law School and São Paulo State University (Unesp). It is dedicated to discussing contemporary legal issues related to global transformations and the challenges faced by the international (and post national) community. This series comprises three episodes that will explore Extractivism as a global issue. This is Episode 3 ‘Mining in Africa: traceability and global companies’.

Mineral resources play an important role in the global economy, but their extraction often raises complex legal, political, and social questions. This episode of the Going Global podcast explored these issues through the case of Angola’s mining sector with Professor Afonso ‘Mosquito’ Garrido, whose expertise spans governance, technology, compliance, and sustainability. The discussion examined topics including conflict (blood) diamonds, the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, the Lobito Corridor, and the challenges of regulating global mineral supply chains. Through these themes, both the strengths and limitations of international legal frameworks were examined in addressing issues of conflict, governance, and economic development. The episode primarily explored questions related to international law and environmental governance, highlighting the growing importance of legal mechanisms designed to promote transparency, accountability, and sustainable development within the mining sector.

This episode was developed and presented by Beatriz Adas from São Paulo State University (Unesp) and Newcastle University Global Law students Eleanor Mensah and Leo Johnson. The subject is particularly relevant because mineral resources are essential for global industries, including technology, energy, and infrastructure. However, mining benefits are often accompanied by concerns regarding governance, corruption, environmental degradation, and social inequality. Understanding how legal mechanisms address these challenges helps to explain the broader relationship between natural resources, development, and international justice.

One of the first topics explored was the Lobito Corridor, a major railway and infrastructure project that connects mining regions in Central Africa to the Angolan coast. This project was compared to Brazil’s Grande Carajás Programme, another large-scale mining enterprise . This comparison raised an important question: do these projects promote genuine development for local communities, or do they mainly serve international markets? Professor Garrido explained that while infrastructure can create economic growth, its success depends on how effectively governments ensure that local populations benefit from those investments.

The discussion then moved to the issue of conflict diamonds, often referred to as ‘blood diamonds.’ Using the example of Sierra Leone’s civil war, the ways in which diamonds were used to fund armed groups and prolong conflict were analysed. This led to a wider discussion about the role of international organisations and whether stronger or earlier intervention could have reduced the human cost of the conflict.

A significant part of the episode focused on the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS), which was created to prevent the trade of diamonds linked to armed conflict. While the scheme has helped reduce the circulation of conflict diamonds, Professor Garrido discussed some of its limitations. In particular, the Kimberley Process focuses mainly on diamonds that fund rebel groups and may not adequately address issues such as corruption, inequality, or harmful practices carried out by governments and corporations. This raises questions about whether international legal frameworks always reflect the realities faced by local communities.

Finally, Angola’s recent efforts to improve diamond traceability were explored. By tracking the origin of diamonds throughout the supply chain, governments and businesses hope to increase transparency and reduce illegal activity. However, the discussion highlighted that traceability alone cannot solve every governance challenge and must be supported by strong institutions and effective regulation.

Overall, this episode demonstrated that mineral extraction is not only an economic issue but also a legal and governance challenge. The discussion encouraged listeners to think critically about the role of international law in balancing economic development with justice, accountability, and sustainability.

Going Global Podcast. Episode 2 – Rethinking International Law through Posthumanism and the Rights of Nature

By Aliya Khan; Daniel Nobre Fernandes da Silva; Emma Bickers; Raquel Freitas Colaço

Going Global: A Legal Podcast for Today’s Global Challenges is a collaborative podcast series between Newcastle Law School and São Paulo State University (Unesp). It is dedicated on discussing contemporary legal issues related to global transformations and the challenges faced by international (and post national) community. This series comprehend three episodes that will explore Extractivism as a global issue. This is episode 2 ‘Posthumanism as a new standard for responsible extractivism?’. It was hosted by Emma Bickers and Aliya Khan (Newcastle Univerisity), and Raquel Freitas Colaço and Daniel Nobre Fernandes da Silva (Unesp).

Introduction

How can a legal system built on human mastery and resource extraction solve a global ecological crisis? In this episode, we come together to critically evaluate the boundaries of public international law in the face of climate breakdown. Our discussion challenges orthodox environmental frameworks and explores radical alternatives to shift how the law conceptualizes the natural world.

The Speaker

Our guest for this episode is Dr. Emily Jones, a NUAcT Fellow at Newcastle Law School. Dr. Jones is a renowned scholar specializied in Public International Law, Environmental Law, and critical Legal theories, specifically pioneering feminist, queer, and post humanist approaches to jurisprudence. Her groundbreaking work re-examines foundational concepts of sovereignty, exploitation, and legal personhood.

Overview of the Field: Why It Matters

Traditional international environmental law operates within a deeply anthropocentric framework, viewing nature primarily as an inert ‘resource’ destined for human appropriation, property, and capital accumulation. Under this orthodox paradigm, well-established legal principles like permanent state sovereignty over natural resources and the ‘sustainable development’ model often act as legal shields that facilitate, rather than restrict, ecological destruction and global extractivism. Discussing critical jurisprudence is essential since it uncovers how international law historically enabled colonial plunder and continues to reproduce North-South structural inequalities. To confront issues like deep-sea mining or the corporate accountability gap in ecocide, the legal architecture must be destabilized from its core human-centered bias.

What is Discussed in the Episode

Throughout the episode, the conversation flows through three major conceptual pillars:Posthumanism and Critical Architecture: We dive into the definition of (a feminist) posthuman theory, exploring how it dismantles both the hierarchy between humans (along axes of race, gender, and class) and the dangerous split between humans and the non-human world. Dr. Jones answers hard-hitting questions about whether a fundamentally human-centred legal structure can ever genuinely safeguard global supply chains.

  • The Rights of Nature vs. The Relational Approach: Moving beyond the ‘Universal Declaration of Mother Earth’, we evaluate the limits of standard legal transfers. Dr. Jones explains the vital need to shift away from granting nature human-like ‘rights’ – which can easily be co-opted by neoliberal interests – and instead adopt an indigenous-informed, relational approach centred on human kinship and reciprocal responsibilities to care for dynamic ecosystems. We also reflect on how the law is evolving following recent regional climate litigation, such as the Klimaseniorinnen case at the ECHR.
  • Extractivism and Hope: Finally, we confront the stark realities of sustainable extractivism and international jurisdiction in unregulated areas like the deep seabed. Despite the overwhelming scale of global ecocide, the episode concludes with a profound reflection on ‘queer hope’ and political affirmation, rejecting paralysis to imagine incremental, transformative steps toward structural climate justice.

Going Global Podcast – Episode 1 ‘Introduction to Global issues: regulating extractivism in a divided world’

By Livia Porto; Luísa Sasaki; Ekaterina (Katherine) Iosifova; Cadence Willis.

Going Global: A Legal Podcast for Today’s Global Challenges is a collaborative Podcast series between Newcastle Law School and São Paulo State University (Unesp). It is dedicated to discussing contemporary legal issues related to global transformations and the challenges faced by the international (and post national) community. This series comprises three episodes that will explore Extractivism as a global issue. This is Episode 1 ‘Introduction to Global issues: regulating extractivism in a divided world’. Itis hosted by Livia Porto and Luísa Sasaki (Unesp), and Ekaterina (Katherine) Iosifova and Cadence Willis (Newcastle University).

In this episode, we welcome Professor Eduardo Saad-Diniz and João Victor Gianecchini to discuss the intersections between extractivism, global geopolitics, environmental governance, and international law. Professor Eduardo Saad-Diniz holds a Habilitation in Criminology and a PhD in Criminal Law from the University of São Paulo (USP) and is also affiliated with the ARC Foundation – Amazonia R&D Center in Manaus, Brazil. João Victor Gianecchini is a PhD candidate at the University of Frankfurt, Germany, supported by a scholarship from the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Foundation, and holds an LL.M. from USP.

The episode explores extractivism as a central issue in contemporary international debates. Extractivism as a concept surrounds the intensive exploitation of natural resources, especially in environmentally sensitive regions such as the Amazon rainforest. In a context marked by the worsening of environmental crises and the reorganization of international geopolitical relations, discussing extractivism becomes essential to understanding the economic, social, environmental, and legal impacts resulting from these activities.

The discussion examines how extractivist practices in the Amazon Rainforest are shaped by shifting global power dynamics and competing economic interests. The guests analyse the relationship between environmental degradation, resource exploitation, and contemporary geopolitical transformations, including the growing influence of BRICS countries and changing approaches to international cooperation. Particular attention is given to the implications of these developments for environmental governance through green criminology and the future of global responses to the climate crisis.

Another relevant issue discussed in the episode concerns environmental crimes and the limitations of domestic monitoring and investigative mechanisms in Brazil. In this context, the guests reflect on the possible role of international organizations and non-governmental organizations in overseeing extractivist activities and ensuring accountability for environmental harm at the local level and across borders. Furthermore, they discuss whether existing international institutions are sufficient to address such challenges or whether new global mechanisms for environmental protection should be created.

Finally, the episode turns its attention to the future of the Amazon rainforest and the urgent measures necessary to prevent the worsening of environmental degradation. The guests emphasize that the Amazon represents an issue of global relevance due to its environmental, social, economic, and climate impacts. By combining legal, geopolitical, and environmental perspectives, the episode offers a critical reflection on one of the most pressing debates of our time and highlights the importance of expanding international dialogue on sustainability, global governance, and environmental protection.

Accountability for Afghanistan Under Taliban Rule: The New Investigative Mechanism

Bernardo Carvalho De Mello, PhD Candidate, Newcastle Law School

Introduction

In August 2021, the Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan ushered in a regime of severe repression, with women and girls experiencing the most extreme rollbacks of their basic rights. Over the past four years, Taliban authorities have systematically barred women and girls from education beyond primary school, banned most employment for women, and erased female participation from public life through draconian edicts. These actions have been widely condemned as egregious human rights violations – and increasingly recognised as international crimes. The United Nations Special Rapporteur on Afghanistan has warned that the Taliban’s “weaponized” use of law and policy to oppress women and girls amounts to crimes against humanity. Facing an escalating human rights crisis, Afghan activists and international NGOs have long urged stronger accountability measures. In a landmark move, the UN Human Rights Council heeded these calls: on October 6, 2025, it unanimously approved the creation of an independent investigative mechanism to document and preserve evidence of atrocities in Afghanistan, with a special focus on abuses against women and girls. This academic analysis examines the significance of the new mechanism through a feminist, intersectional, and decolonial lens – exploring the challenges of documenting abuses under Taliban rule, the avenues for pursuing justice (from the International Criminal Court to universal jurisdiction), the gendered dimensions of the Taliban’s crimes, and how ongoing documentation can help prevent further rights decay as well as enable future prosecutions.

A New UN Investigative Mechanism: Mandate and Importance

The UN Human Rights Council’s resolution establishes an “ongoing independent investigative mechanism” for Afghanistan – essentially an accountability body tasked with collecting, consolidating, and preserving evidence of serious violations of international law. Modelled on similar mechanisms for Syria and Myanmar, the new body will investigate past and ongoing abuses, identify those responsible, and prepare case files that could be used to facilitate fair criminal proceedings in the future, whether in national courts, regional tribunals, or international courts. Crucially, the mechanism’s mandate explicitly includes Afghanistan’s recent atrocities under Taliban rule, especially the regime’s current abuses against women and girls, which amount to gender persecution. In other words, it will document the Taliban’s gender-based repression as potential war crimes or crimes against humanity.

Importantly, this is not a one-sided effort. The mechanism is empowered to examine crimes by all actors in Afghanistan – not only Taliban officials, but also members of the former U.S.-backed government, local warlords, insurgent groups like Islamic State Khorasan (ISKP), and even international military forces. This broad scope sends a message that there will be no impunity or “hierarchy of victims”: every perpetrator of grave abuses, whether the Taliban or others, is on notice that evidence is being collected for potential prosecution. The inclusive mandate also reflects a decolonial sensitivity – aiming to avoid double standards whereby only global South actors are held accountable. By including atrocities committed by international forces and past governments, the mechanism acknowledges the entrenched impunity that has spanned decades of conflict in Afghanistan.

Documenting Abuses Under a Repressive Regime: Legal and Practical Challenges

While the new mechanism’s mandate is clear, documenting atrocities in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan presents enormous challenges. The de facto authorities in Kabul reject the premise of international scrutiny and have already proven uncooperative – for instance, they have refused visas to UN human rights monitors, including barring the Special Rapporteur from entering the country. The Taliban’s obstruction and denial of access mean that investigators must get creative to gather evidence. On-the-ground fact-finding missions are virtually impossible, so the mechanism will likely rely on remote investigations: interviewing refugees and survivors in exile, leveraging testimony via secure communications, and analysing open-source intelligence (such as photos, videos, and satellite imagery) that can corroborate alleged abuses. Local Afghan activists (often operating anonymously or from abroad) play a crucial role in this evidence-gathering by clandestinely documenting incidents at significant personal risk. However, engaging with witnesses inside Afghanistan carries grave dangers – people who provide information about Taliban crimes could face violent retaliation if exposed. A feminist and intersectional approach to documentation requires robust measures to protect survivors and witnesses, especially women, ethnic/religious minorities, and LGBTQ+ individuals who may be doubly vulnerable under Taliban repression. Human rights organisations have urged that states support and protect anyone who engages with the mechanism, for example, by offering safe refuge and refusing to deport Afghan asylum-seekers back to danger.

Another hurdle is ensuring that the collected evidence meets the standards of international courts. The mechanism’s investigators must employ rigorous methodologies so that witness statements, documents, and forensic data will hold up in future prosecutions. This entails preserving the chain of custody for physical evidence, verifying the authenticity of digital media, and carefully cataloguing the systematic nature of abuses. Under Taliban rule, many human rights violations are not one-off incidents but part of broad policies – for example, the enforcement of edicts against women or the targeted persecution of minority communities. Documenting such patterns requires not only recording individual stories but also compiling proof of official directives and a paper trail (or digital trail) of orders from the Taliban hierarchy. Here, the Taliban’s own pronouncements can ironically serve as evidence: the regime has issued over 100 written or announced decrees that restrict women’s freedoms and other rights. Each decree and its implementation (for instance, reports of women being flogged for violating the new “Virtue and Vice” rules) becomes part of the evidentiary record of an overarching oppressive system. The legal challenge will be to link crimes to specific perpetrators – identifying which Taliban officials or commanders were responsible for carrying out or ordering abuses. Given the Taliban’s secrecy and lack of transparency, building these linkage evidence files is difficult, but not impossible: the mechanism can draw on Afghan insiders’ testimonies, leaked documents, and the Taliban’s own public statements to map the chain of command.

Gender Apartheid in Afghanistan: A Crime Under International Law

Women and girls have been the primary targets of the Taliban’s abuses, and a feminist analysis is crucial to understanding the gravity of these crimes. Afghan and international experts increasingly describe the Taliban’s rule as a form of “gender apartheid” – a system of segregation and subjugation of women reminiscent of apartheid regimes (though based on gender rather than race). Since 2021, the Taliban have issued an onslaught of over 200 decrees and edicts that affect virtually every aspect of women’s lives. These include forbidding girls’ secondary and higher education, barring women from working in most sectors (even in aid organisations and schools), requiring women to be fully covered and accompanied by male guardians when in public, and banning women from public spaces like parks, gyms, and even female public baths. In August 2024, the Taliban formalised many of these edicts in a nationwide “Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice” law, which further stripped women of basic rights and personal autonomy. For example, the law’s text explicitly prohibits women from travelling without a male guardian and mandates that any woman who leaves her home must “cover her voice, face, and body,” effectively silencing women’s voices in society. Violations of Taliban decrees are enforced by roaming morality police and courts with no female judges or lawyers – creating a nightmarish legal black hole for Afghan women, who have virtually no recourse or safe channel to seek justice. Women activists who dare protest these edicts have been met with brutal violence: numerous reports document female protestors being beaten, arbitrarily detained, “disappeared,” or even killed for peacefully resisting the regime’s gender discrimination. Others have been arrested and flogged simply for the “crime” of teaching young girls in secret schools, or for travelling without a male chaperone.

From an international law perspective, the Taliban’s institutionalised oppression of women is not merely a domestic policy issue – it rises to the level of atrocity crimes. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) includes persecution on the grounds of gender as a crime against humanity. Indeed, in an unprecedented move, the ICC Prosecutor in early 2025 formally requested arrest warrants against the Taliban’s supreme leader (Haibatullah Akhundzada) and chief justice (Abdul Hakim Haqqani) for crimes against humanity – specifically, the persecution of Afghan women and girls. The ICC prosecutor found reasonable grounds to believe that these senior Taliban figures have systematically deprived women and girls of fundamental rights (education, employment, freedom of movement, expression, and more) in a deliberate policy to impose patriarchal control. This constitutes gender persecution: a coordinated attack against a civilian population (women) based on gender. Notably, the Prosecutor also highlighted that the Taliban’s campaign targets not only women and girls, but also those whom the Taliban view as not conforming to their rigid gender norms – including LGBTQ+ people and men who ally with women’s rights. Persecution of people based on sexual orientation or gender expression can likewise fall under crimes against humanity when it’s as systematic and violent as what is occurring in Afghanistan. An intersectional lens reveals how these abuses intersect: for example, a woman who is from an ethnic minority or who is queer faces compounded persecution under the Taliban’s theocratic and misogynistic rule. Every aspect of such a person’s identity – gender, ethnicity, sexuality – is a potential target for Taliban punishment. Afghan LGBTQ+ individuals, in particular, have faced unprecedented brutality, from beatings and death threats to reports of summary executions, all while being driven completely underground.

International experts have begun arguing that “gender apartheid” itself should be recognised as a crime under international law, analogous to racial apartheid. While the legal category is not yet formally codified, the term powerfully captures the lived reality in Afghanistan: the Taliban have created a state order in which women are segregated, erased, and dominated as a class. This systemic misogyny is enforced through violence and fear, meeting the threshold of an “other inhumane act” intentionally causing great suffering or severe mental and physical harm – another prong of crimes against humanity. For Afghan women, the daily denial of autonomy, education, and basic dignity is not just a social policy issue, but a mass victimisation that the world has a duty to address. The new UN investigative mechanism, by focusing on the gendered dimensions of Taliban abuses, will help ensure that these crimes are documented in detail and that the voices of Afghan women are centred in future accountability processes. Decolonial feminists emphasise listening to Afghan women’s own characterisation of their oppression; notably, Afghan women activists themselves have decried the Taliban’s rules as gender apartheid and sought international recognition of their plight. In this sense, the mechanism can amplify subaltern voices on the global stage, rather than imposing an external narrative.

Conclusion

The establishment of the UN’s independent investigative mechanism marks a decisive moment in the struggle for accountability in Afghanistan. By centering women and girls in its mandate, the mechanism acknowledges that the Taliban’s systematic repression is not a cultural aberration but a legal and moral emergency that demands an international response. Yet, as this essay has shown, the path to justice is fraught with obstacles—political, logistical, and epistemic. Conducting investigations under a regime that denies access and silences victims requires innovative, survivor-centred, and intersectional methodologies that prioritise safety and credibility. A feminist and decolonial approach insists that Afghan women, ethnic minorities, and LGBTQ+ individuals are not passive subjects of humanitarian concern but active agents of truth and resistance. The mechanism’s value thus lies not only in preserving evidence for future trials but also in affirming that these lives matter now—that their suffering will not vanish into silence. Whether through the ICC, universal jurisdiction, or yet-to-be-imagined forums, accountability remains possible. The world’s responsibility is to ensure that the documentation of these crimes leads to meaningful justice and to a reimagining of international law that truly embodies its promise of universality and equality.

Call for Submissions: Volume 11, Special Issue, ‘Law and Global Challenges’

The North East Law Review (NELR) is now inviting submissions for Volume 11, Special Issue, ‘Law and Global Challenges’, which will be published in Summer 2025. The deadline for submission is 17:00 (UK time) on 14 February 2025 (Friday).

Submission Guidelines

Topic of the special issue: Law and Global Challenges
The world faces numerous challenges, triggered by conflict and war, climate change, technology development, healthcare access, gender inequality, and cultural homogenisation- this list is by no means exhaustive. What role has the law played, or what role can it play, in either alleviating or intensifying these challenges? We invite submissions that explore legal issues related to the topic of Law and Global Challenges. Submissions may focus on any law subject, at international, regional, or national law levels, and take doctrinal, socio-legal, comparative, or other legal research methodologies.

Forms of submission accepted:

Articles: original analyses and examinations of law issues align with the topic, between 3,000 and 6,000 words, including footnotes;

Case Comments: discussions and analyses of recent cases and other influential cases align with the topic, from any jurisdiction, between 2,000 and 3,000 words, including footnotes.
Short or longer submissions may be considered.

Citations: Oxford Standard for Citation of Legal Authorities (OSCOLA), 4th Edition.

Formatting: House Style.

Submission and Review:
•Please email your work in a Microsoft Word document to nelr@newcastle.ac.uk.
•Please include an abstract of no more than 250 words and 3-5 keywords in your submission.
•All submissions will undergo a blind review process by multiple editors on the Editorial Board, comprising academic staff and students at the Newcastle Law School. For blind review purposes, please remove all personal information from the submission document.
•Authors will be notified about the status of their submission by the end of March 2025. Some revisions may be required.
•NELR does not accept submissions that have been published elsewhere, except personal blogs or SSRN pages.


Authors are welcome to contact the Editorial Board for any inquiries at nelr@newcastle.ac.uk.

NELR Podcast: Divine Winds, a film by Dr Víctor M. Cázares L., Leverhulme Early Career Fellow, Newcastle University

Dive into a riveting conversation with Víctor Cázares as he unravels the intricate dance between history and law, exploring how constitutions are more than just texts—they’re powerful, sometimes violent, catalysts for societal change.

Discover the untold stories behind constitutional evolution as Víctor highlights the surprising connections between peacemaking and conflict and why history’s lessons are crucial for shaping the laws of tomorrow.

Be captivated by Víctor’s innovative approach of using music and film to illustrate the dynamic and often tumultuous world of legal history, showing how artistic mediums can bring new insights into academic research.

The podcast is hosted by Bernardo Carvalho De Mello, co-convenor of the Constitutionalism & Governance Research Group and PGR student at Newcastle Law School.

South Africa’s case against Israel before the International Court of Justice

Bernardo Carvalho de Mello

On December 29, 2023, the Republic of South Africa sued the International Court of Justice, bringing the State of Israel to the Hague Court over allegations of violations of the 1948 Convention for the Prevention and Suppression of the Crime of Genocide (hereinafter “Convention against Genocide” or “convention”). In short, South Africa initiates judicial proceedings to (a) verify that the actions committed by Israel in Gaza constitute violations of different obligations present in the convention and (b) obtain a decision in precautionary proceedings and immediately suspend Israel’s military actions in and against Gaza.

Knowing that proceedings before the Hague Court can take years, a request during the course of the conflict also aims to obtain a precautionary order to influence current events. This even seems to be a trend in recent years in terms of human rights. In this sense, it is possible to verify that the court was recently approached in two cases involving the same convention: the case of Ukraine v. Russia (2022) [1] and the case of Gambia v. Myanmar (2019) [2]. In both cases, the International Court issued precautionary orders demanding specific actions from the requested States to protect the rights present in the convention.

This text technically analyses the case filed by South Africa before the Hague Court in light of existing international rules and the court’s jurisprudence on the matter to clarify the meaning of this legal action for the conflict. Initially (1), it focuses on South Africa’s allegations, thus examining its initial petition. To this end, I will analyse the court’s jurisprudence on matters of genocide and precautionary measures (2) Seeking parallels with the current situation, I will speculate on the possible directions the court might pursue regarding the case.

(1) South Africa’s allegations and the court’s procedural requirements

In its application [3], South Africa argues that Israel is violating the Genocide Convention, among other allegations, by failing to act to prevent the carrying out of genocide, for conspiring to carry out a genocide and for preventing the investigation and punishment of genocide, in accordance with articles I, II, III, IV, V and VI of the convention [4]. According to the South African document, “The acts and omissions by Israel complained of by South Africa are genocidal in character because they are intended to bring about the destruction of a substantial part of the Palestinian national, racial and ethnical group, that being the part of the Palestinian group in the Gaza Strip (‘Palestinians in Gaza’).” Among the different sources it uses to support its arguments, South Africa uses statements from various countries and heads of state (including Brazil) to define genocide as noted in paragraph 12 of the petition [5]. However, if the case proceeds, each act will need to be analysed separately under the terms of the Genocide Convention to verify a violation, demanding a high evidentiary burden from both parties.

One might question the rationale behind South Africa’s decision to initiate the lawsuit and the procedural basis for its legitimacy in doing so. It could appear more straightforward for the State of Palestine to sue Israel, allowing both to directly address and counter each other’s claims.

Despite these considerations, the legal obligations present in the Genocide Convention are obligations of a unique nature in international law: obligations of an erga omnes parte nature. In other words, they are obligations owed to all other parties to the convention and, which it is the legal interests of all convention members to safeguard. As the court itself noted in 2022: “(…) such a common interest implies that the obligations in question are owed by any State application of the genocide convention (judgment) party to all the other States parties to the relevant convention; they are obligations erga omnes partes, in the sense that each State party has an interest in compliance with them in any given case”. In this way, if alleged convention violations are verified, any State that is a party to the convention — including the United Kingdom — would have the legitimacy to sue another State or even intervene in the procedure because it is a party to it and has interests in its interpretation.

South Africa’s request not only aims to discuss the convention’s obligations but also requires as a precautionary measure, that Israel carry out a series of acts. These include (1) that Israel suspends its military activities in and against Gaza (paragraph 144 n. 1); (2) that Israel guarantees that any military action or irregular military groups cease their activities (paragraph 144 n. 2); (3) that all measures available to the State of Israel to prevent genocide are taken (paragraph 144 n. 4 and 5) [6]. In other words, there is a clear intention on the part of South Africa to end the Israeli offensive without damaging the rights protected in the convention, therefore confirming the dual purpose of the action.

(2) The jurisprudence of the International Court on genocide and precautionary measures

Under Article IX of the Genocide Convention, the International Court of Justice is the judicial body responsible for resolving disputes involving its application and interpretation of the convention. The court has already issued a crucial advisory opinion detailing the importance of the convention and made several pronouncements on the nature of the obligations contained therein. Furthermore, two contentious cases have already reached the merits stage and obtained final decisions: the case of Bosnia v. Serbia (2007) [7], in which the court found that Serbia failed to prevent genocide carried out by militias on its territory, and the case Croatia v. Serbia (2015), in which the Court understood [8] that a genocide did not occur, despite the crucial dissenting vote by judge Antônio Augusto Cançado Trindade.

The lessons from previous cases demonstrate that one cannot lose sight of the fact that the times of international justice are as slow as those of domestic justice, and a case like this can even lead to a division within the court (composed of 15 judges from different nationalities, origins, and perceptions of international law). The South African petition is the beginning of a long process. In the two cases in which it finished judging allegations of violation of the convention, the International Court of Justice took more than ten years to issue a final decision, with several procedural incidents throughout the process.

This is because the legal configuration occurs when a particularly high evidentiary standard is reached. In addition to committing specific acts of violence against a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group, genocide as a legal figure requires a special will to eliminate, in whole or in part, the group in question, in accordance with Article II of the convention. As the court itself has established in the past, the intention to destroy a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group as such “is the essential characteristic of genocide, which distinguishes it from other serious crimes. It is regarded as a dolus specialis, that is to say a specific intent, which, in order for genocide to be established, must be present in addition to the intent required for each of the individual acts involved” [9].

In the Croatia v. Serbia decision in 2015, the International Court was particularly demanding when it came to verifying special intent. Consequently, the Court concluded that Croatia had failed to demonstrate and prove special intent, despite the acts committed being provided for in the convention, the volitional element of destruction of the group was missing, which could not be merely inferred from the acts. The case of Gambia v. Myanmar (2019), still without trial before the court, seems to contribute to the South Africa v Israel case; the fact that there are reports from a special fact-finding mission of the UN Human Rights Council that have already attested to the genocidal intent may be particularly relevant [10].

The South African strategy, however, appears to be in line with other recent cases before the court in which the convention was invoked that sought an interim order to cease violations of the convention on an urgent basis. In such situations, the Court is only required to demonstrate its initial jurisdiction (prima facie jurisdiction), the potential for harm, the urgency of the matter, and the plausibility of the violated rights. With these criteria met, the International Court can issue an order that demands less rigorous procedural standards than what would be needed to prove genocide. Specifically, it can mandate a party to refrain from actions that might breach the Genocide Convention, without the stringent requirement to prove genocide has occurred. In this sense, a relevant precedent also appears to be the case of Ukraine v. Russia (2022), wherein the provisional measures focus less on the need for genocidal intent but instead on the risk of violation of rights protected by the convention [11].

(3) What to expect from the proceedings before the International Court of Justice?

The South African action can also be read as an attempt to quickly obtain from the Hague Court an order to cease belligerent acts on the part of Israel. This judicial action has the potential to amplify international pressure, which is not only political but also legal in nature, to halt hostilities and bring the parties to the negotiation table.

Obviously, many procedural requirements need to be met, and the urgency of the case will lead to a series of complex legal arguments in the coming weeks in the Hague in an attempt to make the South African request successful. Suppose the court finds that it has jurisdiction over the dispute (something that is not always obvious in the court’s jurisprudence). In that case, it will begin a long process of discussing the existence or not of genocide and other violations of the convention.

Court proceedings can take several paths, and accurately predicting judicial behaviour in highly complex cases is not always fruitful. However, given the recent jurisprudence on the matter, some questions have emerged, and other situations can be conjectured.

The first question that arises involves Israel’s participation or not in the procedures, which tends to make all the difference in terms of defences and justifications. Israel would have the opportunity to present its procedural and substantial defences, such as contesting the court’s own jurisdiction and contesting the existence of a “controversy” between South Africa and Israel involving the convention. Another more complex issue involving the limits of self-defence in international law could also arise.

A second procedural question would be whether, in the present case, there will also be a tendency for intervention by third States, as happened in the cases of Ukraine v. Russia (2022) and Gambia v. Myanmar (2019). It is unclear which States will be willing to participate procedurally in the debate. Although one can imagine at least Palestinian participation in the procedures, it will be interesting to see which States will actually participate in the procedure and what arguments will be invoked, both in terms of alleging the existence of violations and maintaining the high evidentiary standard for configuring genocide.

While the seriousness of the situation in Gaza calls for international action, due legal process must be respected due to the severity of the accusations made. As mentioned, in the jurisprudence of the International Court, a State has never been effectively condemned for actively conducting a genocide.

The court is guided by the adversarial principle, and it can be assumed that a judicial institution, guided by praetorian impartiality and independence, does not wish to be perceived as endowed with predictions. This means that Israel’s participation and hearing of its arguments constitutes a fundamental point for the process before the court. Perhaps we can expect from the court something similar to previous cases: an order as a precautionary measure, that is, temporary for the duration of the process and seeking to safeguard the rights of pendent lite, ordering the abstention from acts that may harm the rights protected in the Convention against Genocide.

Although there are criticisms of the mobilisation of the International Court merely for precautionary purposes in cases involving human rights violations, this tendency to consolidate itself in the jurisprudence of the Hague — and the case of South Africa does not seem to be an exception. Furthermore, it is vital to have a judicial body that can decide or not on the existence of genocide, avoiding the appropriation of the expression by political speeches. If, in any way, it contributes to preventing the worsening of conflicts and ensuring that the rights of the parties are preserved, the International Court of Justice will be exercising its essential role as the main judicial body of the United Nations and, therefore, of the very protection of rights recognised by the United Nations and the international community.

1 International Court of Justice, 2024. Allegations of Genocide under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Ukraine v. Russian Federation: 32 States intervening). Available at: https://www.icj-cij.org/case/182 [Accessed 25 January 2024].

2 International Court of Justice, 2019. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (The Gambia v Myanmar) [2019] ICJ Gen List No. 178. Available at: https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/178/178-20220722-jud-01-00-en.pdf [Accessed 22 February 2024].

3 International Court of Justice, 2023. Application Instituting Proceedings, Filed in the Registry of the Court on 28 December 2023. [online] Available at: https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/192/192-20231228-app-01-00-en.pdf [Accessed 25 January 2024].

4 United Nations, n.d. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. [pdf] Available at: https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.1_Convention%20on%20the%20Prevention%20and%20Punishment%20of%20the%20Crime%20of%20Genocide.pdf [Accessed 22 January 2024].

5 International Court of Justice, 2023. Application Instituting Proceedings, Filed in the Registry of the Court on 28 December 2023. [online] Available at: https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/192/192-20231228-app-01-00-en.pdf [Accessed 25 January 2024].

6 International Court of Justice, 2023. Application Instituting Proceedings, Filed in the Registry of the Court on 28 December 2023. [online] Available at: https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/192/192-20231228-app-01-00-en.pdf [Accessed 25 January 2024].

7 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro) [1996] Available at: https://www.icj-cij.org/case/91 [Accessed 25 January 2024].

8 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v Serbia) [2015] Available at: https://www.icj-cij.org/case/118 [Accessed 25 January 2024].

9 Ibid.

10 Human Rights Council, 2018. Report of the independent international fact-finding mission on Myanmar. A/HRC/39/64, 12 September. p.19

11 International Court of Justice, 2024. Allegations of Genocide under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Ukraine v. Russian Federation: 32 States intervening). Available at: https://www.icj-cij.org/case/182 [Accessed 25 January 2024]

Bernardo Carvalho de Mello is a law PHD student at Newcastle University

Student editor-in-chief (NELR BLOG) – Thea Nord Berget

Academic Editor (NELR BLOG) – Dr Neha Vyas