By Samiur Rahman
Once heralded as a beacon of poverty alleviation by targeting the achievement of Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 1, Bangladesh has made significant strides in the consumer lending sector since 1990 due to rapid growth in Micro Finance Institutions (MFIs), which are estimated more than 1,000 in numbers and among these 724 licensed MFIs are serving 32.18 million borrowers. An early 2005 empirical study on the consumer lending practices of mainstream MFIs, i.e., Grameen Bank, Brac, etc., indicates a reduction in subjective poverty through microcredit lending of 6.5% per programme a year. Likewise, a recent 2025 study revealed that the micro-credit sector has expanded dramatically showing that over the span of 5 years between 2018 and 2022 , Bangladesh obtained 29.74 million customers against 25.40 million during 2018 with an annual loan disbursement of BDT 1.9 trillion.
These figures demonstrate the growing significance of micro-finance in our economy particularly in agriculture and rural economy. However, the overall regulatory landscape still reveals structural problems. For instance, the lack of effective regulation of interest rates, as most of the MFIs use a flat rate method typically between 10 to 30% , may conceal the true cost of credit and risk, inflating the interest rate for certain lending products, thereby harming the borrowers in the long run. Recently, a Supreme Court ruling also indicated this issue , questioning the exploitative interest rates of the micro credit services offered by Grameen Bank.
Furthermore, the rapid expansion of micro-credit institutions and recently introduced MFS (Mobile Financial Service) micro lending services may weaken the macro prudential regulatory oversight and create systemic risk within the consumer lending sector. However, the 2005 study also revealed that the top three NGOs in Bangladesh held 85% of total cumulative credit, leading to a high concentration of lending capital. The 2005 study revealed a strong picture of vulnerability for the new borrowers who are objectively poor, around 65.3%. Finally, drawing from these, there is an indication of an anti-client-based lending regime which lacks transparency thereby raising a critical question, is the micro-credit regulation properly optimized to ensure fairness to our consumers? In this context, the regulatory framework of the micro-credit regulation in Bangladesh needs to be unpacked.
The regulatory framework for micro-credit regime in Bangladesh comprises of two organs. First, the Micro Credit Regulatory Authority (MRA) under the remit of the Micro Credit Regulatory Authority Act 2006, which is the primary legislation regulating entities like NGO and NBFIs (Non-Bank Financial Institutions) in Bangladesh. The act itself holds prudential regulation of the institution’s ability to lend rather than embracing any consumer duties and fairness obligations for the regulated entities working under its remit. Especially, section 9 of the act specifies supervisory duties of MRA to ensure proper regulation of the MFIs, but no consumer-friendly guidelines exist for ensuring fair treatment, fair value, transparency, and vulnerable borrower protection against unscrupulous lending practices of the MFIs. Moreover, other provisions of this legislation focus on maintaining the prudential stability of the regulated institutions, with no provision for borrower protection, which is alarming. The enforcement provisions of the Act similarly fall short, resembling sections 35 to 37 of Chapter 6 of the act. These only apply to licensing and certification-related issues not irresponsible lending or consumer protections. Therefore, the primary legislation governing the micro-credit sector only concerns about the governance of the MFIs (lenders) rather than promoting borrower protection.
To remedy this, the MRA rules 2010 make matters to some extent favorable for the marginalized borrower. Circular 5 of the rules states interest rate caps of up-to 27%, which is still enormous for the most vulnerable borrowers. Additionally, it also ensures 15 days grace period before the first installment which is an attempt to ease the repayment-related burden of the borrowers. However, the compliance of such regulation is questionable because MRA lacks human resource capacity to supervise an enormous number of MFIs that exist in our country, thereby giving enough chance to the unscrupulous lenders to exploit the loopholes of the current regulatory regime and get away with unfair lending practices, as this regime fails to regulate borrowers’ understanding, affordability test, and MFIs attempt to justify the value of their debt financing. Finally, the rules of deposit mobilization enumerated in the MRA rules only justify liquidity, capital reserve, etc., which are prudential safeguards but overlook conduct regulation relating to responsible consumer lending. However, Bangladesh Bank (BB), also published some guidelines in the form of soft laws, which are non-binding instruments with zero accountability for non-compliance of the MFIs actively engaged in consumer lending. In this regard, Bangladesh Bank (BB) Guidelines for Customer Services and Complaint Management (2014), could be scrutinized as Bangladesh Bank is responsible for macro prudential oversight of our financial sector.
The guideline as a soft law, lacks enforcement as it is a service and quality guideline rather than a conduct-of-business-centric rule book. Therefore, even if the MFIs breach this, there is no substantial disciplinary outcome as guidelines lack legislative enforcement power. Moreover, although the guidelines focus on administrative and operational resilience of the MFIs, it is does not cover borrower protection. The consumer protection regime of Bangladesh, i.e. the Consumer Rights Protection Act 2009, also paints a grim picture as the act itself regulates general consumer-related products rather than regulated lending activities like micro-credit services. Although the act recognizes financial services, the definition in sec.2(22) is too narrow to include regulated financial activities and does not contain any provisions concerning borrower protections. Therefore, drawing from the above concludes that the borrower protection regime is underdeveloped therefore facilitating a regime where the MFIs take advantage of uninformed borrowers . Although the borrower can file a writ petition under Article 102 of our constitution as a judicial recourse for unfair lending practices, this pathway itself is unreliable because of cost, litigation backlog in the SC, and delay in the pronouncement of the judgments. Moreover, Artha Rin Adalat sec. 6(2) (a special court in Bangladesh specializing in fast loan recovery from financial institutions pursuant to section 2), also restricts individual access to financial redress as the forum only allows regulated corporations to file litigation.
So, regulatory reform of the borrower protection regime is inevitable in Bangladesh and should follow reform initiatives in light of the United Kingdom’s recent overhaul of the consumer lending framework. In the face of growing criticism of Pay-Day and Wonga lending scandal, which took the high cost short-term credit (micro-credit) interest rate to APR 4214% and 31.37% a month, led to the creation of FCA’s (Financial Conduct Authority consumer lending guideline with stringent enforcement outcome, safeguarding the sector-wide borrowers. Although the financial regulation in the UK is principle-based, the country has moved away from box-ticking and light-touch regulation to a more law- and society-based regulation . The new FCA consumer duty framework is revolutionary as it consists of three pillars. First , lending entities must follow strict retail and consumer-focused principles, i.e. the main agenda behind lending would be borrowers. Secondly, cross-cutting rules enabling the consumers to pursue their financial objectives, act in good faith, and avoid causing foreseeable harm to the retail customers. Finally, the financial services should promote four outcomes aligned with the previous objectives.
The four outcomes are: first, products and services that meet customers’ needs. Second, price and value that is fair for what customers get. Third, consumer understanding, meaning clear information that helps customers decide and fourth, consumer support when customers need assistance. Moreover, if the borrower is entering a regulated credit agreement, must coincide with the FCA Consumer Credit Sourcebook (CONC) 5A, with default charges not exceeding 15 pounds, an interest rate cap of 0.8% per day, and the borrower must never pay more in interest than the borrowed amount. Clifford Chance (2023) reported that this consumer duty regime in the UK is ensuring responsible lending and allowing board-level accountability. Moreover, in case of consumer complaints, the legal aid through the Financial Ombudsman Service (FOS) allows the complainant quasi-judicial recourse to their grievances, provided FCA can also impose sanctions on non-compliant firms for breach of the consumer duty framework.
So, why would Bangladesh care to model their borrower protection regime in light of FCA? The straight answer is that enabling borrower protection would make corporate lending more accountable and would allow the vulnerable borrower, i.e. rural farmers, SME entrepreneurs make more informed choices and exert control over their lending or debt outcomes. To achieveborrower-level fairness, the MRA needs exclusive clauses of borrower protection and fairness outcomes of the MFIs as the MRA is responsible for the conduct and prudential regulation of the NGOs and MFIs. Later, Bangladesh Bank should enable strict consumer lending guidelines like the FCA and impose stricter sanctions for non-compliance. Most notably, the flat-rate interest should be abolished or should be made transparent by the Bangladesh Bank, allowing the impoverished borrowers a sigh of relief when borrowing money for their personal financial endeavors.
Therefore, I suggest that the legal redress regime should mirror the UK and creation of a separate tribunal for financial consumer protection is inevitable or the government could empower the Ombudsman office quasi judicial power to tackle complaints relating to consumer lending products. Additionally, the legal aid must be made individually accessible to ensure access to legal justice which is a fundamental right of our citizens. In conclusion, the financial regulation of Bangladesh is certainly rule-based regulation (RBR) and lacks conduct oversight where box-ticking is pretty much evident and a law and society-based approach focusing on consumer well-being seems like a misnomer. Therefore, a regulatory divergence in light of the twin-peak structure of the UK, separating conduct and prudential regulation, enabling outcome-based lending practices, would allow the micro-credit sector of BD to become more compliant, responsible and consumer-focused which will allow borrowers to remain at the center of our financial regulation and allow them to pursue their financial objective as a result giving them a proper chance to alleviate from the vicious cycle of poverty.