Phi2003 Workshop
The workshop is in two sections. Work in groups and post answers below — I shall go through them at the beginning of next week.
Section A| Hobbes on Freedom
Liberty, and Necessity are consistent, as in the water, that hath not only liberty, but a necessity of descending by the Channel; so likewise in the Actions which men voluntarily doe: which, because they proceed from their will, proceed from liberty; and yet, because every act of mans will, and every desire, and inclination proceedeth from some cause, and that from another cause, in a continuall chaine, (whose first link is in the hand of God the first of all causes,) they proceed from necessity. (Hobbes, ch 21, pp 146-7)
- Define the theories of determinism, libertarianism and compatibilism.
- In what way can a river be described as free?
- What theory does the above passage suggest Hobbes hold?
- Is Hobbes guilty of a high redefinition of the term or is our everyday thinking guilty of a metaphysical error concerning the meaning of the word free?
Section B| The Naturalistic fallacy
I cannot forbear adding to these reasonings an observation, which may, perhaps, be found of some importance. In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remarked, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surprized to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, it is necessary that it should be observed and explained; and at the same time that a reason should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it. But as authors do not commonly use this precaution, I shall presume to recommend it to the readers; and am persuaded, that this small attention would subvert all the vulgar systems of morality, and let us see, that the distinction of vice and virtue is not founded merely on the relations of objects, nor is perceived by reason.
— David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, III, 1, i
The above passage has often been read to advocate the claim that it is not logically possible to deduce from what merely is the case to what should be the case. (Commentators disagree about the interpretation, though.) In other words, there is a logical gap between two classes of judgements or propositions: statements of facts and statements of value. It is claim about the validity of arguments when one uses a fact about human nature or the universe in moral reasoning.
Do the following arguments involve an invalid attempt to derive ought from is? If the answer is yes, show where the reasoning goes awry. Note that this is not a question about the truth or falsehood of the premises of the arguments (“All dogs are blue. Pedro is a dog. Therefore, Pedro is blue.” Is VALID but FALSE).
- A human being who does not get food will die. Therefore, we ought to feed the hungry.
- A human being who does not get food will. We ought to do what promotes human well-being. Therefore, we ought to feed the hungry.
- Hurting people’s feelings is wrong so you ought not to do it.
- Paul gets money out of people by deceiving them. Therefore, he is a crook. Therefore, he ought not to do it.
- You distinctly said, ‘You can borrow my lecture notes – I promise,’ therefore you promised to lend me your notes, so you placed yourself under an obligation and obligations are things one ought to do. Therefore, you ought to lend them to me.
- Bob wants to win the chess game. To win he needs to move the queen one space forward. Therefore, he ought to move his queen one space forward.
Final discussion points:
(1) given the interpretation of Hume offered and the above arguments, can one say it is impossible to derive normative (ought) statements from descriptive (factual) ones?
(2) How does this relate to Hobbes’s attempt to redefine moral terms and foundations? Is he guilty of the naturalistic fallacy?
You leave the answers here….
Section A.
1. Define the theories:
Determinism – actions and events are determined by a chain of previous events i.e. they are necessary.
Libertarianism – actions are a result of a will – ‘free’.
Compatibilism – previous events and character may affect the probability of an action but we still have the will to make it happen or not.
2. A river could be described as free because it doesn’t flow in a perfect stream – bits froth up and bits go off course. But I don’t think it can be called free because anything it does is obeying physical laws.
3. Our everyday thinking does misuse the concept of freedom e.g. calling a river free. Hobbes is guilty of redefining freedom to fit in with what I read as an actually almost deterministic viewpoint.
Section B.
1. No food, die – ought to feed the hungry.
Assuming sanctity of life, valid. But that doesn’t come into the logic, just our human nature. So, logically invalid.
2. Same as above. The extra step is still a normative statement based on human desire to save lives rather than a logical step. So, invalid.
3. Hurting feelings is wrong, ought not to do it.
Invalid – wrongness is a moral concept and can’t be turned into a normative statement.
4. Same as above. The label “crook” is not a logical step.
5. Valid.
6. Valid.
” Our everyday thinking does misuse the concept of freedom e.g. calling a river free. Hobbes is guilty of redefining freedom to fit in with what I read as an actually almost deterministic viewpoint.”
Good — see the comments/replies below on taking the redefinition claim seriously.
“Assuming sanctity of life, valid. But that doesn’t come into the logic, just our human nature. So, logically invalid”
Again good, here we see Hume’s real point, not that logic is inapplicable to value statements, but that often premises are (deliberately?) hidden and rest on agreed intuitions which are perhaps controversial when revealed.
I’m currently reading through the second chapter of the book Free will and Continental Philosophy and thought I’d email since I’m a little confused, and you’re the author!
You maintain in chapter two that in the school of Compatibilism, individual character is the differentiating factor in cases of moral responsibility.
Why is it that Compatibilists overlook the possibility, if not fact that character is too the result of a causal chain? By my understanding character is to some unknown extent the result of environment and biological processes, i.e. chains.
So it seems to me that the Compatibilists suppose that we ascribe moral responsibility based on nature, i.e. “penalise him for doing wrong because his character is predisposed to behaviour considered wrong”. To me, this suggests that free will and determinism aren’t compatible still.
From what I’ve read this sounds a little iffy to me, so I thought I’d email to clear up any misunderstandings.
A really good and important observation. You are spot on.
First, a confession: I am guilty of really only discussing one form of compatibilism (and there are many more) in that book. As you remember in the lecture, I did hint at the problems with assuming that liberty and necessity are consistent in this way and you are absolutely right if freedom means “could have acted otherwise” in a literal sense, then there is no responsibility as we are not responsible for being our characters (genetics and environment do that causally).
But, in defence of this position, I don’t think they claim that. The “could have acted otherwise” condition is the characteristic criterion of the libertarian. Remember that we are interested in accounting for the phenomenon of moral responsibility and, if I do something (me, the character, the accidents which have become me) I deserve praise or blame. Compatibilism can account for that praise/blame so long as we jettison the rather obscure metaphysical ideas we have about “freedom” which are both unclear and unrealisable.
I return to these issues when we move on to Kant and Hegel after Christmas.
1. Define the theories of determinism, libertarianism and compatibilism.
Determinism – Events are actions. They have causes which can offer explanations.
Libertarianism – There are free actions and there are determined events.
Compatibilism – Actions are free and caused, by desire and belief. Character plays a role in the desire and belief.
2. In what way can a river be described as free?
Hobbes compares humans to a river. Liberty and necessity are consistent for Hobbes. A river not only has liberty but necessity of a channel. A river has liberty to flow down the channel, but it also has necessity to do so. Hobbes is purposely inverting this definition of liberty in order to describe how a humans have liberty but do not freely choose.
3. What theory does the above passage suggest Hobbes holds?
A compatibilist theory – actions are events, they’re free and are also caused. Hobbes says that everything proceeds for a cause in a continual chain.
4. Is Hobbes guilty of a high redefinition of the term or is our everyday thinking guilty of a metaphysical error concerning the meaning of the word free?
Hobbes asserts that freewill is a metaphysical error. The will is nothing but desire, and desire has a material cause. Hobbes is a compatibilist, he proposes that character plays a role in the desire and belief which causes actions.
Good response, but you don’t engage with the high redefinition problem. Philosophers/scientist/politicians are often guilty of responding to a problem by redefining the terms of the problem such that the phenomenon in question just magically disappears. One may wonder if the phenomenon similarly disappears (which is what Hobbes here believes).
Section A:
Determinism – The belief that everything has a cause and free will does not exist.
Libertarianism – Our actions are not caused and therefore we are free.
Compatibilism – The belief that although our actions all proceed from a previous cause, we are still ‘free’, thus free will and determinism do not necessarily contradict each other.
In what way can a river be described as free?
If liberty is considered to be the act of what is possible at that moment, by that agent, then the river is free to run through the channel.
However, if liberty is considered as an ability to “act otherwise”, then river is not free, because it necessarily runs through the channel.
What theory does the above passage suggest Hobbes hold?
Compatibilism – Hobbes believes liberty can co-exist with causality, because while everything is caused, the ability to be willing to do an action, according to Hobbes, is liberty. However, the example of a river is questionable then, because how can a river “will” to do anything?
Is Hobbes guilty of a high redefinition of the term or is our everyday thinking guilty of a metaphysical error concerning the meaning of the word free?
Perhaps the use of the word ‘free’/’freedom’ is unable to meet any form of universal meaning, so Hobbes is only offering yet another definition (that we may or may not find easier to relate to in our understanding of the world).
Section B: Had trouble with those.
A human being who does not get food will die. Therefore, we ought to feed the hungry.
INVALID: No reason to not let them die.
A human being who does not get food will die. We ought to do what promotes human well-being. Therefore, we ought to feed the hungry.
VALID
Hurting people’s feelings is wrong so you ought not to do it.
VALID/INVALID? Is wrongness/rightness a valid reason for action?
Paul gets money out of people by deceiving them. Therefore, he is a crook. Therefore, he ought not to do it.
INVALID: Why should he not be a crook? Although it’s same with the wrongness, those premises imply an argument, but do not specifically state it.
You distinctly said, ‘You can borrow my lecture notes – I promise,’ therefore you promised to lend me your notes, so you placed yourself under an obligation and obligations are things one ought to do. Therefore, you ought to lend them to me.
VALID
Bob wants to win the chess game. To win he needs to move the queen one space forward. Therefore, he ought to move his queen one space forward.
VALID
(1) given the interpretation of Hume offered and the above arguments, can one say it is impossible to derive normative (ought) statements from descriptive (factual) ones?
Not sure what is meant by derive here.
More controversial example:
“Piracy is theft. Theft is wrong. Therefore, piracy is wrong. Therefore, you ought not to pirate.” – argument is valid? (I hope), so in that sense you can derive ought from is, but the derivation only holds as long as statements are agreed as being true. You may not consider piracy a theft, or you may not consider theft wrong, in which case the argument is false, because the premises are false?
As I said.. having trouble with this.
(2) How does this relate to Hobbes’s attempt to redefine moral terms and foundations? Is he guilty of the naturalistic fallacy?
It seems that Hobbes thought that the only difference between is and ought to, is that of necessity and liberty. The events are caused, and an agent has a liberty to act by the cause. (agent doesn’t have the liberty to act otherwise though, so how is it different from necessity?)
“Perhaps the use of the word ‘free’/’freedom’ is unable to meet any form of universal meaning, so Hobbes is only offering yet another definition (that we may or may not find easier to relate to in our understanding of the world). ”
You are getting there — see my comment above on high redefinition.
I shall have a quick chat about the naturalistic fallacy, but the counter example you offer is valid but derived from normative premises (theft and piracy are wrong). Hume holds that natural facts cannot give rise to value judgements — yet this seems to be the very thing Hobbes is doing, but doe she do it by falling foul of Hume’s observation, or by redefining again our notion of value.
Liberty, and Necessity are consistent, as in the water, that hath not only liberty, but a necessity of descending by the Channel; so likewise in the Actions which men voluntarily doe: which, because they proceed from their will, proceed from liberty; and yet, because every act of mans will, and every desire, and inclination proceedeth from some cause, and that from another cause, in a continuall chaine, (whose first link is in the hand of God the first of all causes,) they proceed from necessity. (Hobbes, ch 21, pp 146-7)
I tried to simplify what he’s saying, in brackets are the quotes from the text above:
Actions are done voluntarily (Actions which men voluntarily doe).
Actions proceed from agent’s will(desire). ( which, because they proceed from their will)
Will/desire proceeds from liberty. (proceed from liberty)
Will/desire proceeds from a cause/necessity. (every act of mans will, and every desire, and inclination proceedeth from some cause, …, they proceed from necessity)
What is the difference, then, between a liberty and a necessity?
Good technique for understanding difficult passages, but the question you ask at the end needs an answer. Don’t be rhetorical.
A
1. Define the theories of determinism, libertarianism and compatibilism.
Determinism: the belief that all things in the world are subject to a universal law: every event follows from a cause and causes a next event to follow.
Libertarianism: an extreme laissez-faire political philosophy advocating only minimal state intervention in the lives of citizens.
Compatilibism: the belief that free will and determinism are compatible ideas, and that it is possible to believe both without being logically inconsistent. Compatibilists believe freedom can be present or absent in situations for reasons that have nothing to do with metaphysics.
2. In what way can a river be described as free?
It has the freedom to run its channel but it is still determined to do so. If I am quite honest, I am struggling to understand the logic of compatibilism as both libertarianism and determinism appear to be logically incoherent. Also I don’t understand his explanation about how a river is free, because surely through a determinists eyes, the river cannot be free.
3. What theory does the above passage suggest Hobbes hold?
I believe Hobbes is in support of the compatibilist theory, as he talks about necessity (determinism) and freedom (libertarianism) being two theories that work alongside one another.
4. Is Hobbes guilty of a high redefinition of the term or is our everyday thinking guilty of a metaphysical error concerning the meaning of the word free?
From what I have gathered, I don’t believe Hobbes is guilty of a high redefinition of the term ‘freedom,’ but rather has a wrong idea of what constitutes necessity, as I do not believe that one cause causing another cause is not necessity, but rather something that happens in an unpredictable manner. I believe both Hobbes and everyday thinking people have a good grasp of what freedom is – however Hobbes’ example of the river being free confuses me.
B
1. A human being who does not get food will die. Therefore, we ought to feed the hungry.
Invalid
2. A human being who does not get food will die. We ought to do what promotes human well-being. Therefore, we ought to feed the hungry.
Valid
3. Hurting people’s feelings is wrong so you ought not to do it.
Valid
4. Paul gets money out of people by deceiving them. Therefore, he is a crook. Therefore, he ought not to do it.
Invalid
5. You distinctly said, ‘You can borrow my lecture notes – I promise,’ therefore you promised to lend me your notes, so you placed yourself under an obligation and obligations are things one ought to do. Therefore, you ought to lend them to me.
Valid
6. Bob wants to win the chess game. To win he needs to move the queen one space forward. Therefore, he ought to move his queen one space forward.
Valid
I plan on doing some more reading into Hobbes’ position, as I don’t feel confident that I have totally grasped where he is getting at.
Notice here:
“Libertarianism: an extreme laissez-faire political philosophy advocating only minimal state intervention in the lives of citizens”
This is the correct definition, but is here merely taken from a source without reflection. That form of libertarianism is a political philosophy which is opposed to collectivism, authoritarianism and egalitarian policies. We are looking for the libertarianism which is opposite to determinism. always BEAR IN MING THE SLIPPERY NATURE OF USING PHILOSOPHICAL TERMS.
For more on Hume’s law look at: http://www.blackwellreference.com/subscriber/uid=1067/tocnode?query=hume+fallacy&widen=1&result_number=4&from=search&id=g9781405106795_chunk_g978140510679510_ss1-183&type=std&fuzzy=0&slop=1
On Hobbes, I do believe, given Hobbes’ explicit materialism that he must, in the final analysis, be not just a compatibilist but a determinist: “that which is not subject to motion is not subject to impediment.” However…
At the beginning of ch. 21 when Hobbes is describing the liberty of subjects (and here he means those subject to the power of a sovereign but there are echoes of the subject as an individual), he uses a variety of metaphors and cases to describe this liberty. Here are the first few paragraphs from that chapter:
“LIBERTY, or freedom, signifieth properly the absence of opposition (by opposition, I mean external impediments of motion); and may be applied no less to irrational and inanimate creatures than to rational. For whatsoever is so tied, or environed, as it cannot move but within a certain space, which space is determined by the opposition of some external body, we say it hath not liberty to go further. And so of all living creatures, whilst they are imprisoned, or restrained with walls or chains; and of the water whilst it is kept in by banks or vessels that otherwise would spread itself into a larger space; we use to say they are not at liberty to move in such manner as without those external impediments they would. But when the impediment of motion is in the constitution of the thing itself, we use not to say it wants the liberty, but the power, to move; as when a stone lieth still, or a man is fastened to his bed by sickness.
And according to this proper and generally received meaning of the word, a freeman is he that, in those things which by his strength and wit he is able to do, is not hindered to do what he has a will to. But when the words free and liberty are applied to anything but bodies, they are abused; for that which is not subject to motion is not to subject to impediment: and therefore, when it is said, for example, the way is free, no liberty of the way is signified, but of those that walk in it without stop. And when we say a gift is free, there is not meant any liberty of the gift, but of the giver, that was not bound by any law or covenant to give it. So when we speak freely, it is not the liberty of voice, or pronunciation, but of the man, whom no law hath obliged to speak otherwise than he did. Lastly, from the use of the words free will, no liberty can be inferred of the will, desire, or inclination, but the liberty of the man; which consisteth in this, that he finds no stop in doing what he has the will, desire, or inclination to do.
Fear and liberty are consistent: as when a man throweth his goods into the sea for fear the ship should sink, he doth it nevertheless very willingly, and may refuse to do it if he will; it is therefore the action of one that was free: so a man sometimes pays his debt, only for fear of imprisonment, which, because no body hindered him from detaining, was the action of a man at liberty. And generally all actions which men do in Commonwealths, for fear of the law, are actions which the doers had liberty to omit.
Liberty and necessity are consistent: as in the water that hath not only liberty, but a necessity of descending by the channel; so, likewise in the actions which men voluntarily do, which, because they proceed their will, proceed from liberty, and yet because every act of man’s will and every desire and inclination proceedeth from some cause, and that from another cause, in a continual chain (whose first link is in the hand of God, the first of all causes), proceed from necessity. So that to him that could see the connexion of those causes, the necessity of all men’s voluntary actions would appear manifest. And therefore God, that seeth and disposeth all things, seeth also that the liberty of man in doing what he will is accompanied with the necessity of doing that which God will and no more, nor less. For though men may do many things which God does not command, nor is therefore author of them; yet they can have no passion, nor appetite to anything, of which appetite God’s will is not the cause. And did not His will assure the necessity of man’s will, and consequently of all that on man’s will dependeth, the liberty of men would be a contradiction and impediment to the omnipotence and liberty of God. And this shall suffice, as to the matter in hand, of that natural liberty, which only is properly called liberty.”
Bear this in mind when we begin discussing rational egoism and Hobbes’ endeavours as motivations at greater depth as part of the rational egoism and moral science topic. Liberty as the freedom to act on desire is always a possibility and a subject may have desires that are in contradiction of law or apparent self-preservation. But Hobbes, I believe, would say that such desires are uncommon and in error.
PHI2003 Blog Work:
Section A| Hobbes on Freedom:
Define the theories of determinism, libertarianism and compatibalism.
– Determinism is the theory that events necessarily follow the chain of causation that an event will always occur if the necessary conditions for it to occur precede it.
– Libertarianism holds that the actions of a human are free as the origins of said action a the will, uncaused.
– Compatibalism is the idea that our actions are both free and caused, and that liberty and necessity are compatible. If I ought to have acted differently, I would have.
In what way can a river be described as free?
– Can it, though?
What theory does the above passage suggest Hobbes hold?
– Hobbes seems to be a compatibalist, holding that both liberty and necessity can coincide.
Section B| The Naturalistic fallacy:
Do the following arguments involve an invalid attempt to derive ought from is? If the answer is yes, show where the reasoning goes awry. Note that this is not a question about the truth or falsehood of the premises of the arguments (“All dogs are blue. Pedro is a dog. Therefore, Pedro is blue.” Is VALID but FALSE).
– There is no ought. Ought can never be derived from an is. Nothing from an event provides an objective “ought.”
Final discussion points:
(1) given the interpretation of Hume offered and the above arguments, can one say it is impossible to derive normative (ought) statements from descriptive (factual) ones?
Yes.
(2) How does this relate to Hobbes’s attempt to redefine moral terms and foundations? Is he guilty of the naturalistic fallacy?
Yes, in a sense. However, if morality itself is merely a human construction, and exists merely as a conduit to satisfy human desires (i.e. allows people to live in peace so they can do things they want but not live in fear, too), then it does not matter whether Hobbes attempt to redefine moral terms and foundations is guilty or not.
1. Define the theories
Determinism is the view that every event occurs as an inevitable consequent of the antecedent event- everything is part of a causal chain and this includes human actions. This dismisses both free will and moral responsibility.
Libertarianism hold the thought that humans are ultimately free in all decisions that they make. This is because the existence of alternative possibilities and the agent’s power to choose between them, making them morally responsible for their actions.
Compatibilism is the doctrine that humans are partly free and partly determined. There is a causal connection between actions but as long as the agent is free from external coercion they are free. Determinism and human freedom are compatible here without a logical inconsistency.
2. In what way can a river be described as free?
When thinking about water and the motion in which is acts, it appears very free. It freely flows in whichever direction it pleases with no physical constraints and it is not restricted to any shape. So on first glance the whole river could be considered very free, as it is made up of water. On the other hand, when we consider the river from a bird’s eye perspective we can see that the water is contained by the river banks. The river banks are set and the broad direction of the water and places it can go is thereby restricted. This could make the ‘free will’ of the water seem a complete illusion (a deterministic response). However, we can appreciate that the water in the river is still freely flowing along it’s own accord. Perhaps as long as the water’s freedom of movement is contained in the river banks, the river is both free and determined.
Compatibilist’s might agree with this and make an analogy to claim that as long as the human’s will (water) is contained in the causal chain (river banks) humans are still free, yet partly determined.
3. What theory does the above passage suggest Hobbes hold?
Hobbes claims that humans perform actions of their will which ‘proceed from liberty’ (freedom). However, their will has been determined by ‘some cause’ in a causal chain. Hobbes seems to believe in both freedom and determinism meaning Hobbes hold a Compatibilist position.
4. Is Hobbes guilty of a high redefinition of the term or is our everyday thinking guilty of a metaphysical error concerning the meaning of the word free?
Traditionally I consider freedom to be the power to act as one chooses. Hobbes pointed out that our choices (or our ‘will’) are determined by some prior cause. I agree with Hobbes here, and so I do agree that humans are guilty and naive to think that as humans we are absolutely free. There are many factors that influence our character which then determines the things we do from biological factors to the environment/area we were socialized in. Some of our behaviors are learned and, broadly speaking, we all have cultural values impressed on each of us from an early age. However, I do believe in free will to some extent as a human I can appreciate it feeling nonsensical to argue we have no choice at all. In our daily life we make decisions between alternative choices practically at every moment that we are conscious. We are always deciding what to do with our time, even down to the position we are seated in: we are always actively deciding what we actually want to do. There are always alternatives to observe and learn from and for this reason I argue for moral responsibility. So our power to choose is limited by certain factors but we are still free to act as oneself and to act as one chooses. Thereby, I consider freedom freedom from physical coercion, control and oppression, largely agreeing with Hobbes redefinition of the term ‘freedom’.
§ A human being who does not get food will die. Therefore, we ought to feed the hungry.
Invalid, it relies on the assumption that we should help one another.
§ A human being who does not get food will. We ought to do what promotes human well-being. Therefore, we ought to feed the hungry.
Valid
§ Hurting people’s feelings is wrong so you ought not to do it.
Invalid, simply claiming something is ‘wrong’ is weak valifaction
§ Paul gets money out of people by deceiving them. Therefore, he is a crook. Therefore, he ought not to do it.
Invalid, it relies on the assumption being a crook is unjust
§ You distinctly said, ‘You can borrow my lecture notes – I promise,’ therefore you promised to lend me your notes, so you placed yourself under an obligation and obligations are things one ought to do. Therefore, you ought to lend them to me.
Valid
§ Bob wants to win the chess game. To win he needs to move the queen one space forward. Therefore, he ought to move his queen one space forward.
Valid
1. Given the interpretation of Hume offered and the above arguments, can one say it is impossible to derive normative (ought) statements from descriptive (factual) ones?
Hume’s argument is logically consistent but ultimately accepting his view leads to some tragic consequences. I would have to then agree that prescriptive statements cannot ever be derived from descriptive statements. If this were the case, it would be impossible to claim any moral statements. Dismissing morality from the world completely sits uneasy with the concepts of human compassion and empathy. It seems reasonable to derive some moral conclusions as long as there is some evaluative premise added to make it valid. For example, starving innocent children is cruel and therefore the government should try to stop poverty. These added premises are products of empathy, which I regard a universal quality (although it may altered and influenced through our cultural background). For this reason I argue that normative statements can be derived from descriptive statements, without the link being completely arbitrary.
2. How does this relate to Hobbes’s attempt to redefine moral terms and foundations? Is he guilty of the naturalistic fallacy?
Hobbes deduces moral premises from number of empirical propositions about human nature and therefore he is guilty for committing the naturalistic fallacy.