Law & Equality

Northern Ireland Assembly Votes to Legalise Same Sex Marriage” proclaimed the headline in The Guardian. Few headlines have promised so much more than the subsequent story delivers. For in spite of the one-vote majority in favour of a change in the law in Northern Ireland in the Assembly on Monday, the DUP’s invocation of a “petition of concern” (POC) on the issue meant that it was able to veto the introduction of same-sex marriage in Northern Ireland. As Gerry Lynch put it, ‘it still felt like a punch in the plexus to finally secure a democratic majority through years of hard work only for it to be vetoed undemocratically’. With rich irony the Northern Ireland Act provisions designed to protect minority groups against predatory applications of majority power have been turned into a means of stymieing reform aimed at delivering marriage equality.

It wasn’t supposed to be like this. With the spectre of the Northern Ireland Parliament’s permanent Unionist majority dominating the drafting of the arrangements for the Northern Ireland Assembly at the time of the Good Friday Agreement, POCs were intended to maintain consociationalism within Stormont by requiring a super-majority and cross-community support where Northern Ireland’s Unionist or Nationalist parties considered that a measure threatened the interests of their community. The ability of POCs to block any legislative change has instead seen them increasingly applied as a strong-arm tactic to prevent changes to the law with the aim of preserving the status quo or extracting concessions in return for a POC being lifted. DUP measures, indeed, appear to be block signed by party MLAs with the issue to which they are to be applied being added to the form at a later stage. Public confidence in the Stormont Assembly’s ability to address the needs of society in Northern Ireland has plummeted.

Whilst the DUP’s stance on gay marriage might be out of step with opinion polling across Northern Ireland, it remains popular with its own core supporters and so the political incentive to wield a POC (ahead of next year’s Assembly elections) remains strong. But if the democratic institutions in Northern Ireland remain so dysfunctional, will the courts intervene to permit gay marriage? Legal challenges to the limitations are already underway in the Northern Ireland High Court. The UUP leader Mike Nesbitt, whilst describing opposition to gay marriage as being on the “wrong side of history” (whilst maintaining his own vote against change), has told his party conference that he expects the new law to be forced upon law makers through the courts.

Forcing law reform through judicial decision could unblock this particular impasse. The need to react to an adverse court decision might help the Unionist parties to soothe the evangelical elements amongst their support base, being “saleable” as a long-resisted reform that was forced upon the parties. All the better if the judgment is not issued until after the Assembly elections. And for people who want to get married, a win is a win, and they are not likely to sniff at the courts forcing the pace of change.

So should the courts intervene? Under section 6 of the Northern Ireland Act the legislation of the Northern Ireland Assembly is not valid law if it is outside the legislative competence of the Assembly (a concept which includes making a law which breaches ECHR rights). But as the Northern Ireland Assembly has not made a law banning Gay Marriage, just failed to enact one allowing it, the general provisions of the Human Rights Act (and its incorporation of the ECHR into UK Law) will apply.

Whilst the ECHR includes a right to marry (Article 12) the Strasbourg Court has to date refused to rule that it is discriminatory for states not to apply this right to homosexual couples. In July, in its latest judgment on the issue,Oliari v Italy, the Court maintained that as only 11 of the 47 states signatory to the Convention had to date accepted same-sex marriage, there was no European consensus in favour of reading such a right into the terms of the ECHR. Many Unionist politicians picked up on this point in Monday’s debate:

The European Court of Human Rights has ruled that same-sex marriage is not a human right, so this is not a rights issue. (Gordon Lyons, DUP)

There is no human right recognised by the European Convention on Human Rights or the European Court of Human Rights to same-sex marriage. It therefore cannot be and is not a rights issue, nor is it an issue of equality. Rather, there is a worked-up, phoney demand for rights where none does or should exist. There is no equality issue here. (Jim Allister, TUV)

These same politicians will eagerly and angrily decry any effort by the Northern Ireland courts to change the law on human rights grounds. But Article 12 is not the only applicable ECHR right. The Court has established that the relationship of a cohabitating same-sex couple living in a stable partnership falls within Article 8 ECHR’s protection of “family life” (Schalk and Kopf v Austria), this might provide a basis for arguing that, as same-sex marriages concluded in other parts of the UK are treated as Civil Partnerships within the Northern Ireland jurisdiction, the awkward legal transformation of a marriage into a civil partnership as soon as someone steps off a ferry or plane amounts to discrimination.

Moreover, the definition of marriage in Northern Ireland law – “the voluntary union for life of one man and one woman to the exclusion of all others” – rests on a nineteenth century judicial decision, Hyde v Hyde (backed up by secondary legislation – the Matrimonial Causes NI Order 1978). By altering this definition the courts cannot be accused of tossing aside legislation enacted by elected lawmakers, a fact which might embolden any judge concerned about the political backlash resultant from such a decision. They also have a much freer hand in terms of their powers under the Human Rights Act than they would have had if the definition of marriage was contained in primary legislation, if they can be persuaded to move ahead of Strasbourg on the issue of Article 12.

This room for manoeuvre makes the gay marriage cases crucial tests for the role of the courts in Northern Ireland’s system of government. On a range of issues from gay marriage, to the ban on gay blood donations to the strict limitations on abortion, judges in Northern Ireland are increasingly being confronted with cases which highlight the blockages in the Assembly’s law-making process. Some might decide that the time has come to chivvy the Assembly along.

Colin Murray.


– Phuong D. Nguyen (LLB Law, Newcastle University)

Undoubtedly, competition law is moulded to assure the process of competition in terms of consumer welfare maximisation and the efficiency of the market. Accordingly, on the process of achieving a perfectly competitive market, firms are required to properly compete with concentrations on price, quality, and innovation of products and services. However, there has been no subsistence of ‘perfect competition’ in several developing countries due to the failures of the market. Firms ‘in concentrated industries’ or firms ‘protected by barriers to market entry’ have a proclivity to exploit their market power to arbitrarily constrain the productivity, raise the price, or reduce the quality of products to pursue their monopoly profits. Evidently, such conduct happens in different geographical markets and jeopardises the stability of the market, and consequentially, consumers’ benefit. Developing economies are the most susceptive subjects. Hence, in resistance to anti-competitive conduct and forestall in its detrimental impacts, the adoption of a robust competition law regime in the realms of both developing and developed countries has been proposed. Nonetheless, in practice, it is apparently difficult to implement a general competition law regime due to a vast array of disparities between developing and developed countries. Unfortunately, in this essence, some challenges would be inevitably engendered towards developing countries

The embryonic development – whether the convergence emanated from the actual desideratum of developing world?

Recently, there have been a large number of issues derived from microeconomic conducts triggering repercussions towards domestic markets and the global market. Thereby, such behaviours nowadays have not been the ‘prerogatives of sovereign nation states’ but viewed as ‘legitimate objects of attention by the international community’. Accordingly, there is an extraordinary spread of competition law witnessed in developing countries adopting, or attempting to adopt, competition policy to ameliorate the adverse impacts that stemmed from the explosion of ‘monopolisation’ and ‘international cartels’ in the 1990s. In the previous period, the preciousness of competition and competition policy had not been the pivotal concentration of the developing world. However, nowadays, due to the propensity of economic transformation, many developing countries have modified their economies based on the economic theories of comparative advantage and liberalisation, replacing ‘centrally planned economies’. Correspondingly, competition has taken into account the need of progressing competition policy with appropriate facilitation.

Nonetheless, this trend has been criticised as immature and ‘simply a response to international pressure’. The beginning of the developing world’s conversion into the developed world mainly arises from the requisite of counteracting devastating effects generated by microeconomic conducts of local individuals, households and firms. Thereby, the pressing of globalisation has persuaded policy makers of developing countries to enact competition laws, rather than the competition laws themselves being inherently formed on the basis of the real growth of developing economies.

Divergences between developed and developing world causing obscurities in achieving a general competition law regime.

There is a plausible existence of a convergence between developing countries and developed countries reflected by the International Competition Network (ICN) in its report on the Objectives of Unilateral Conduct Laws. According to the report, both developed and developing states ‘are common to the competition regime as a whole’ to systemise an ‘effective competitive process, enhancing efficiency and protecting consumer welfare’. However, it is stated that ‘Spokespeople for developing countries often express the need for an antitrust paradigm different from that of the developed world. Spokespeople for the developed world tend to argue for universal norms, which may apply differently when facts are different.’ Thereby, in spite of attaining ‘basic’ goals of competition law, it is still a huge challenge for developing countries to reflect the aims and targets of competition law equivalent to those of developed countries. Since the developing world and the advanced world are not regarded as being on ‘equal footing’ in the level of development. The competition law system of the developed world has been entirely fashioned and progressed pursuant to competition-specific considerations and patterns in the line with international agreements and general growth of international economy whereas the developing world arrives at the urgency of globalisation through international commitments.

On the other hand, regarding the ICN report, ‘ensuring an effective competition process’ can be regarded ‘either as a goal as such or as a means to achieve other goals such as consumer welfare and efficiency’ as it has been recognised by 32 out of 33 agencies from both developed and developing countries as ‘a stand-alone’ to ‘achieve different and related competition law goals.’ Hence, the aspirations of ‘ensuring an effective competition process’ might be variedly discerned in developed and developing countries. In addition, with regard to conceivable vindications of convergence, it might be argued that the onset of competition law in developing countries is merely ‘the cut and paste’ strategy or legal transplant’ from developed countries to developing countries. The competition policies of the developing world have a Western-approach but they have different purposes in the context of competition. For instance, the competition policy of South Africa is on the far side of economic objectives when pondering non-economic objectives with the aims of ‘correcting social inequalities resulting from its history, promoting employment, advancing social and economic welfare, ensuring to SMEs an equitable opportunity to participate in the economy and increasing the economic opportunities of historically disadvantaged persons’. Another example is the Chinese Anti – Monopoly Law (AML), setting up benchmarks to focus on ‘national economic development’ with an uncertainty of how this ‘open criteria’ shall be interpreted. Accordingly, this has resulted in the issue of overriding nationalist protection of China in some cases, typically, in Coca Cola/Huiyuan; Mofcom, the Chinese merger control agency had blocked the merger between Coca Cola and Huiyuan with the core concern of consolidating domestic beverage manufacturers. Nonetheless, this decision has received heavy denunciation regarding its substance and the absence of translucency as argued in The Economist ‘The most benign interpretation of the rejection…is that it reflects a political response to critical comments by America’s new administration. The more worrying interpretation is that, even as China publicly urges other countries to commit to open their markets to Chinese investment and trade, it is imposing yet another barrier to outsiders.’

On the other hand, there has been an inclination of several developed economies demanding that developing countries adopt competition policy as a prerequisite for entering into bilateral free trade agreements. Thus, this might put the developing world in an exigent situation with more harm than good. The first obstruction for developing countries lies inherently in the role of government in the economy. Some developing countries’ governments may go beyond and extend their interference such as in cases of expropriation – stringent trade barriers, which might potentially pose risks towards the economy – instead of leaving economic affairs to be operated by private corporations according to principles of the market. Typically, the lack of credibility of commitments in both ‘vertical’ and ‘horizontal’ has entailed market failures, low standards of equilibria and output. Additionally, the reaction of major developing governments is trying to reduce by ‘self-help’ remedies which are superficially anti-competitive when the government’s capability of administration is circumscribed as its judges and regulators are prone to pressure and corruption.

In respect of governance, the lack of independence of competition authorities subsisting as ‘investigating’ authorities has been mirrored in several segments of the developing world. In particular, those organs in some developing countries have short-time proliferation and have insufficient powers to efficaciously exercise their duties to reach legally binding decisions. A good example is Conselbo Administrativo Defensa Economica (CADE), the competition agency of Brasil, which is accountable to investigate cases of cartel and abuses of dominance. Albeit the advent of the Competition Act, the Law 8884/94 demonstrated the conception of autarquia federal to dictate that CADE was dependent, some provisions of the law have sabotaged the independence of CADE. Specifically, its existence was merely two years, ostensibly short, which accordingly pressed it to seek political support in terms of re-designation. Additionally, CADE also received assistance from Economic Law Office (SDE), part of the Ministry of Justice, and a Secretariat of Economic Surveillance (SEAE), part of the Ministry Finance. Thereby, it is readily understood that member of the authorities like CADE are politically assigned, and obviously have standard duties falling outside the field of competition law.

In addition, the significant peculiarity of convergence in competition law is indicated by the extraterritorial assertion of jurisdiction with plentiful vindications of this appeared in the major parts of the advanced world such as EU and the American regimes. Notwithstanding, there are inherent difficulties derived from the heterogeneous enforcement, externally-based information gathering and the refusal and none of cooperation from foreign firms and foreign competition authorities. For instance, in the case of Genco/Lonhro, two South African undertakings were proscribed by the Commission for their dereliction of dominant duopoly (collective dominance) in the markets of platinum and rhodium. However, in Gencor v. Commission, Gencor alleged that the regulation of the Commission could not applicable to economic activity conducted in a non-member country and granted by the government of South Africa in addition to the contravention of the fundamental principle of territoriality pursuant to international law. In addition, the Commission did not have jurisdiction under the EU Merger Regulation to prohibit activities in South Africa which, furthermore, the Government there had approved. Moreover, even in the developed segments such as EU and the USA, a contradiction in decisions by the competition agencies is unavoidable. A good example is the case of Boeing/McDonnell Douglas merger which represents a conflict in the co-operation agreements in practice. More specifically, in this case, the FTC reached a majority in deciding not to oppose the merger between the two undertakings, while the European Commission seemed likely, at one point, to prohibit it in its entirety.

It is necessary that with the growth of ample transnational transactions, the desideratum of a general competition law is demanding. However, on the basis of mentioned analysis and evaluations, when adopting such a competition regime, the developing world as the latter is evidently confronting with hindrances in comparison to the former, the developed world. Hence, this still seemingly surrenders and impedes the adoption of a sturdy competition policy mechanism in the both advanced and developing countries.


Source: Road sign campaign against Female Genital Mutilation in Uganda by Amnon Shavit

-Nikita Beresford, (LLB Law, Newcastle University)

The first ever prosecutions for female genital mutilation (FGM) have been announced, 28 years after the offence was first specifically criminalised under Prohibition of Female Circumcision Act 1985. The act was replaced in 2003 with the Female Genital Mutilation Act without any prosecutions ever taking place. This decision is a positive step to combatting honour-based violence in Britain; it does not excuse the shocking record of past decades.


FGM is not a small-scale or trivial crime. The procedure can involve the full or partial excision of clitoris, labia minora or labia majora, and the subsequent sewing up of the vulva region, with only a small whole left for urine and menstrual blood. In the most extreme cases, women have to be cut open to allow for intercourse and childbirth, and are subsequently re-sewn. The physical risks include blood loss, shock, infection, urinary infections, abscesses and difficulties in passing menstrual blood, having intercourse, or giving birth. A 2007 study estimated that 23,000 girls resident in the UK under the age of 15 were at risk, while almost 66,000 women were already victims. More recent research indicates the number of at risk children could be much higher, more than double what was previously thought.


It is shameful that, given the number of potential victims, it is only now that the CPS has found a case in which it believes there is a reasonable chance of conviction. Offences of this nature are notoriously difficult to detect and investigate, with witnesses and victims unwilling to testify, and very few referrals being made to the police. But I share the sentiments of other bloggers that with so many instances of the crime, and the genital mutilation of young women itself being evidence of (at the very least) parental complicity, it is inconceivable that it has taken almost three decades to assemble enough evidence to go ahead with a prosecution. Hopefully the upcoming proceedings mark a watershed in public awareness and prosecutorial discretion, and in the future preventing and punishing FGM will be given the status it deserves.


The hearings of Dr Dharmasena, charged with committing an act of female genital mutilation, and Hasan Mohamed, who faces a charge of intentionally encouraging FGM, and a second charge of aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring an act of FGM, begin at Westminster Magistrates’ Court on April 15.


More information:

Forward UK – Key Issues – FGM

NHS Choice – Female Genital Mutilation





(Image Attribution: By adrian8_8 [CC-BY-2.0 (], via Wikimedia Commons)

– Keira Constable (LLB Law, Newcastle University)

With the 2014 Winter Olympics having just finished, I still wonder why the International Olympic Committee (IOC) chose to have these high-profile games in Sochi, Russia. Aside from the outrageous laws that were passed concerning gay propaganda, and the dangerously uncompleted accommodations for the press and tourists, Russia is still one of the largest source countries for trafficking in persons (TIP); specifically the trafficking of young women and girls. And while TIP occurs in every country around the world, Russia has been particularly lax in enforcing it’s laws on human trafficking, to the point where the U.S. Department of State’s Trafficking in Person’s Report 2012 labeled it as Tier 2 on the watch list, which basically means the country has legislation in place, but the current laws aren’t doing much to suppress TIP. I’m sure a country’s track record in combatting human trafficking doesn’t even appear on the radar when the IOC chooses where it will host the upcoming Olympic Games, perhaps it should be a factor for upcoming games.

Large international sporting events draw in massive amounts of people – athletes, media, and tourists alike. While tourist money does affect the local economy in many positive ways, it is also proven that tourist dollars can be used for evil, for instance, buying a pre-teen girl for a couple of hours; something that if one were to get caught doing in one’s home country, they would be criminally charged and thrown in jail. The sad fact of the matter is, sporting events such as the Olympics drive up the demand, and supply, of trafficked victims and if the host country’s TIP laws are already not up to international standards, how can we (the international community) help the victims of such a terrible crime, if we are the ones perpetuating the demand?

In 2000, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) created the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children which defined what TIP as the “recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.” (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2000) Russia signed the protocol in 2000 and ratified it into domestic law in 2004. This (relatively) quick ratification was probably due to the government knowledge of the widespread abject poverty after the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, which would lead people to try to make money by any means. Also, the lifting of the Iron Curtain freed the movement of peoples across former Soviet countries’ borders, either through legal or illegal means.

The Winter Olympic Games may not bring as many spectators as the Summer games, but they still bring a surge in tourism to the host city. In 2010, the Winter Olympic Games were hosted in the Canadian city of Vancouver, British Columbia where, according to the CBC (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation), “The [Canadian Tourism Commission] said the value of Canada’s tourism brand in 2010 was $132 billion, which it said was a 7.2 per cent increase compared with the pre-Olympics valuation.” (CBC, 2011) In countries with strict immigration laws, traffickers use these events as an easy way to obtain visas and masquerade their victims as spectators. (Hayes: Human Trafficking for Sexual Exploitation at World Sporting Event, 1106). But what about places like China, or Russia – two very significant source countries for human trafficking victims?

According to the Consortium for Applied Research on International Migration for the Eastern Neighbourhood of the European Union (CARIM-East) report on Russia, an estimated 30,000 to 60,000 women are trafficked out of Russia each year. This makes it one of the largest source countries on the planet. These women, for the most part, are trafficked into sexual slavery. While there is obviously no data to reflect the impact on sex trafficking in Russia in relation to the Winter Olympics as it is too early to tell, one can easily assume that traffickers would keep their girls local for the games. Not only is it less expensive for traffickers, since they don’t need to pay for plane tickets to send these women to another country, but they have thousands of people flocking to a country where sex laws are less strict than their own (for the most part) which drives the local demand way, way up, which, in turn, enables the traffickers to jack up the prices for pimping out these women – money that these women will never see themselves.

Taking all this into consideration, perhaps the IOC should start taking into account the impact that sex trafficking has on a country before that it is chosen to host one of the world’s biggest sporting events. While no country is immune to TIP, there could be bigger sanctions in place for those countries that fail to have proper legislation, or enforcement of existing legislation, concerning human trafficking, and are being considered to host an international sporting event. Despite the Olympics only just ending in Russia, from the notoriety of it being a source country, we can easily assume that the exploitation of women and children for sexual purposes in that country has  drastically increased this year due to the Olympics and its poor reputation in regards to TIP. From this, the IOC needs to look beyond the gold medals and the bright lights of the pistes and racetracks, to the broader impact the Olympics has on a host country and its people – namely, the women and children that fall prey to human traffickers and are sold to rich tourists to be used as sex slaves.



Image Source:

– Michael Keightley (LLB Law, Newcastle University)

First of all, it makes sense to start with some important statistics regarding judicial diversity in the last twelve years. Starting from April 2001 the percentage of women in the judiciary has increased from 14.1% to 24.3% by April 2013, with those of an ethnic minority in the judiciary increased from 1.9% in April 2001 to 4.8% in April 2013. This is a gradual increase over the past twelve years, but that is only a general average. Baroness Hale raises some more specific, and less positive, statistics: “only 26.6% of the upper tribunal judiciary are woman, though 11% are BME” and no BME or women are sitting as Court of Appeal judges, Heads of Division and there only one woman in the Supreme Court, which is Baroness Hale herself.

All of which begs the question: why is there such a lack of diversity in the judiciary? And does diversity even matter?

The lack of diversity is, obviously, a poor representation of the general population. Considering the judiciary are empowered to adjudicate upon and enforce constitutional principles, then they should both represent and uphold constitutional principles of diversity and equality. The duality between the representation of values and the upholding of values is crucial to the question of whether or not diversity in the judiciary really matters.

It is mere common sense that the judiciary should represent the constitutional principles they aim to enforce, or face the label of hypocrisy, with principles of equality and diversity being at the forefront when you consider the secular and diverse nature of the United Kingdom. However, what is more important than the face-value representation of equality and diversity is the enforcement of equality and diversity. For example, if there was a candidate for the position of a judge then merit would be the obvious primary influence upon the choice over gender or ethnicity. This is reflected in s.63 of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005, which states that selection must be based on merit and ‘good character’. However, considering the current lack of diversity in the judiciary, if two candidates were of equally ‘good character’ and one was a female of an ethnic minority and the other was a white male, it would be the constitutional duty of the selecting body to enforce the principles of diversity and give priority to the first candidate to promote judicial diversity. Sadly, the lines are not that clear-cut and the situation is simple in theory alone. But generally it is easy to conclude that even though both the representation and enforcement of equality and diversity are important, they are not of equal importance.

Although, this view is quite basic as it fails to consider further implications of a lack of judicial diversity and merely assumes that judicial diversity has no implications beyond that of the face-value representation in the courts. Keith Vaz, MP, argues the important point that “a more diverse judiciary would bring different perspectives to bear on the development of the law and to the concept of justice itself.” It would be nonsensical to ignore the fact that somebody’s social background can influence the development of the law; and that a diverse set of backgrounds is likely influence the development of the law in a more positive manner. It is important to recognise that generations of females and people from ethnic minorities may have “broken the glass ceiling, but to make this achievement worthwhile others have to follow and do better.” Both democracy and justice are perpetually evolving concepts, yet they will fail to develop at a satisfying rate if the judiciary that interprets and enforces the law does not do that to a standard that runs parallel to the standards the public expects. Thereby leading only to a serious risk of undermining public confidence in the courts if the judiciary is not diverse.

The problem itself needs to be traced back further than just to the selection process of the judiciary. There is a much more representative amount of both women and ethnic minorities graduating with degrees, with women often outweighing men in most universities. Not to mention, for law students, there are schemes offered by The Law Society offering various scholarships, the most relevant of which is the Diversity Access Scheme. This scheme helps provide financial assistance to those who have faced exceptional obstacles in the course of gaining a professional qualification and are wanting to fund their year doing the LPC or Bar. On the surface it appears that there is encouragement of diversity and the promotion of equality at a basic level. But somewhere in between university graduates and the judiciary members there is a significant dip in representation.

This leads to the conclusion of two broad theories. The first being that there is a lack of diversity within the judiciary because there are still structures such as the Old Boy’s Network that exist and consequently encourage the white, middle-class male figure to dominate the judiciary. The second, being the more positive theory, which is that the diverse nature of the judiciary is simply yet to fully develop as there have been developments in diversity; with 1.9% of the judiciary from an ethnic minority and 14.1% female in 2001, which has gradually increased to 4.2% and 22.6% respectively. There may be a simple answer for the lack of diversity and it is impossible to force such diversity to happen overnight.

This, by no means, an attempt to promote positive discrimination in order to improve the situation – which has actually been suggested as a strategy by Police Minister Damian Green to remedy the unrepresentative percentages in the police force (27.3% of police offices being female and 5% being from an ethnic minority) – such a consideration would undermine both the ideals of meritocracy and the genuine skill that the current members of the judiciary hold.

But when “an analysis of almost 13,000 case files found that the CPS was more likely to object to bail for male African Caribbeans (13.2%), compared with white men (9%)” then there is a genuine concern in the public over equal treatment; and this concern would likely see improvement if the judiciary that attempts to enforces such equality was more representative.

It is unclear whether there is a direct link with the enforcement of justice and the diversity of the judiciary, but what is and has always been clear, is that to not have (or not attempt to develop) a diverse and representative judiciary not only undermines public confidence, but undermines the equal justice that is being enforced. It is logically and obviously a constitutional issue when the public are not represented by the judicial bodies that are meant to assist them.