Rural England after Brexit – a moment of opportunity?

Posted on 18 December, 2017 by Fiona

Professor Mark Shucksmith OBE, Newcastle University

Brexit will have significant effects on rural areas of the UK, but the challenges and opportunities these bring for rural economies and societies have been little discussed beyond farming impacts. Leaving the EU will require new thinking in relation to agricultural and environmental policy but also for rural businesses, communities and services. What national policies for each of the devolved territories should replace these after Brexit? Could this offer an opportunity to introduce better rural policies, suited to 21^st Century rural potentials and challenges?

Rural policies in England, in particular, have been ripe for reform for many years[i]. Brexit could offer an unforeseen opportunity to rethink policy approaches. The Common Agricultural Policy will no longer apply, the Single Farm Payment and rural development funding such as LEADER will be swept away. Much is yet uncertain. Questions must be posed about what should replace the CAP, and much effort is being devoted to developing scenarios and alternative proposals for farm support and agri-environmental policy. But these questions should extend beyond agriculture, important though that is, because farming is now only a small part of the rural economy. And while most are no longer land-based, rural businesses make a substantial contribution to the national economy (19% of the country’s output comes from rural businesses). How then should rural businesses and rural communities be supported to give them the best chance of thriving and playing their full part in the future of the UK after we leave the EU? To help with this question let us consider two scenarios.

What could rural areas look like after Brexit?

2025 Scenario 1

Small businesses across rural England are struggling to survive as a result of what they describe as the ‘triple whammy’ of loss of markets due to export tariffs, skills shortages, and the closure of support schemes formerly funded by the EU’s regional policy and rural development policy. Farm families are hard hit, especially in upland areas such as our national parks and AONBs, by the loss of export markets and EU subsidies and by a reduction in opportunities to earn off-farm incomes. District, County and Unitary Councils lose funding as they are now reliant on Business Rates and Council Tax – services suffer. Environmental groups are concerned that land abandonment is damaging landscapes and habitats – tourism businesses suffer. Rural communities complain that the lengthy economic downturn and public spending cutbacks together with a failure to rural-proof national policies, are leading to losses of essential services, such as aspects of social care, health care, schools, leisure opportunities, shops and transport, with many voluntary and community organisations also having to close their services. Young people and older people requiring care face particular hardships. MPs representing rural constituencies are forming an all-party parliamentary group to promote the need for a coherent rural policy.

2025 Scenario 2

Small rural businesses are leading the economic recovery from the initial economic shock of leaving the EU. Aided by a national rural industrial strategy which recognises the economic potential of rural innovation and enterprise (including tourism and culture) and builds on lessons from the rural growth pilots, rural businesses are outperforming those in most cities. Farmers are adapting to the new trade deal with the EU and to new national support schemes which are better targeted toward provision of public goods such as landscape, wildlife, flood prevention and carbon sinks, and to diversifying income sources. Rural communities are thriving due to the growth in employment opportunities, renewed investment in affordable rural housing, and effective joint working between better-resourced and less financially challenged unitary, county, district and parish/town councils and community and voluntary organisations. These are all part of a new coherent rural strategy, agreed between central and local government and other key stakeholders, which is encouraging and enabling innovations in service and infrastructure provision, in planning and place-shaping, and in skills provision and business support. The OECD is sending a team of experts to study this successful approach so that other countries can learn from our experience.

What might be the elements of a successful, coherent rural strategy post-Brexit[ii]?

An asset-based, locally-led approach: In such an approach, place-based strategies are developed by local people collectively working with local councils as democratically elected, community leaders and deliverers of essential services but also involve external partners and networks. Primarily based on local assets and local knowledge, local groups also learn from one another through national and transnational networks, sharing ideas and know-how; and the necessary contribution of an enabling state in partnering, capacity-building and setting an enabling framework is also recognised[iii]. Without this, inequalities will grow between places – a recipe for a two-speed countryside.

A Rural Industrial Strategy: A crucial part of the enabling framework for rural entrepreneurial potential[iv] to be fulfilled, contributing to national productivity, growth and innovation, is an Industrial Strategy that encourages rural businesses and builds on learning from the rural growth networks. This does not just mean rural-proofing the recently proposed Industrial Strategy, vital though that is, but the adoption of an approach which has rural circumstances at its heart – a Rural Industrial Strategy. This would reflect the characteristics and contexts faced by rural businesses (typically microbusinesses, often home-based), addressing skills and training, business support, infrastructure, planning and finance – taking ideas both from the Rural Productivity Plan 2015 and from EU schemes such as the RDPE, LEADER and Objective 1 and 5b. Each LEP would be required to address rural issues through properly funded Rural Action Plans, informed by this Strategy.

A Rural Communities Strategy: Rural life opportunities and thriving communities are also core elements in such a vision. DEFRA Ministers have spoken of their determination to “keep our villages thriving and growing” and to ensure “people living in our market towns and villages have the same life opportunities as those who live in our cities” – something which is a statutory right in Norway[v] but is lacking in rural Britain[vi]. Rural citizens should expect a fair deal for rural communities – i.e. fair outcomes including access to services which meet needs; transparent decisions based on evidence; equal opportunities to participate in society; and a fair hearing and an effective voice in decision-making. The government’s allocation of resources to local authorities and other providers should reflect the additional costs of delivering services in rural areas and the extra time and cost for citizens of reaching distant, centralised services. This requires investment and innovation in the provision of affordable housing[vii], public spaces, connectivity, social care, health care and schools, among other essential services – often in partnership between public, private and VCSE sectors. There is much innovative practice to draw on[viii] but this is hampered by underfunding.

These two strategies could be underpinned by a Rural Social Innovation Fund, recapturing the creativity and capacity-building of early LEADER programmes, administered through local partnerships of councils and RCCs. The purpose would be to build capacity through animation, facilitation and knowledge exchange and to promote social innovation in service provision and social enterprise. Social innovation is increasingly recognised as a vital ingredient of dynamic economies and as a means of addressing the challenges of service provision in rural areas. In urban policy social innovation is well established in terms of a ‘quadruple helix’ of open cooperation and interaction between public authorities, private businesses, universities and citizens towards smart, sustainable and inclusive growth. International research[ix] suggests that rural regions may benefit even more from such models of open innovation. These would require a new social partnership operating transparently at multiple scales between public authorities, private businesses, universities and the citizens and voluntary and community organisations of rural areas.

Affordable rural housing: There is recognition at last of the urgency of addressing housing issues nationally, but in rural areas homes are even less affordable and there is much less social housing to rent[x], such that housing opportunities for even middle income households are very restricted. The Government’s affordable rural housing target should be reinstated with necessary budget and cross-subsidy provisions, alongside incentives to landowners to release exception sites, accompanied by powers for councils and housing associations to build small rural schemes exempt from the right to buy. The right to buy, mandatory or voluntary, should not apply in rural areas where unmet demand and need exceeds supply over the medium to long term.

Public goods and market failure: The British countryside contains iconic landscapes, precious habitats, flora and fauna, beloved cultural legacies – indeed a wealth of natural and cultural assets which depend on land management often without any market revenue. These public goods are highly valued by millions of people, as well as helping to support a low carbon future and green economy[xi]. Prince Charles, among others, has argued that the countryside is like a delicately woven tapestry, where land, farmers and communities are inextricably intertwined and may easily unravel. Their stewardship therefore requires targeted incentives and rewards for appropriate land management (within the constraints of WTO rules) alongside sustainable rural communities.

Coherent rural policy and implementation: Rural policy in each of the devolved nations necessarily reaches across the portfolios of many government departments, creating challenges of co-ordination, responsibility and accountability. None of the ten actions in the Treasury/DEFRA Rural Productivity Plan[xii] were DEFRA responsibilities, for example, although rural policy is scrutinised by the EFRA Select Committee which expressed its misgivings about the lack of co-ordination of rural policy in its report Rural Communities (2013). Since then the post of Rural Advocate and DEFRA’s Rural Community Policy Unit have been abolished, although a DEFRA Minister has the title of Rural Ambassador. Each of the devolved nations has developed their own approach to rural-proofing[xiii], but research suggests that a prerequisite for effective rural proofing is a coherent national rural policy which extends across all the departments of Government[xiv] .

The question remains of how best to ensure rural policy co-ordination:

Across central government departments (leadership; rural-proofing[xv])
Partnerships between local and central government (an England-wide ‘rural deal’?)
At local level (subsidiarity and partnership with VCSEs)

Above all a New Coherent Rural Vision and Strategy is essential, agreed between all departments of central government, local government and other key stakeholders. This should enable realisation of the latent potential of rural economies and a fair deal for rural communities. It would include coherent leadership from within central government alongside an England-wide “rural deal” which shares power, resources and responsibility with local government and communities through a framework of devolution and capacity building.

[i] http://www.ippr.org/files/uploadedFiles/ipprnorth/events/rural_agenda_-_exec_summary.pdf

[ii] See also CRE (2017) After Brexit: 10 key questions for rural policy. http://www.ncl.ac.uk/media/wwwnclacuk/centreforruraleconomy/files/CRE_10_Key_Questions_final.pdf

[iii] Shucksmith (2012) Future Directions in Rural Development, Carnegie UK Trust.

[iv] Phillipson et al (2017) Small rural firms in English regions: analysis of UK longitudinal business survey, CRE

[v] Shortall S and Alston M (2016) To Rural Proof or Not to Rural Proof? A Comparative Analysis, Politics and Policy, 44, 1, 35-55

[vi] Social Mobility in Great Britain, 2017. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/662744/State_of_the_Nation_2017_-_Social_Mobility_in_Great_Britain.pdf

[vii] Rural Housing Policy Review, 2015.

[viii] CRE (2015) Reimagining the rural: What’s missing in rural policy? CRE

[ix] Kolehmainen et el (2015); Nordberg 2013)

[x] ACRE Rural Housing Position Paper, 2017 http://www.acre.org.uk/cms/resources/policy-papers/housing-position-paper-final-a4-pages.pdf

[xi] Commission for Rural Communities (2010) High Ground, High Potential, CRC.

[xii] HM Treasury/DEFRA Rural Productivity Plan, 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/454866/10-point-plan-rural-productivity-pb14335.pdf

[xiii] Shortall (2017) Rural-proofing: magic bullet or rural vote catcher? Newcastle University Institute for Social Renewal https://blogs.ncl.ac.uk/nisr/rural-proofing-magic-bullet-or-rural-vote-catcher/

[xiv] Shortall S and Alston M (2016) To Rural Proof or Not to Rural Proof? A Comparative Analysis, Politics and Policy, 44, 1, 35-55

[xv] https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/rural-proofing

Are There Lessons from Turnout at the Local Elections?

Posted on 9 May, 2017 by Fiona

Dr. Alistair Clark is Senior Lecturer in Politics at Newcastle University. He has written widely on political parties and elections, and has covered Scottish local elections since 2003. His current research includes electoral integrity and parliamentary standards. This blog was originally published on the Centre for Constitutional Change website.

Amid all the spin and recriminations about the results of the Scottish local elections, one story has barely been touched upon. This is that despite all the pessimism about participation, turnout for the council contest was up significantly to 46.9% from 39.6% in 2012. This was the highest turnout for standalone Scottish council elections for several decades. By contrast, the turnout for the six new Metro Mayors elected in England was poor for such a flagship piece of the UK government’s devolution agenda in England. Tees Valley recorded a turnout rate of only 21%, the West of England and Greater Manchester contests achieved 29% and only 27% of voters went to the polls in the West Midlands.

There had been concern about turnout amongst Scottish policymakers prior to the elections. Local elections are low participation and low information second order contests. In the aftermath of the 2012 elections, the Scottish Parliament’s Local Government and Regeneration Committee held an enquiry into low turnout, among other things (which, for disclosure, the present author gave two rounds of evidence to). This exercise was recently repeated with the Committee hosting a roundtable debate on turnout prior to the 2017 contests. Many would have been pushed to know there was an election on however. Most Scottish councils actually go so far as to ban campaign posters on council property (i.e. lampposts), which hardly help underline the importance of local issues.

In the event, turnout was high for local elections at 46.9%. Nine of Scotland’s 32 councils actually broke the 50% benchmark, with East Renfrewshire performing best at 57.8% (+9.4%), and Edinburgh Council just getting over that hurdle at 50.5% (+7.9%). There were some significant rises, with Aberdeen, East Dunbartonshire, and Scottish Borders all recording an increase of 10% or more, and eight others recording between 8-10% rises. In only three councils did turnout fall. Argyll and Bute recorded a 1.7% drop, while Orkney fell by 7.4% and, most strikingly, Shetland Islands declined by 13.5% to 41.2%. Only one council, Glasgow, at 39%, recorded turnout below 40%, although this was still up by 6.8% on 2012.

These figures are impressive for local elections, given that they were being held as standalone contests not combined with election to any other level of government. Equivalent local contests in England are often lucky to achieve around a third of the vote if held alone. It raises a number of questions however. Firstly, why did turnout rise? There are three likely reasons. It is a legacy of the high levels of registration and participation seen in the Indyref in 2014. A general election in June called by a pro-Brexit Prime Minister has undoubtedly heightened the political atmosphere, as has Nicola Sturgeon’s push for a second Independence referendum. Consequently, it is also likely to be a reflection of the polarisation between the SNP and ongoing revival of the Scottish Conservatives over the constitutional issue. The council elections were a proxy for this. Motivated voters turnout, and voters have undoubtedly been motivated by this question. Give voters something important to vote for and many will do so, even if this is not necessarily directly related to the issue at hand – running local services in this case.

Secondly, what does this mean for the general election in June? In particular, which party is likely to get its vote out on the day more efficiently? Differential turnout will be key. Former Scottish government Minister Marco Biagi suggested in a Tweet over the weekend that the pro-Independence parties (SNP and Greens) did less well at getting their vote out than the Unionist parties. More research needs done into this, but that Yes-voting Glasgow’s turnout was so low, and the formerly, and now once again, Conservative voting areas of Aberdeenshire, Perth and Kinross and the Borders recorded between 9 and 10% rises suggests there may be something to this. Higher turnout did seem to benefit the Conservatives, primarily at Labour’s expense, even in Glasgow.

Given the threat from the Conservative Party that has been talked up recently, the SNP will no doubt want to ensure that, if this explanation is correct, their sizeable army of activists is motivated for a considerable get out the vote (GOTV) operation and that they do so effectively. The local elections will act as a wake-up call for them. The Conservatives do not have the same number of activists but they will be well resourced, motivated and will likely target seriously narrowly a small number of potentially winnable constituencies since there are no prizes for coming second under first past the post.

Thirdly, why was turnout higher in Scotland than in what were also constitutionally important elections to the Metro Mayors in England? I have argued elsewhere that the UK government needed to do much more to engage the public with these new positions. As we have seen in places such as Hartlepool and Stoke on Trent, both of which had elected Mayors but voted to give them up, the devolution agenda can go into reverse if the public are not suitably engaged with important positions with significant powers. The broader lesson from Scotland is that engaging voters can work.

Rather than having election fatigue, Scotland’s political engagement seems to remain high in the run up to the general election, as demonstrated by turnout in the 2017 council elections. If people had been fed up of elections, participation would have been lower. The results will motivate both the SNP and the Conservatives, the SNP because they are defending so many seats, the Conservatives because there would be considerable pride in becoming Scotland’s second party at Westminster and taking the shine off the SNP’s dominance. Turnout will certainly be higher in the general election, although whether it hits 71% as it did in 2015 remains to be seen. What also remains to be seen is just who that higher turnout will benefit.

This blog originally appeared on the Centre for Constitutional Change website.

To manage or not to manage: What next for our ‘wild’ uplands?

Posted on 22 September, 2016 by Fiona

On 14 July 2016, the Prime Minister Theresa May announced her new Cabinet, following a significant reshuffle and re-structure of Government. In this context, researchers from all over Newcastle University express their thoughts on the challenges and opportunities for the Government in the Ideas for May’s Ministers blog series, considering how individuals, communities and societies can thrive in times of rapid, transformational change. Professor Mark Reed is the N8 Professor of Socio-Technical Innovation at Newcastle University, funded through the Agri-Food Resilience Programme, and a Professor in the Institute for Agri-Food Research & Innovation and Centre for Rural Economy at Newcastle University. Download his policy brief on this subject.

To: Andrea Leadsom, Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs
From: Professor Mark Reed, Newcastle School of Agriculture, Food and Rural Development

Depending on the policy decisions made in the next weeks and months, we may be about to embark of one of the biggest ‘experiments’ our country has ever known.

It will affect the UK’s rural communities, environment, water supplies, wildlife, recreation and cultural heritage and the consequences of getting it wrong are unthinkable.

And the question? In light of Brexit and the inevitable changes to funding, do we continue to actively manage the peatlands of upland Britain?

There are so many unknowns, how we take this forward is still up for debate. What is certain is that we can’t do nothing.

Without support, historically degraded peatlands in our uplands will continue to deteriorate, losing biodiversity as well as vast quantities of carbon to the atmosphere, degrading water quality and imposing higher water treatment costs on water companies, and subsequently on consumers.

The UK Government has argued consistently for the EU’s bloated Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) to be slimmed down but as yet there have been no indications whether farmers will receive less after the current guarantee on payments runs out in 2020.

Almost 40% of the EU’s budget is devoted to the CAP, which is designed to provide stable, sustainable and safe food supplies, whilst maintaining farm incomes.

If there is a reduction in funding, then there is a good chance that farmers in the lowlands will adapt, as long as there are favorable trade deals.

However, a small change in payments could have a significant impact on the viability of land management operations across many UK uplands, given the precarious nature of many upland enterprises that currently depend on EU subsidies.

Leaving aside the wider political arguments, the withdrawal of the UK from the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy after Brexit represents an opportunity to develop new agricultural policies that are better value for taxpayers, protect nature and support rural communities. We have a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to change the basis on which we pay farmers and others who manage our land, to reward them for the environmental benefits that we all depend on, but often take for granted.

Peatlands represent an important opportunity for this new approach, given the considerable benefits provided by these habitats to the UK.

Research into post-Brexit policy options on peatlands, a large portion of our uplands, leads me to two key conclusions:

There is strong evidence that paying for restoration and active management for conservation could provide benefits for wildlife, water quality, reduced flooding and climate. Meanwhile, we know little about the effects of large-scale withdrawal of management from peatlands.
There is uncertain and often-contested evidence over the potential effects of policies that lead to a large-scale, significant reduction in active management. Taking, a Precautionary Approach would retain farm incomes but provide a renewed focus on the delivery of wider public benefits.

My idea for Andrea Leadsom MP (Environment Secretary) is that refocusing increased funding on restoration and environmental management could provide multiple benefits:

Damaged peatlands would be restored, providing benefits for climate, water quality and wildlife that depend on healthy peat bogs;
Recovery of native woodlands through targeted expansion on non-peat soils (e.g. in valley bottoms between deep peat areas), to provide biodiversity and wider benefits including shelter for livestock, reduce soil erosion and flood management benefits; and
Many of the jobs, rural communities and cultural heritage associated with peatland management would be retained.

In this way, we can support rural communities whilst restoring and improving our largest semi-natural environment, delivering more benefits for everyone in society than we currently get from the money we spend on peatlands through the Common Agricultural Policy.

Download Professor Mark Reed’s policy brief on this subject.

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